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Abstract
Thesis Title: Network-oriented Load Control for SS.7/IN
A uthor: Brendan Jennings
Intelligent Network (IN) systems are today the prevalent means of providing services based on 
manipulation o f voice call set-up in the public telecommunications infrastructure. As INs are 
evolving into more dynamic and open service delivery platforms, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to dimension them to meet the performance requirements of a dynamically changing set 
o f services. This is leaving networks more susceptible to overloads, which result in end-user 
dissatisfaction and revenue loss for the operator. In this context, load control strategies that 
protect against harmful overloads, are of critical importance.
Load control in IN systems and underlying Signalling System No.7 (SS.7) networks is 
characterised by node-oriented strategies centred on the protection o f individual network 
resources, without regard to overall network performance. We argue that, given current and 
future increases in number and usage of IN services, node-oriented load controls cannot 
guarantee that desired performance levels are consistently achieved. Instead, we advocate 
adoption o f network-oriented approaches that seek to optimise the usage of network resources 
from a global, rather then localised, perspective.
We first present a detailed analysis of standard SS.7 and IN node-oriented controls that 
demonstrates their inherent flaws and shows that they can interact poorly when invoked 
simultaneously. We then specify a load control that is based on explicit allocation o f critical 
resources in a profit-optimal manner and that employs a token-based paradigm. This strategy is 
shown to perform at least as well as two node-oriented strategies in the context of controlling a 
single IN Service Control Point (SCP). More significantly, we introduce strategy enhancements 
that provide the following: co-ordinated, profit-optimal control over multiple resource types of 
varying characteristics; minimisation of the load o f the SS.7 network; and reaction to SS.7 
overloads or equipment failures. The enhanced strategy represents a highly efficient and flexible 
network-oriented control solution for SS.7/IN.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
CHAPTER 1
I n t r o d u c t io n
Recent years have seen a huge increase in the penetration o f desktop computing in homes and 
businesses world-wide. This has been fuelled to a large part by the success o f the Internet, 
which has, amongst other things, demonstrated the immense commercial potential o f advanced 
multimedia services. Exposure to the Internet has raised expectations o f the services offered by 
the public telecommunications infrastructure. End-users anticipate that video telephony, 
interactive multi-user games, e-commerce applications and a wide range o f other complex 
services, will soon be available at low-cost and regardless of physical location or terminal 
equipment capabilities. W hilst the main technological components required to realise this vision 
are available, there remains significant technical, regulatory and economic challenges in 
deploying these components in a manner that meets the demands of a volatile and highly 
competitive market.
As the level o f interconnection between fixed, mobile, Internet and enterprise networks grows, a 
key component in ensuring their ongoing success will be the availability o f a common platform 
for the delivery of advanced communications services. Today the Intelligent Network (IN) is the 
prevalent means o f realising services based on manipulation of voice call set-up and is widely 
viewed as a starting point for the integrated service delivery platform of the future. Some widely 
used IN-based services are Freephone, Prepaid, Televoting and Number Portability.
IN-based services are executed under the control of service logic residing in a dedicated 
network node called a Service Control Point (SCP). End-user requests for IN services are 
detected at network switches, known as Service Switching Points (SSPs), which pass them on to 
an SCP for service execution. In providing services, SCPs may be assisted by Service Data 
Points (SDPs), which house databases containing service and end-user data, and Intelligent 
Peripherals (IPs), which provide automated announcements and digit collection. 
Communication between the various IN network elements is facilitated by the highly reliable 
and robust Signalling System No. 7 (SS. 7) network. The cornerstone of the IN concept is the 
separation o f service logic from the network switches. This separation has the advantages o f
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greatly reducing the time from service conception to deployment, decreasing the dependence of 
network operators on particular switch vendors and increasing the potential for the provision of 
services by third party providers.
As network operators are increasing the range of IN services they themselves offer and also 
opening their networks to other service providers, the task of managing network resources so 
that end-users receive acceptable quality-of-service is becoming problematic. In particular, it is 
extremely difficult to plan and dimension networks that can consistently meet the performance 
requirements of a dynamically changing set of complex services and their associated resource 
usage demands. For this reason INs are becoming more susceptible to overload, the situation 
where the traffic load offered to one or more network resources exceeds the resource’s capacity 
to process that traffic in a timely manner. Overloads significantly degrade service session 
completion rates and result not only in lost revenue for the operator, but also in high levels o f 
end-user dissatisfaction. The latter is very significant in a deregulated market, where end-user 
perceived quality-of-service can be an important differentiator between competing service 
providers.
In a rapidly evolving IN environment it is important to employ efficient and flexible load 
control strategies, which provide automatic detection o f overload with some means o f 
re-routing or reducing the traffic offered to affected resources, or take measures to actually 
prevent the overload onset. Currently deployed IN load control strategies are node-oriented  in 
nature, being designed to protect individual network nodes during overload. Given current and 
future increases in the number and usage of IN services we argue that node-oriented strategies 
alone cannot guarantee that IN performance targets are consistently achieved. Because of their 
localised nature they are not able to control traffic in a manner that is optimal from the 
perspective of the whole network. In addition, individual node-oriented controls tend not to 
interact effectively with each other, so that often they become ineffectual, or even cause the 
propagation of overload to previously unaffected network resources.
The objectives o f this thesis are to demonstrate the poor performance o f standard SS.7/IN 
node-oriented load controls and to specify and evaluate a network-oriented IN load control 
strategy, which seeks to optimise the resource usage in the network as a whole, rather then on a 
localised basis. The strategy we propose provides for co-ordinated, profit-optimal control of 
multiple IN resources and protection against overloads in the SS.7 network. We believe it 
provides the foundation for a managed load control facility capable o f optimising the 
performance of existing and future IN-based service platforms.
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1.1 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis makes contributions in the research area o f load control for distributed 
telecommunications systems. Specifically, it addresses load control in SS.7/IN environments, 
demonstrating both the drawbacks of current approaches and the potential benefits o f adopting 
well-designed network-oriented strategies. The main contributions are:
•  A comprehensive examination and appraisal o f the performance o f currently deployed SS.7
and IN load control strategies, incorporating:
-  A survey o f the public literature relating to aspects of the operation and performance of 
load control strategies for SS.7 and IN, together with an indication o f some issues not 
addressed therein;
-  An analysis o f the operation of the standard SS.7 and IN load controls, using 
quasi-analytic and simulation models employing an SS.7/IN network topology that is 
more realistic then those employed in models described in the literature. The models are 
used to investigate in detail some aspects o f control operation not addressed in previous 
studies;
-  An analysis o f the interaction between SS.7 and IN load controls in the presence of 
various combinations o f SS.7 and IN resource overloads;
-  An outline o f a quasi-analytic modelling approach for the transient analysis o f SS.7/IN 
load controls in the context of realistic network topologies. The approach is a significant 
enhancement o f an approach originally described by [Zepf and Willmann, 1991];
•  A new framework for network-oriented IN load control, founded on the use o f a
token-based paradigm for governing the allocation of network resources, incorporating:
-  A base strategy for SCP load control by means of explicit, profit-optimal allocation of 
processing capacity (in the form of tokens) to multiple SSPs. Also provided is a detailed 
comparative analysis o f the performance o f this strategy with two other SCP controls;
-  Enhancements to the base strategy that facilitate centralised, distributed or distributed 
hierarchical load control o f multiple SCPs of varying processing characteristics and 
supported service mix (we refer to these as heterogeneous SCPs);
-  Enhancements to the base strategy that facilitate co-ordinated, profit-optimal load 
control o f multiple SCPs and SDPs, together with an indication o f how the strategy 
could be further enhanced to provide control over other resource types;
-  Enhancements to the base strategy that optimise the routing o f service requests to 
minimise SS.7 network load and react to the onset of SS.7 resource overload;
-  An outline o f how the framework could be further developed and applied to load control 
problems in other application domains.
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1.2 MAIN CONCLUSIONS
The overriding conclusion o f this thesis is that standard node-oriented SS.7/IN load control
strategies are seriously flawed and that a network-oriented approach, such as the proposed
token-based strategy, offers a more optimal, robust and flexible solution. In some more detail
the main conclusions are:
• Standard SS.7 and IN load controls are badly designed, in that they fail to provide adequate 
protection during overload and are unfair in their treatment o f different service types. This is 
due to their reactive nature, reliance on statically-defined control parameters and inability to 
make globally optimal load control decisions;
• The proposed token-based SCP load control strategy protects, in a profit-optimal manner, 
individual SCPs from overload. The strategy is predicated on the explicit allocation o f  SCP 
processing capacity, which ensures that pre-specified target utilisation is never exceeded. 
Allocation o f processing capacity is based on service specific profit ratings, thus more 
valuable services (from the network operator’s viewpoint) are protected during periods of 
high load. The token-based strategy performs significantly better then a widely-deployed 
node-oriented strategy and at least as well as a similar profit-optimising control;
• The token-based strategy can provide globally co-ordinated load control for INs containing 
multiple SCPs o f varying processing characteristics. In doing so it provides a means to 
introduce the dynamic routing o f service requests by SSPs to any SCP, whilst 
simultaneously ensuring that SCP overloads do not occur. Realisations o f the strategy can 
be structured to mirror the topology o f large-scale INs;
• The token-based strategy can take into account that different types o f resource will become 
the system bottleneck in different traffic conditions. The strategy adapts its behaviour to 
protect different types o f resource by explicitly allocating tokens for each type o f resource 
required for the successful completion o f a service session;
• The pheromone-based SCP selection and delay-based load throttling enhancements to the 
token-based strategy respectively provide an effective means to minimise the IN signalling 
load carried by the SS.7 network and the capability to react to the onset o f resource failures 
or overloads in the SS.7 network;
• Tokens provide an understandable and useful non-technical abstraction o f the operation of 
load control in the IN. For example, the allocation o f tokens can be directly related to 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) agreed between a network operator and the customers on 
the behalf o f which particular IN services are offered;
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1.3 THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter 2 places in context the work described in this thesis. It commences by introducing the 
àrea of load control in distributed telecommunications systems, outlining the reasons why load 
controls are required, standard methods of load control and the attributes o f an ideal control. 
Brief introductions to the structure and operation o f SS.7 and IN, with particular emphasis on 
deployed and proposed load controls, are then provided. This is followed by a comprehensive 
overview of the public literature in the area of SS.7/IN load control. The chapter concludes with 
an identification o f open research issues, together with a justification for the research work 
undertaken.
Chapter 3 provides background information on the various methods and paradigms required for 
a full understanding o f both the simulation/analytic models and the load control strategies 
described in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 presents the results o f a detailed analysis o f the operation o f standard SS.7 and IN 
load control strategies. It commences by introducing the SS.7/IN network topology used in the 
study and proceeds to describe the quasi-analytic and simulation models o f this network. Seven 
separate overload scenarios are investigated, involving the overload o f various subsets of 
network resources. Through these scenarios both the independent and combined operation of
SS.7 and IN plane controls is examined. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
limitations o f currently deployed controls and a discussion of what attributes a new control 
strategy must possess in order to avoid similar drawbacks.
Chapter 5 presents the base version of the token-based load control strategy. This version 
provides control over a single SCP, by periodically calculating and sending allocations o f tokens 
to SSPs, which use them to control the number of accepted service requests. Performance of the 
strategy is compared with that o f the Automatic Call Gapping (ACG) control and another 
proposed strategy that employs mathematical optimisation.
Chapter 6 presents and analyses three major enhancements to the token-based strategy. The first 
allows for profit-optimal control o f an IN containing multiple, possibly heterogeneous, SCPs. 
This enhancement provides a co-ordinated means o f introducing the dynamic routing o f service 
requests by SSPs to more than one of the SCPs in the network. The second enhancement 
involves the profit-optimal control o f multiple resource types. Finally a strategy enhancement 
that takes into account the potential for SS.7 overloads is presented. In this enhancement SSP 
round-trip delay measurements for messages sent to SCPs are used to select favourable SCPs in 
order to minimise SS.7 network load and to react to failures or overloads.
Chapter 7 summarises the main results of the work, discusses issues relating to implementation 
of the token-based strategy in a real IN, outlines other potential applications o f the strategy and 
identifies directions for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
B a c k g r o u n d  I n f o r m a t io n  a n d  L it e r a t u r e  
R e v ie w
In this chapter we provide a brief overview of the state-of-the-art regarding load control in the 
signalling-plane o f public telephony networks. §2.1 discusses the importance o f load control and 
outlines the necessary characteristics of a network-oriented load control strategy. §2.2 and §2.3 
provide an overview o f SS.7 and IN respectively, focussing in particular on the load control 
strategies employed in each. §2.4 then provides a comprehensive review o f the publicly 
available literature relating to the SS.7 and IN controls. Finally, §2.5 draws conclusions from 
the literature review and outlines the approach described in the remainder o f the thesis.
2.1 LOAD CONTROL IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
NETWORKS
All communications systems and networks have a finite capacity that limits the volume of 
traffic (telephone calls, file transfers etc.) they can successfully process within a given time 
period. In situations where the usage of the network by end-users is higher then normal the 
traffic arrival rate may exceed the maximum service rate. This situation is referred to as an 
overload. In this thesis we deal with (public) telecommunications networks supporting services 
involving an end-user initiating a voice communication with one or more other end-users or 
automated announcement facilities. Typically overloads o f these networks occur due to either 
equipment failures or mass call-in events (triggered by mass media stimulated competitions and 
telephone polls), during which a large segment of the population initiates calls to a single 
number within a short time-span.
In realising telephony services, control information must be passed between various nodes in the 
network. During an overload the messages carrying this information encounter overloaded 
network resources and are queued in input buffers. Queuing increases delays, which, in 
sustained overloads, often grow to the degree that end-users abandon their service attempts. 
Messages relating to abandoned requests remain in the network and, since they do not result in
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revenue for the network operator, waste processing resources that could otherwise be spent 
profitably. Furthermore, end-users tend to reattempt earlier abandoned service requests, which 
increases offered load and therefore delays, leading to an even higher abandonment rate. This 
results in positive feedback, resulting in all network resources being fully utilised but the 
amount o f utilisation relating to useful work, termed throughput, rapidly approaching zero.
As described above, overloads degrade network throughput, which is highly undesirable from 
the point o f view of both the end-user and the network operator. Therefore, it is essential that 
steps be taken to minimise the impact they have on network performance. Load Control refers 
to strategies and mechanisms used to manage network traffic so that network resources are 
efficiently used and service completion rates are maximised in all traffic conditions, in 
particular during overload. A broad spectrum of load controls have been proposed and 
implemented. In general they employ one or more of the following techniques:
• Message Dropping: Messages are dropped without notifying their originator. For example, 
messages arriving to a full queue are often dropped, as are messages that have been stored 
in a queue for an unacceptable delay. This technique is generally only efficient during short 
periods of overload, since during sustained overload, reattempts resulting from prematurely 
terminated sessions will tend to further exacerbate and prolong the overload;
• Reactive Control'. An overloaded resource employs an overload detection algorithm that 
explicitly notifies the originators of message traffic when it detects overload onset. The 
intention is that the traffic originators will respond by reducing traffic towards the affected 
resource;
• Message Throttling: Messages are rejected (or throttled) if  certain requisites are fulfilled. 
Throttles generally reside at the point o f ingress of service requests into the network and are 
invoked in response to overload indications from affected resources and/or on the basis o f 
locally-available measurements. Throttles are generally progressive in nature, rejecting an 
increasing proportion o f requests as the overload situation grows in severity;
• Prioritisation: Messages may be assigned priorities on the basis of their relative 
importance, the intention being that throttles will initially react to overload by throttling the 
least important messages, with higher priority messages being affected only as a last resort. 
Typically messages relating to ongoing service sessions are given priority over initial 
service requests, in order to avoid termination of ongoing sessions;
• Alternative Routing: Networks are generally designed to ensure that more than one 
communication path exists between all pairs o f nodes. During an overload it m ay then be 
possible to route messages over an alternative path, thereby bypassing the affected part of 
the network.
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Traditionally, load control strategies have been node-oriented in nature; that is, they focus on 
protecting individual network nodes from overload. We argue that, given the current trend 
towards more open and dynamic networks, node-oriented strategies alone cannot guarantee that 
desired performance levels are consistently achieved. In particular, node-oriented strategies 
cannot control traffic in a manner such that overall network throughput is maximised, or ensure 
that network operator goals like profit maximisation and protection o f important services are 
achieved. Moreover, node-oriented controls have in certain scenarios been shown to further 
worsen an overload situation by interacting badly with each other and causing overload 
propagation [Houck et al., 1994; Atai and Northcote, 1996]. We focus instead on the 
development o f network-oriented load controls, in which control decisions are co-ordinated 
throughout the network in order to achieve globally-optimal resource utilisation. More 
specifically, an ideal network-oriented load control strategy will satisfy the following generic 
requirements:
1. Optimality
The optimality o f a strategy refers to its ability to allocate network resources in a manner 
that maximises some global measure o f network performance. We use profit as a global 
measure, since it encapsulates the relative importance o f services to the network operator;
2. Efficiency
The efficiency o f a strategy refers to its ability to maintain resource throughput at the 
maximum allowed level during overload. In addition, an efficient strategy will place 
minimal overhead on critical network resources;
3. Robustness
The robustness o f a strategy refers to its ability to provide optimal and efficient control in 
the face o f changes in network state and varying input traffic profiles;
4. Scalability
The scalability o f a strategy refers to its ability to provide optimal and efficient control in 
different networks, regardless of their size or topology;
5. Responsiveness
The responsiveness o f a strategy refers to its ability to react rapidly to changes in offered 
traffic levels;
6. Stability
The stability o f a strategy refers to its ability to behave in a controlled manner: its operation 
should not result in fluctuations or oscillation in resource utilisation;
7. Fairness
The fairness o f a strategy refers to its ability to distribute resources to service requests in ‘a 
fair manner.’ The interpretation o f ‘a fair manner’ is contentious. For example, a fair
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strategy has been defined variously as one in which the probability of rejection is the same 
for all end-users, regardless of location [Lodge, 2000] or as one in which only those services 
causing an overload should be throttled [Tsolas, 1992];
8. Simplicity
The simplicity o f a strategy refers both to the ease which the strategy can be understood and 
to the ease with which it can be implemented and administered.
2.2 SIGNALLING SYSTEM NO.7 (SS.7)
Signalling in telecommunications networks consist o f communications between customer 
premises equipment, switches, network-based servers and databases, to manage and complete 
end-user service sessions. The signalling protocols typically used by telecommunications 
network operators and equipment vendors for communications between the various core 
network elements are those standardised by the ITU: the Common Channel Signalling System  
No. 7 (SS.71)  protocol suite [ITU, 1993a],
The SS.7 signalling network can be viewed as a packet-switched data network overlaid on the 
switched voice-circuit network. As illustrated by Figure 2.1, an SS.7 network consists o f 
Signalling Points (SPs) and Signalling Transfer Points (STPs), connected together by Signalling 
Links. SPs correspond to the switching exchanges in the switched circuit network and to other 
elements such as network databases or management centres. STPs are packet switches which 
route signalling messages towards their destination SP.
SS.7 specifications mandate that an SS.7 network meets stringent availability targets, for 
example the maximum allowed downtime for signalling routes is 10 minutes per year. To meet 
these targets SS.7 networks must be very robust to failures, so they are designed to incorporate a 
high degree o f functional redundancy. To achieve redundancy SS.7 network elements are 
usually deployed in mated, redundant pairs and are connected by means o f a mesh topology of 
signalling links, thus ensuring that signalling messages can be routed on alternative paths when 
a failure occurs at a single point (link or node) in the network.
In order to improve network robustness the SS.7 protocols incorporate a comprehensive range 
o f procedures for error/failure detection, alternative routing, load control and failure recovery, in 
addition to procedures for their core functionality of transferring signalling messages between 
SPs. The SS.7 protocol and its relationship to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
seven-layer model [ITU, 1989] is shown in Figure 2.2.
1 Other widely used acronyms/abbreviations for SS.7 are SS7, C7 and “Number 7.” 
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SP: Signalling Point
STP: Signalling Transfer Point ----------  Signalling Links
Figure 2.1: Com ponents of an SS.7 network.
Figure 2.2: The SS.7 protocol suite and its relationship to the OSI seven-layer model.
We now provide a brief overview of the functionality incorporated in the various SS.7 
protocols:2
2 Note that the protocol suite is designed to be modular and extensible; in particular new protocols 
availing o f the services o f TCAP have been introduced as networks have evolved. For this reason INAP 
and MAP protocols shown in Figure 2.2 are not part o f the set o f SS.7 protocol specifications per se, 
rather they are part o f the specifications for Intelligent Networks and second generation mobile telephony 
networks respectively.
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Message Transfer Part -  Level 1 (MTP1)
The MTP1 protocol defines the physical and electrical characteristics o f the signalling links of 
an SS.7 network. Signalling links utilise 64 kbit/s digital transmission channels? which are 
usually multiplexed on the same transport infrastructure as voice circuits.
Message Transfer Part -  Level 2 (MTP2)
MTP2 provides link-layer functionality, ensuring that the two end-points o f a signalling link can 
reliably exchange signalling messages. It incorporates procedures for error checking, sequence 
checking, retransmission and basic flow control.
Message Transfer Part -  Level 3 (MTP3)
MTP3 provides (partial) network-layer functionality. It ensures that signalling messages can be 
reliably delivered between two SPs in the SS.7 network, whether or not they are directly 
connected. All SPs within an operator’s SS.7 network are assigned a unique Point Code, which 
is used for addressing purposes by MTP3: each signalling message carries an Originating Point 
Code (OPC) and a Destination Point Code (DPC), as well as a service indicator, in its routing 
label. Static routing tables at each SP are used to specify outgoing links upon which signalling 
messages with particular DPCs are to be transferred.
MTP3 incorporates a range o f procedures for dealing with failure conditions, for example 
procedures which inform remote parts o f the network of failures, procedures which re-route 
traffic away from failed links and procedures for restoration o f failed links. It also incorporates 
procedures for link overload detection and for informing traffic sources o f link overload status 
(cf. §2.2.1 for a full description).
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) User Part (ISUP)
The ISDN user part defines the messages used in the establishment and tear-down o f voice and 
data calls over the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), and to manage the trunk 
network upon which they rely. In spite o f its name, ISUP is nowadays used for both ISDN and 
non-ISDN calls (it is backwards-compatible with the Telephony and Data User Parts which 
predated it). The protocol also provides support for supplementary ISDN services such as 
User-to-User signalling.
Signalling Connection Control Part (SCCP)
SCCP provides two major functions that augment and enhance the addressing capabilities of 
MTP3. The first function is the capability to address applications within an SP (MTP3 can only 
send and receive messages to/from SPs as a whole). SCCP allows for explicit addressing of 
software subsystems within a signalling node through use of Sub-System Numbers (SSNs).
3 Except in the United States /  Canada, where 56 kbit/s is the data rate of signalling links.
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The second function is the ability to perform incremental routing using a capability named 
Global Title Translation (GTT). Global titles, or Global Title Addresses (GTAs) are user part 
significant addresses, such as dialled digits or network terminal numbers, which do not 
explicitly contain the routing information (ie. the DPC and service indicator) required by MTP3 
to successfully route a signalling message. GTT, normally residing at an STP, translates a global 
title into a DPC/service indicator pair (this is typically a many-to-one translation). Use o f  GTT 
frees user parts from the burden o f maintaining lists of every potential SS.7 PC to which they 
may have to send a message. This greatly simplifies network management and makes it easier to 
add new SPs or modify routing plans.
An additional, but rarely used, capability o f SCCP is the provision of a fully connection- 
oriented message transport service.
Transaction Capability Application Part (TCAP)
TCAP consists o f two sub-layers: the Transaction Sub-Layer (TSL), which provides a thin 
end-to-end connection for the transfer o f remote operations using the Component Sub-Layer 
(CSL), which is based on the OSI Remote Operations Service (ROS) [ITU, 1994a]. This is 
essentially a remote procedure call like capability. The specifics o f the remote operations and 
their returns are described as TC-user protocols using the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.l) 
[ITU, 1994b] and encoded using the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) [ITU, 1994b]. For example, 
the remote operations that define the interactions between switches and network servers 
(containing service-specific intelligence) are defined by a TC-user protocol called the Intelligent 
Network Application Protocol (INAP) [ITU, 1993b].
2.2.1 SS.7 L oad  C ontrols
SS.7 standards incorporate a range o f complex network management functionality aimed at 
preserving connectivity between signalling points and acceptable performance levels in the 
event o f failures o f signalling links/nodes or network overloads. SS.7 load controls are complex 
and involve the interaction o f a number o f procedures residing in the MTP, SCCP and user 
parts. The central approach used in these controls is that o f employing ‘choke packets,’ which 
are sent from the point at which overload occurs to the signalling points where the traffic 
causing the overload is originated. These traffic sources then reduce the level o f  traffic sent to 
the relevant destination(s), thereby alleviating the overload. In this section we describe the 
detailed operation o f the various SS.7 load control mechanisms and identify those having the 
greatest impact on the operation o f networks during overload.
2.2.1.1 MTP Controls
MTP load control mechanisms can be classified into two groups: those designed to protect 
signalling links from overload (signalling network MTP controls) and those designed to protect
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against nodal (SP/STP) overloads (M TP nodal controls). We outline the operation o f both and 
comment on their relative importance in the context of actual SS.7 overloads.
Signalling Network MTP Controls
There are three separate versions o f the signalling network MTP controls, known respectively as 
the International Option (10), the National Option (NO) and the National Option with 
Congestion Priorities (NOCP). The two national options are used in the United States and 
Canada, whereas the 10 is used elsewhere. In the 10 control the MTP does not assign overload 
priorities to messages and any decision to throttle messages is taken only in the user parts? In 
the NO control the MTP can assign multiple overload levels to affected destinations that it 
reports to user parts, however message throttling is again performed only in the user parts. In the 
NOCP control, multiple overload levels are employed and the MTP bases message throttling 
decisions on these priorities, separately and in addition to whatever discard may occur in the 
user parts.5
In this thesis we restrict ourselves to analysis of the operation o f the 10 control, which is 
employed in the majority o f SS.7 networks world-wide. This decision is justified as previous 
studies conclude that either there is little difference between the operation o f the national and 
international controls [Manfield, 1994], or else the 10 control performs significantly better 
[Rumsewicz, 1994a; Rumsewicz and Smith, 1995; Northcote and Rumsewicz, 1995].6 In 
particular, since the IO throttles at the user part level, it can operate on calls rather then 
messages (as NOCP does), so it can be less susceptible to user part recovery procedures 
(§2.4.1.2 describes the negative impact these can have on control performance). Given the 
above, we can conclude that study o f the 10 control gives us a best case for the operation o f the
SS.7 controls. The description o f the signalling network MTP controls in the remainder of this 
section is based on the international specifications.
As alluded to previously, the signalling network MTP controls are designed to react to overload 
o f signalling links. MTP3 entities continually monitor the overload status o f all links emanating 
from a node. A link is deemed to be overloaded once the combined length o f its transmission 
and retransmission queues exceeds an implementation-dependent onset threshold value 
(denoted L0). Likewise, link overload is deemed to abate when the combined queue length falls 
below an implementation-dependent abatement threshold value (denoted LA). The abatement
4 O f course message discard will occur in the MTP when physical memory/buffer capacity exhausts.
5 In m ost studies it is assumed that where NOCP is employed there is no user part load throttling. 
[Rumsewicz and Smith, 1995] compare versions of the control in which user part throttling is and is not 
present and conclude that the former is generally superior; we use NOCP to refer to this particular version 
o f the control.
6 We have more confidence in the conclusions o f the latter three studies due to the fact that more detailed 
models, incorporating for example user part recovery procedures, were used and results were analysed in 
terms o f  call rather then message throughput rate performance.
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threshold is set below the onset threshold in order to provide hysteresis during overload 
abatement.
Once a link becomes overloaded the associated node’s MTP3 entity invokes the Transfer 
Controlled (TFC) procedure, which informs traffic sources, by means o f TFC messages, that 
signalling routes using the affected link are overloaded. One in every m (default m = 8) 
arriving signalling messages to be sent over the overloaded link, trigger the sending of a TFC 
message to the message’s originating SP.7 Transmission o f TFC messages continues until the 
status o f the link returns to normal. Note that no discard occurs in the MTP, hence all signalling 
messages are routed to MTP level 2 for transmission over the (overloaded) link. It is important 
to note that TFC messages indicate that a destination SP (not a specific link/route) is 
overloaded, hence traffic sources will throttle traffic on all routes towards a destination, 
regardless o f whether they are actually overloaded or not.
The operation o f the TFC mechanism when a signalling message arrives for a link currently 
designated as overloaded is illustrated by Figure 2.3. The sequence o f events is as follows: the 
arriving message is the m = 8rt to have arrived since the last TFC message was generated ( 1); 
the message is sent to the link for transmission (2)\ a TFC message with parameter indicating 
the overloaded destination (SPa) is generated and sent to the SP that originated the message 
(SPx) (3).
Figure 2.3: Illustration of the operation of the MTP level 3 overload detection and the TFC
procedure.
Upon reception of a TFC the MTP3 entity in the receiving SP informs all local user parts that 
the specified destination SP is overloaded, by means of a Congestion Indication (Cl) 
encapsulated in a MTP-STATUS primitive. This is done for every TFC arriving for the affected
7 In the case where the overloaded link is local to SP which itself originates traffic sent over the 
overloaded link a TFC message is not sent, rather the MTP level 3 entity indicates to the local user parts 
that the destination is overloaded by means o f the MTP-STATUS primitive.
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destination. Note that the MTP3 entity does not itself retain information regarding overloaded 
destinations, its only response to the arrival of TFCs is to send CIs to all local user parts.
MTP Nodal Controls
MTP nodal controls aim to address overload caused as a result o f overload or outage of (SS.7 
related) processors at signalling nodes (both STPs and SPs). Nodal controls are present in both 
MTP2 and MTP3.
The MTP2 nodal flo w  control is initiated when overload is detected (in an implementation- 
dependent manner) at the receiving end of a signalling link. The onset o f overload is indicated 
to the transmitting side by means of special link status signal units; the transmitting side can 
take the link out o f service if  the overload persists beyond a duration controlled by a set o f 
timers. More importantly, the receiving side can withhold acknowledgements, resulting in the 
queues at the transmitting side growing to the level where the signalling network MTP controls 
are invoked (albeit at neighbouring nodes); this process is known as backpressure.
For the case o f the MTP3 nodal controls, overload detection is implementation-dependent and it 
is assumed that nodal overload results in the build-up of message queue lengths, which again 
triggers the signalling network MTP controls. Specifically we can assume that upon nodal 
overload detection, backpressure is applied to all local links, resulting in queue build-up at 
neighbouring nodes, then resulting in invocation o f the TFC procedure as described above.
From the above description we see that nodal overload will always result in the sending o f TFC 
messages to traffic sources, so load throttling behaviour will be very similar to that seen in the 
link overload case. In general we would expect node processing capacity to be provisioned so 
that it is not the bottleneck and therefore links will generally overload before SP processors. For 
these reasons we choose to focus solely on link overload and ignore the possibility that node 
processors may overload.
2.2.1.2 ISUP Controls
User part controls respond to overload detected by the MTP by throttling traffic destined for 
overloaded destinations. ISUP throttles traffic to the destinations indicated in CIs by reducing 
traffic in a stepwise manner, under the control o f two timers, denoted T29 and T30. Both the 
number and size o f the traffic reduction steps are implementation-dependent. On receipt o f the 
first Cl for a destination SP, the traffic load to that destination is reduced by one step and both 
timers are started. Until T29 expires, further arriving CIs for the destination in question are 
discarded; this avoids reducing the traffic level too quickly. If  a Cl is received after the expiry o f 
T29, but before the expiry o f T30, the traffic is reduced one more step and both timers are 
re-started. This process is repeated while CIs continue to arrive, until the maximum traffic
reduction level is reached. I f  T30 expires the traffic load is increased by one step and T30 is
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re-started. This process is repeated until full load has been restored. The operation o f the control 
is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Accepted Load
Figure 2.4: Illustration of ISUP load throttling.
While a number o f models for the ISUP throttling process can be envisaged, it appears prudent 
to assign priorities to different ISUP message types in order to minimise the impact on higher- 
level call processing. An example assignment, in order of increasing priority, is as follows:
Priority 1. User-to-user signalling messages, which are generally associated with a general data 
service and can be regarded as non-essential to call processing;
Priority 2. Initial Address Messages (IAMs)* these are the initial messages sent in an ISUP 
session, hence throttling them has the least impact on call processing;
Priority 3. Call progress messages (Address Complete (ACM), Answer (ANM), Release (REL), 
etc.), these messages are associated with calls already in progress hence they should 
be given priority over IAMs;
Priority 4. Management messages, these messages should be throttled only as a last resort;
Using the assignment above load reduction steps could correspond to the throttling o f different 
types o f message. In addition, there could be a number o f steps for each message type, for 
example IAMs could be throttled by 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% depending on the current level.
2.2.1.3 SCCP Coutrols
The only controls specified in current SCCP standards relate to SCCP class 3 service for 
connection-oriented data transfer with flow control. The flow control is realised by a window 
mechanism (c /  §2.3.1.1), where the size of the window is negotiated at connection 
establishment and is not changed during the data transfer phase. As noted previously SCCP 
class 3 is rarely used in practice, hence the operation of this control has negligible impact on 
actual network performance.
8 A description o f the roles played by IAM and other ISUP message types in ISUP telephony sessions is 
provided in §4.1.2.1, page 71.
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In SS.7 networks employing the SCCP GTT service it is often not possible for MTP entities to 
send TFC messages to the true sources o f overload traffic, instead they will be sent to the node 
at which GTT is performed, in many cases an STP. Even if TFCs can reach the source and CIs 
are passed to SCCP users, it will be impossible for these users to impose suitable throttles 
because they will have no knowledge o f the point code addressing scheme used by the MTP. 
Given this, it is clear that SS.7 vendors must incorporate some form o f load control for 
connectionless SCCP data transfer in their products, to provide control over the ever-increasing 
volume of SCCP traffic carried by networks. This has been recognised by ITU, which in 
January 1996 proposed a standard load control mechanism for connectionless SCCP classes 
[McMillan and Rumsewicz, 1996]. This control aims at ensuring equitable treatment o f all MTP 
user traffic and is effectively a mirror of the ISUP control, incorporating stepwise traffic 
reduction controlled by timers.
2.3 INTELLIGENT NETWORKS
The Intelligent Network (IN) came into being in the mid-1980s as a way of de-coupling 
telecommunications service logic from the implementation of switching exchanges. This 
facilitated centralised service processing functionality, eased the deployment o f new services 
and reduced the escalating complexity o f exchanges. The IN provides the Public Switched 
Telephony Network (PSTN) with the infrastructure to provide advanced services such as 
Freephone and Number Portability. IN standardisation has taken place in ANSI [ANSI, 1999], 
ETSI [ETSI, 1994] and the ITU [ITU, 1997]. Unfortunately, this distribution o f standardisation 
effort and the proprietary enhancements to IN by vendors have created a plethora o f non­
interworking IN solutions. However within geographical regions, for example the USA or 
Europe, there is sufficient agreement on standards that interworking is possible and, at least 
nominally, the ITU standards form the basis for international interworking.
The basic IN model comprises a distributed functional architecture, containing functional 
entities that are collectively responsible for handling any telephony calls that involve service 
logic which is more sophisticated than that which can be provided by traditional call routing on 
the basis of dialled digits. Figure 2.5 below shows the functional entities, their relationships and 
illustrates how these entities are typically grouped into platforms in a network? Control 
relationships between the functional entities are normally supported by SS.7 signalling 
infrastructure.
Each Functional Entity (FE) plays a role in the completion of calls requiring additional 
processing prior to routing through the network. The CCF is responsible for the routing o f
9 Other groupings are also employed, for example SCPs often contain both SCF and SDF functional 
entities.
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normal calls through the PSTN and detects when an IN service session should be initiated, 
typically through examination o f dialled digits. For an IN call the CCF cedes control to the co­
located SSF, which initiates an INAP session with the SCF in order to request any special 
handling instructions for this call. The SCF will normally respond with a destination address 
(number) to which the call should be routed. Many variations on this basic scheme are possible, 
involving the SCF querying a database (the SDF) or instructing the SSF to connect the call to a 
recording playback device controlled by an SRF. The SCF may also instruct the SSF regarding 
specific billing arrangements to be used when dealing with this call. Supporting entities provide 
functionality such as service creation (by the SCEF) and service management (by the SMF and 
SMAF); they are not directly involved in the processing of IN service sessions.
IN has been structured into a number o f modular extensions called Capability Sets. The first 
Capability Set (denoted CS-1) was standardised in 1993 and is widely deployed (although often 
with proprietary extensions). CS-2 has also been standardised and is available from many 
equipment manufacturers. At the time o f writing CS-3 really exists only as a standard and work 
on CS-4 has recently commenced. Each Capability Set extends the IN model and INAP protocol 
to deal with more sophisticated services while remaining within the original IN architectural 
framework.
Point Point Peripheral
SMF: Service Management Function SCF: Service Control Function
SMAF: Service Management Agent Function SSF: Service Switching Function
SCEF: Service Creation Environment Function SDF: Service Data Function
SRF: Specialised Resource Function CCF: Call Control Function
------------  Control Relationship CPE: Customer Premises Equipment
------------ Management Relationship
Call/Bearer Relationship
Figure 2.5: Basic functional model of an Intelligent Network.
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Apart from work on the specification o f IN Capability Sets a number of groups are developing 
technologies that aim at evolving and enhancing the capabilities of IN. For example the IETF 
SPIRITS/PINT work [IETF, 2001] address how Internet applications can request and enrich 
telecommunications services. The Parlay consortium is specifying an object-oriented service 
control Application Programming Interface (API) that facilitates the access, control and 
configuration o f IN services by enterprise information technology systems [Parlay, 1999], The 
Object Management Group’s IN/CORBA interworking specification [OMG, 1999] enables 
CORBA-based systems interwork with existing IN infrastructure, thereby promoting the 
adoption o f CORBA for the realisation o f IN functional entities. Further information on these 
initiatives can be found in [Brennan et a l ,  2000].
2.3.1 IN L o a d  C o n t r o l s
SCPs maintain and execute IN service logic, therefore during periods o f high traffic loading 
they receive a large volume of service requests from the SSPs in the network, making them very 
susceptible to overload. For this reason most of the large body of publicly documented research 
on IN load control has focussed on the strategies for protecting SCPs against overload. Broadly 
speaking, two approaches are taken: in the first SSPs detect SCP overload based on their own 
measurement and take the necessary prophylactic steps, whilst in the second the SCP detects 
overload itself and notifies the SSPs o f its overload status. These two approaches have been 
classified by [Lodge, 2000] as active and reactive respectively, on the basis that the former 
require the control to be in place continually, while the latter only requires control invocation 
for the duration o f the overload.
We start this section by giving a brief introduction to the most common active and reactive IN 
load control strategies investigated in the literature. We then provide more detailed descriptions 
o f two reactive strategies: ACG, a widely deployed control supported in IN standards and an 
adaptive strategy based on mathematical optimisation; the operation o f these two controls is 
investigated in chapter 5.
2.3.1.1 Active IN Load Control Strategies
Active strategies reside in SSPs and use only locally available measurements as the basis for 
deciding whether an SCP is overloaded. Typically these measurements are the response delays 
for messages the SSP sends to the SCP during an IN service session. I f  these delays grow too 
large it is reasonable for the SSP to assume that the SCP is overloaded (though o f course the 
overload may be in the signalling network). The SSP can then throttle new IN sessions until it 
detects overload abatement (again through monitoring of response delays). The most widely 
studied active strategy is Window, though others have also been described, for example [Nyberg 
and Olin, 1994] outline an active strategy employing a Percentage Thinning (PT) throttle (a 
specified percentage of requests that arrive in a given time period are throttled).
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-The Window strategy involves the use o f two parameters in the SSP to determine whether or not 
a service request can be accepted and forwarded to the SCP. The window size ( W )  indicates the 
maximum number o f requests for which responses may be outstanding at a given time, and a 
counter ( C )  indicates the actual number of these outstanding requests. Note that the strategy 
measures the response delays for only the first pair o f messages in a service session, applying 
the standard load control guideline that sessions should not (unless absolutely necessary) be 
throttled if the network has spent significant processing capacity on them. It operates as follows:
• If  C - W ,  the transmission window is ‘closed’ and the next service is throttled, otherwise 
the SSP accepts the request and increments C  ;
• Timers control the value o f W  : every time a message is sent to the SCP, a tim er is started at 
the SSP, then if a timeout on response occurs, the SSP interprets this as indicative o f SCP 
congestion and W  is decremented;
• When a positive response is received (before the associated timer expires), a counter CO is 
incremented and the size W  is increased by one when CO reaches a threshold value Cmax. 
The minimum value o f W  is 1 and there is a maximum value Wmax ;10
At the SCP side any new arrival is discarded in cases where the queue o f incoming messages is 
full. The operation o f the mechanism is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
Outstanding Responses, C = 5 C  = 4 C = 5 C = 4 C = 3
v v vy >r V
A A
Response Timeout 
(DECREASE WINDOW)
Response Counter, CO =  1 CO = 0 CO =
Window Size, Wmax = 5 W = 4
CO =  Cmax = 2 
(INCREASE WINDOW)
W  = 5
A SCP Response 
Message
Accepted 
Service Request ''
Rejected 
Service Request
Figure 2.6: Illustration of the operation o f the Window IN load control strategy.
10 Clearly the values o f Wmax in the various SSPs collectively determine the maximum number o f  sessions 
that the SCP will process at any one time. Therefore careful setting o f the WmxK values is necessary to 
ensure that the SCP does not overload.
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2.3.1.2 Reactive IN Load Control Strategies
Reactive IN load control strategies require interaction between an overload detection algorithm 
residing at the SCP and a load throttling algorithm residing at the SSPs. The detection algorithm 
can run continually, indicating overload when a pre-specified threshold for some measurement 
is passed, or at set intervals, comparing the mean value o f some measurement over the last 
interval against a threshold. In either case, once overload is detected an overload indication is 
sent to all, or a subset of, the SSPs. Often indications are specific to a subset o f the supported 
services, or even to specific sub-populations o f dialled digits. Upon reception of an overload 
indication the SSP commences load throttling, the degree of which is usually also dictated by 
the indication. Throttling continues until the SCP detects overload abatement and indicates it to 
the SSPs.
SCP Overload Detection Algorithms
A range of SCP overload detection algorithms, making use of different performance metrics, 
have been proposed and investigated. These include:
• Queue Length Control (QLC): the length of the SCP central processor input queue is 
examined every time a new message is added to the queue; if a pre-specified threshold 
length is exceeded overload is deemed to have occurred. Overload indications are 
immediately sent to the SSPs. Similarly, when a pre-specified abatement threshold is passed 
from above overload is deemed to have abated. This control has the advantage o f reacting 
very quickly to overload onset but can lead to unnecessary over-control caused by random 
fluctuations in arrival rates;
• Incoming Message/Session Rate: The number of messages or new sessions (initial messages 
of service sessions) arriving at the SCP over a set interval is compared to a threshold. The 
intention is that these counts will be directly proportional to the session’s processing 
requirements, however this will clearly not be the case if  the SCP supports heterogeneous 
services, each with different processing requirements at the SCP;
• Average Response Delay (or Response Time Control (RTC)): The average time spent by 
messages in the SCP, from placement in the input queue to the end o f processing, is 
measured over a set interval and compared to a threshold. We note that it may be difficult, 
especially in the presence o f heterogeneous service types, to specify thresholds between 
acceptable and unacceptable levels o f delay;
• Dropped Messages: SCPs typically drop messages if they have been in the input queue for a 
time longer then a pre-specified threshold. I f  messages are delayed for an unacceptable time 
then there is a high probability that the end-user has abandoned the session and therefore 
processing capacity would be wasted unnecessarily. In overload conditions, input buffers
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will fill, resulting in large delays, therefore the presence o f dropped messages is a clear 
indication o f an overload. As noted by [Northcote and Smith, 1998] this approach has the 
advantage that avoiding dropped messages is a well defined performance objective, as 
opposed, for example, to keeping response delays within acceptable limits;
• Processor Utilisation (or Load Measure Control (LMC)): The proportion o f time the SCP 
central processor spends on processing service-related messages is measured or estimated 
over a set interval and compared to threshold values. Since it does not depend on any 
assumptions regarding the homogeneity of message processing requirements this 
measurement, if  directly available, gives an accurate indication o f the loading experienced 
by the SCP. When employed, the aim is typically to keep utilisation in a pre-defined range, 
or close to but below some target capacity.
It is also possible to employ combinations of the above algorithms. For example the incoming 
session rate measurement count could be used to initially detect overload, triggering the 
lowering the threshold o f acceptable queue length, which when surpassed causes the queue 
length control algorithm to send overload indications to the SSPs [Wallstrom and Nyberg, 
1991], The detection algorithm can indicate either an overload level, or an absolute value of 
some throttle parameter to the SSPs. In the former case a new level can be calculated every 
control interval, or the level can be changed in single steps every control interval.
SSP Load Throttling Algorithms
A range o f load throttling algorithms that reduce the acceptance rate o f IN service requests in 
response to SCP overload indications have been investigated. These include:
• Call Gapping (CG): Limits the number of requests accepted in a certain interval to the
specified number. The throttle operates by enforcing a minimum time spacing between call 
acceptances, by means o f a gap timer that is set upon request acceptance. No additional 
requests can be accepted while the gap timer is active (cf. Figure 2.7 page 25 for an
illustration o f call gapping operation). In the basic version o f the control the gap timer 
duration is indexed, using the indicated overload level, from a table o f pre-specified values. 
However, more adaptive versions, in which gap duration is calculated to accurately match 
expected arrival rates have been specified [Pham and Betts, 1992; 1994; Smith, 1995]. 
Modified call gapping throttles have also been proposed. For example [Turner and Key, 
1991; Hac and Gao, 1998] describe a version o f the algorithm in which fixed gap interval 
‘slots’ are used, but in a manner having no association with request acceptances. A counter 
is incremented every time there are no arrivals during a slot; arriving requests are then 
accepted if the counter is non-zero and the counter is decremented;
• The Leaky Bucket (LB): The Leaky Bucket employs two parameters: a burst parameter, 
indicating the maximum number o f requests that can be accepted in an interval and a
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parameter for the maximum number o f requests that can be accepted in multiple consecutive 
intervals. Similarly to CG, it imposes an absolute limit on the number o f requests that can 
be specified, but it differs in that it allows, to a degree, acceptance o f bursts o f requests;
•  Percentage Thinning (PI): With percentage thinning a specified proportion o f requests 
arriving during a time interval are accepted. The decision as to whether or not a particular 
request is accepted can be based on Bernoulli trials (c f  §3.1.1.2), where the probability of 
success is the P T  coefficient indicated by the SCP. Note that this throttle does not impose an 
absolute limit on the number of acceptances, so it will accept too many requests if  arrival 
rates increase rapidly;
• Token Throttle: Token based systems generally employ a token bank that initially contains a 
fixed number o f tokens, matched to system capacity (see for example [Seraj, 1985]). When 
a request is accepted it removes a token from the bank, then when the session completes the 
token is returned. In order to limit the number of accepted requests the number o f tokens in 
the bank can be modified in response to overload indications [Berger, 1991a];
As with overload detection mechanisms it is also possible to combine the throttles described 
above; for example, gap timers could be used to space out acceptances in a token-based system.
2.3.1.3 Automatic Code Gapping
The IN standards used in the USA, [Bellcore, 1992a; 1993; 1994; 1995], provide a relatively 
detailed specification o f a call gapping based load control entitled Automatic Code Gapping 
(ACG). The ACG specification mandates to a large degree the low-level control behaviour of 
SSPs and SCPs and therefore gives a good indication of how call gapping is actually realised in 
IN systems. The detailed operation o f ACG, as mandated by Bellcore, will now be described in 
terms o f the actions that take place at the SCP and the SSPs respectively.
SCP Actions
At set measurement intervals the SCP assigns itself an overload level on the basis o f one or 
more performance measurements made available by the SCP management system. A number of 
measurements may be made and these can be used either separately (with the highest overload 
level indicated by the individual measurements being used), or in some arbitrary combined 
manner, to assign the SCP’s overload level. Four main measurement types are described, though 
none are mandatory and other, arbitrary measurements may be used. The four measurements are 
Dropped Message Count, Average Response Delay, Incoming Message Rate and Processor 
Utilisation. All four measurements are mean values o f some quantity over the previous 
measurement interval.
Rules for translating overload measurements into the SCP overload level are not mandated in 
the Bellcore specifications. An example of a rule for use with the dropped message count 
measurement is provided in [Smith, 1995]: if  during the just passed interval any message has
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been dropped (due- to being delayed by more than t seconds) then the SCP overload level 
increases by one, otherwise it drops to zero. Since the overload measurements affect only the 
increments in the overload level this is in effect a search algorithm in which it typically takes a 
number of intervals before the most appropriate overload level is ascertained. [Northcote and 
Smith, 1998] note that assigning an overload level is often complicated by the fact that many 
SCP implementations incorporate two or more distinct subsystems, all o f which must be 
protected from overload.
The specifications mandate the use of 15 overload levels. Once assigned, the overload level is 
mapped to gap interval and gap duration values, which are used by the SSP throttling 
procedure. Both these values are taken from tables o f standard values prescribed in the 
specifications, however no mapping rules are mandated. It seems natural to use a simple 
mapping rule, whereby the overload level is used to directly index the table values.
The SCP can inform SSPs o f its overload level in one o f two ways: it can fill a TCAP 
component o f the next IN response messages it sends to an SSP in the coming interval, or it can 
create and send autonomous ACG messages. ACG requests apply only to a sub-population of 
the population o f calls originating at the SSP. The sub-population is selected by indicating the 
first four or six digits o f the ten digit GTAs used by SSPs to address IN service requests (c / 
§2.2.1.3). The SCP therefore controls traffic to the granularity of all IN requests having partially 
matching GTAs; such groupings are termed sources.
I f  ACG requests are incorporated in response messages then these requests will refer to the 
source associated with that message. When using autonomous ACG messages it is not so clear 
how sources are chosen; one obvious approach would be to send ACG requests for all sources 
from which messages were received during the previous interval. It is noted in [Smith, 1995] 
that use o f autonomous ACG messages appears more attractive then use o f response message 
ACG requests since, in the latter case, all incoming messages may be dropped with the result 
that no response messages are sent to the sources.
SSP Actions
An ACG request sent to an SSP contains three parameters: the source to gap (indicated by the 
first four/six GTA digits), a gap interval g,- and a duration interval r . Upon reception o f an 
ACG with a non-zero value of g t the SSP activates the standard call gapping throttling 
procedure: only one service request per g,- seconds is accepted over the next t  seconds. The 
ACG throttling procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: Operation of Automatic Code Gapping at the SSP.
The purpose o f the gap duration parameter is to place a limit on the activation period o f the 
control in the case that the SSP does not receive further updates o f the ACG parameters in 
response messages (assuming ACG requests are carried in this manner). When autonomous 
ACG messages are used the SSP is, ignoring message losses, guaranteed to receive updates 
every SCP measurement interval, so the use o f a gap duration appears gratuitous.
When the SSP receives an ACG message it will randomise the gap interval and duration (if 
used) uniformly between 90% and 110% of the indicated value. This is an effort to avoid 
synchronisation o f the throttling behaviour o f the SSPs in the network. When the SSP receives 
new gapping parameters it can optionally immediately reset active gap interval and gap duration 
(if used) timers with the new. This process is called control refreshing and has the effect of 
increasing the length of time gap timers are active in a random fashion.
2.3.1.4 Optimisation Strategy
In this section we describe the adaptive IN load control strategy proposed in [Lodgeet al., 1999; 
Lodge, 2000], The strategy involves the formulation of mathematical optimisation problems 
{cf. §3.1.3 for an overview o f this area), whose solution defines the best possible coefficient 
values to be used by a percentage thinning load throttle residing at SSPs. The optimisation 
involves the maximisation of generated revenue subject to load constraints on SCPs and  SSPs, 
as well as constraints to ensure that pre-defined weightings (similar to priorities) between 
service types are reflected in the PT coefficients.
The strategy, as specified in [Lodge et al., 1999; Lodge, 2000], consists of two independent 
optimisation processes, one operating at the SCP and the other at SSPs. At set intervals the SCP 
optimisation process is invoked and takes as input estimations of IN service request arrival rates 
at SSPs for the coming interval, SCP target utilisation, service type weights and other 
service-related information. It outputs PT coefficients for each IN service type / SSP pairing in 
the network. These values are transferred to the SSPs, which use them as inputs into their 
optimisation processes. SSP optimisation may serve to modify the PT coefficients in light of 
local loading constraints and estimated arrival rates and processing requirements o f non-IN 
service types.
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Key to the operation o f the optimisation strategy is the concept o f service typq weights, which 
are representative o f the relative importance of successfully setting up a session o f a given 
service type in comparison to a session of other service types. Weights can be thought o f as a 
generalisation of priorities. In the strategy specification weights are calculated using information 
regarding service session set-up revenue, processing requirements and SLAs agreed between the 
operator and customers. Specifically the weight of service type j  at resource x  (SSP or SCP), 
denoted cox J , is given by:
where Rj is the set-up revenue associated with service type j ,  q : is the numerical 
Quality-of-Service level of service type j , g . is the number of messages in a type j  service 
session that are processed by resource x , f ix j  is the mean service rate o f service type j  
messages at resource x  and J  is the number of services supported by resource x.
as acceptable delays, customer importance or financial penalties associated with non-adherence
We now describe in detail the optimisation process at the SCP. The first step is to calculate 
estimates o f arrival rates of IN service requests at SSPs for the coming interval. This calculation 
is based on its knowledge of previously set PT coefficients and measurements o f the arrival rate 
of initial service session messages form each SSP in the past interval. The latter are assumed to 
be a sufficiently accurate estimate o f the arrival rates for the coming interval. Thus we have:
where XkJ(t) denotes the estimate at time t o f type j  requests that will arrive at SSP k  in the 
coming interval, AscpjtjiO  denotes the arrival rate of initial messages of type j  from SSP k
and p aSCPkj( t - T )  denotes the values o f PT coefficients set by the SCP for service j  for SSP 
k  at the start o f  the current interval, which is o f duration T  time units.
We are now in a position to state the SCP optimisation problem:
K  J
a a PsCP,k,j(0^k,j(0
Psc p ,i a •‘~*Pscr,K v/  j - 1
subject to the constraints:
Quality-of-Service levels are arbitrarily set by the network operator, on the basis of factors such
to SLAs.
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III. Weighting: 1 < — ^  V £ e  { 1 , y , / e  {I,...,7} w ith j *  /
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where p ^  is the target SCP load and coSCP is the highest o f the service type weights -  which 
relates to service type f . Note that the objective function and constraints are linear functions in 
Pscp,k,j (0  ’ hence the optimisation functions falls into the category o f Linear Programming 
Problems and can be readily solved.
PT coefficients p aSCp,kj(0  » output by the SCP optimisation process, are transmitted to the
relevant SSP and are used as inputs to the SSP optimisation process, if present. I f  the SSP does 
not run its own optimisation process then the SCP PT coefficients are used directly for load 
throttling over the coming interval. Where SSP optimisation takes place, the SCP PT 
coefficients are used as upper bounds on the values that can be taken by the SSP PT coefficients 
for IN service types. SSP optimisation takes into account expected arrival rates o f both non-IN 
and IN service types and the processing demands they collectively place on the SSP. 
Analogously to SCP optimisation, the problem is formulated to ensure that revenue is 
maximised, whilst satisfying SSP load constraints, service type weights and bounds on PT 
coefficients (here the upper bound for IN service PT coefficients are the SCP-indicated 
coefficients rather than one). Full details o f this process can be found in [Lodge et al., 1999; 
Lodge, 2000],
2.4 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section we provide an review o f the publicly documented research studies on SS.7/IN 
load control. We focus on both the models employed in the studies and the insights gained into 
the operation and performance o f the various load controls examined. §2.4.1 reviews work on 
load control at the SS.7 level and §2.4.2 reviews work on IN load control.
2.4.1 SS.7 L oad Control  R esearch
In the early 1990s a number o f SS.7-related failures in the United States telecommunications 
infrastructure caused sustained outages o f the public telephony network; one o f these is 
described in detail in [Houck et al., 1994]. Widespread negative publicity, resulting from these 
outages, focussed the attention o f network operators and the research community on all issues
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relating to the robustness and performance o f SS.7 networks, in particular on the operation of 
the SS.7 load controls. A concerted research effort resulted in greater understanding o f the how 
the controls should be configured and identification o f their inherent shortcomings. In this 
section we first review the network modelling approaches adopted and then give an overview of 
the main results and conclusions o f the various studies.
2.4.1.1 Approaches to SS.7 Network Modelling
During the design of an SS.7 network, or subsequently, when new resources or services are 
introduced, it is necessary to undertake performance modelling and analysis studies to ascertain 
whether the resulting Quality-of-Service parameters stay within the targets mandated in SS.7 
specifications. Consequently, numerous research studies have been concerned with modelling 
the performance characteristics o f individual SS.7 components, end-to-end performance of 
entire SS.7 networks and analysis o f SS.7 protocol functions such as the signalling network 
MTP controls.
There are two main approaches used for estimation o f the performance o f communications 
networks, namely analytic modelling and discrete event simulation (overviews o f these 
approaches are provided in chapter 3). Analytic modelling has the advantage o f providing a 
direct relationship between model parameters and performance metrics and in general requires 
comparatively small development and computational effort. Analytic methods have been 
applied to the estimation o f the performance o f SS.7 links and linksets; see for example 
[Akinpelu and Skoog, 1985; Skoog, 1988; Wang, 1991].
A detailed and all-encompassing approach to analytic modelling o f SS.7 is described in 
[Willmann, 1988; Willmann and Kuhn, 1990; Bafutto et al., 1994]. In this approach the network 
is decomposed into sub-models that correspond to the separate functional entities described in 
the SS.7 recommendations. These sub-models are analysed in isolation to obtain message 
transfer delays, then network-wide delays are calculated by simply adding these individual 
delays. Another approach to end-to-end SS.7 performance evaluation, based on multiple-chain, 
product-form queuing networks is described in [Conway, 1990],
Discrete event simulation facilitates modelling o f the functional rules o f a system with great 
exactness and allows arrival processes, service time distributions and other model parametersto 
be chosen freely. For these reasons it is used as the main tool for load control studies [Komer 
etal., 1994]. This is almost invariably the case in studies o f the operation o f the SS.7 load 
controls. One exception is [Zepf and Willmann, 1991], where a hybrid approach, involving both 
analytic modelling and random number generation, is used to analyse the operation o f the TFC 
procedure.
Simulation studies analysing the SS.7 controls generally model one of the two network 
topologies illustrated in Figure 2.8. The first model contains multiple source SPs, a single STP
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and a single destination SP. It is used to analyse overload o f the linkset between the STP and the 
destination SP [Zepf and Willmann, 1991; Smith, 1994a; 1994b; M anfield et al., 1994; 
Northcote and Rumsewicz, 1995; Rumsewicz and Smith, 1995], In general this linkset contains 
a single link, the exception being [Zepf and Willmann 1991], The model has also been used to 
analyse overload o f the STP [Rumsewicz, 1993; 1994; Northcote and Rumsewicz, 1995], The 
second model contains two STPs and multiple source and destination SPs. It is used in [Zepf 
and Rufa, 1994; Houck et al., 1994; McMillan and Rumsewicz, 1996] to analyse overload o f the 
linkset connecting the two STPs.
Source SPs Source SPs Destination SPs
Figure 2.8: Models fo r sim ulation-based analysis o f SS.7 load controls. Left: Single-STP model.
R ight: Two-STP model.
These models incorporate all the MTP level 2 and MTP level 3 functionality relating to the 
operation of the MTP load controls. For MTP level 2 this comprises the acknowledgement 
procedures, which influence the growth o f the link transmission and retransmission queues. At 
MTP level 3, link queue size monitoring and TFC generation functionality are modelled in 
detail. Models o f user part entities incorporate the throttling o f messages in response to CIs 
received from the local MTP entity, although the manner in which these throttles operate varies 
from study to study. In studies where STP overload is analysed [Rumsewicz, 1993; 1994; 
Northcote and Rumsewicz, 1995] the STP is assumed to have a central processor and numerous 
peripheral processors to handle signalling links; it is assumed that it is the central processor 
which overloads.
All studies, with the exception o f [Manfield et al., 1994], model the message flows associated 
with ISUP signalling traffic on a session-by-session basis. Delays relating to call answer and 
conversation phases are generally assigned constant values or are uniformly distributed within a 
set range; exceptions are [Smith, 1994a; 1994b], where conversation delays are modelled 
according to the distributions described in [Bolotin, 1994]. In general it is assumed that all 
accepted session are completed by end-users, unless a signalling message is throttled/discarded. 
An exception here is [Rumsewicz and Smith, 1995], in which the situation where a 
media-stimulated mass call-in results in all calls remaining unanswered is examined. A  detailed 
model of the ISUP automatic recovery procedures is included in the models used by 
[Smith, 1994a; 1994b; Rumsewicz, 1994; Northcote and Rumsewicz, 1995; Rumsewicz and
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Smith, 1995], Signalling traffic relating to both IN and ISUP sessions is modelled in [Zepf and 
Rufa, 1994; McMillan and Rumsewicz, 1996],
2.4.1.2 Configuration and Operation of SS.7 Load Controls
Research studies on the SS.7 load controls have uncovered a large number o f insights into the 
basic operation of the controls and how best to configure them to give best performance. In our 
discussion of these studies we classify the various studies into those addressing respectively the 
setting of queue size thresholds, the impact of network latency on control performance, the 
impact o f user-part recovery procedures, STP processor overload, comparison o f control 
options, the impact o f IN services and overload propagation through network management 
controls.
Setting of overload detection queue size thresholds
A critical component o f any load control strategy is the mechanism used to detect overload. 
With the signalling networks MTP controls, overload is detected by means of overload and 
abatement thresholds for link queue sizes. The values o f these thresholds have a direct impact 
on the timing and volume o f TFC messages sent to traffic sources and hence on the throttling 
behaviour of these sources. For this reason much o f the early work on the analysis o f  the SS.7 
controls concentrated on finding optimal threshold values.
In [Akinpelu and Skoog, 1985] the authors consider the setting o f onset and abatement 
thresholds in the presence o f link changeovers11 occurring when the traffic offered to the 
network is at normal levels. During the changeover process the input queue of the out-of-service 
link grows (because messages are not being acknowledged) and the messages in this queue are 
transferred onto the input queue of an alternative link. The aim o f the work is to establish 
suitable thresholds such that the queue size during the transient period o f the changeover is 
insufficient to trigger detection of overload onset (the queue build-up is transitory, so throttling 
at traffic sources is not necessary to alleviate it). An iterative algorithm for the calculation of 
thresholds for the national option controls, based on a mathematical transient analysis o f the 
changeover procedure, is proposed and analysed.
Setting o f thresholds to avoid overload detection during changeover can be seen as a minimal 
requirement, o f  more interest is how to set the thresholds to maximise the performance o f the 
load controls during sustained link overload. In [Lee and Lim, 1989] the authors address 
threshold setting during sustained overload by calculating the threshold values so as to ensure 
that a certain number o f signalling messages are transmitted by the link in the time from the 
crossing of the abatement threshold until the crossing o f the onset threshold.
11 The MTP level 3 protocol incorporates procedures for transferring the messages in the input queues of 
a link that is being taken out of service (due, for example, to unacceptably high bit error rates) to another 
link in the same linkset.
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[Manfield et al., 1994] also consider threshold setting during sustained overload. The authors 
agree that the first12 onset threshold should be set to avoid unnecessary control invocation 
during link changeover. In the study a simulation model o f an overloaded link at an STP, a 
single destination SP and multiple source SPs is employed. Taking an onset threshold of 
1,400 Bytes, the simulation model is used to identify suitable values for other threshold values 
and to investigate sensitivity o f the controls to other parameters, such as the duration of the 
timers used in the throttling procedures at sources.
Simulation results suggest that it is the difference between the onset and abatement thresholds 
(which, to a large extent, dictates how long the control remains ‘on’), rather then their absolute 
values, that is critical. Clearly this difference should not be too large, which would result in 
sources over-controlling traffic, or too small, which would result in under-control and/or 
oscillatory on/off behaviour. The authors conclude that the abatement threshold should be set 
roughly 600 bytes less than the onset threshold (regardless of the latter’s value), but larger than 
a minimum value o f 600 bytes. The values o f the other thresholds (in the NOCP control) is not 
seen as critical. In addition, the results show that the operation of the control is relatively 
insensitive to the duration o f source timers. This is a somewhat surprising result since the timers 
control the duration o f message throttling, thus if they are active for too long over-control 
should result.
Whilst the studies discussed above provide valuable insights into the operation of the signalling 
network MTP controls they have the major drawback that they depend on measures o f message 
throughput to evaluate control performance. Message throughput can be a very misleading 
measure o f network performance as perceived by end-users. For example, it has been shown by 
[Rumsewicz, 1993] that, in certain circumstances, call completion rates can be very low even 
when message throughput levels are very high.
Impact of Network Latencies on Control Performance
One o f the main design flaws with the signalling network MTP controls is that they do not take 
into account network latency, which is the interval between the time at which the change in link 
overload status is detected and the time at which traffic sources react by throttling traffic. 
Database update delays in STPs and SPs account for much o f this latency, which can be as 
much as l i  [Smith, 1994a], During overload TFC messages are continually sent to sources until 
overload abates, however network latency means that sources cannot respond quickly enough to 
reduce offered load, so too many TFCs are sent and sources tend to throttle too much traffic.
12 For the IO this is of course the only onset threshold. The authors analyse both the NOCP and the IO in 
this study, but conclude that there is little difference in performance between them (although they note 
that the IO may be superior because it minimises processing associated with messages that are throttled). 
The authors propose that first onset and abatement threshold values for the NOCP be used for the IO 
onset/abatement thresholds.
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In [Smith, 1994a], the author studies the effect of network latency on the performance o f the 
NOCP control. The scenario addressed involves a focussed overload o f ISUP calls towards a 
single SP, resulting in the overload o f a single link. Simulation results show that traffic sources 
over-control traffic, both spatially and temporally. When the link overloads, network latency 
causes suppression o f traffic from too many (often all) sources. In addition, there is temporal 
over-control, due both to the delay in recognising that link overload has abated and the 
operation o f the T15 and 776 timers used to control MTP message discarding.13 Because sources 
are throttled for longer then they need be, the link queue empties before sources re-commence 
accepting messages; therefore the link’s capacity is severely under-utilised. As would be 
expected, the degree o f over-control is found to be greater the larger the network latency.
Smith also shows that network latency leads to synchronisation o f sources and oscillation o f the 
length o f the overloaded link’s queue size. While all sources are still sending traffic via the link 
its buffer fills; once they stop, the queue empties and the link becomes idle until the sources (in 
synchronisation) resume accepting messages. This leads to overload onset again and the cycle 
repeats. This oscillatory behaviour results from the speed at which TFCs are generated upon 
overload onset, with TFCs being sent towards all sources in a short time interval (were there no 
networks latencies this would not be a problem as sources would be able to react immediately).
To combat the behaviour described above, Smith investigates modifying the control both to use 
shorter timer lengths and have larger onset/abatement thresholds (with larger spacing between 
them). For the former, the sources can react faster to the changes in queue length, whilst for the 
latter, the rate o f change o f overload status is slowed down to a level which sources can better 
track. Both approaches are found to be of benefit and have the major advantage that they do not 
necessitate changes to SS.7 specifications or deployed systems. These simple changes can result 
in a big improvement in call completion rates during an overload. We note that although 
Smith’s work focussed solely on the NOCP control, we can expect similar behaviour from the 
IO control, where traffic throttling is also controlled by timers (T29 and T30) and no account is 
taken o f network latencies.
Impact of User Part Behaviour on Control Performance
Another important issue highlighted in [Smith, 1994a], and also in [Rumsewicz, 1993; 
Rumsewicz, 1994b; Rumsewicz and Smith, 1995], is the impact o f user part recovery 
procedures, in particular the reattempt behaviour of ISUP REL messages. ISUP sessions involve 
the reservation of a voice circuit in the trunk network, hence it is important that signalling 
messages associated with the session reach their destination so that the circuit can be released
13 These timers control the throttling o f messages in the MTP for the national option with congestion 
priorities. They play a role similar to the ISUP T29 and T30 timers described in §2.2.1.2: TFCs arriving 
while T15 is active are ignored and expiry of T16 is used to trigger a test o f whether the overload has 
alleviated.
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when appropriate. To this end the ISUP protocol includes procedures for responding to the 
failure o f an ISUP message to reach its destination within an acceptable timeframe. Specifically, 
if an I AM message is not acknowledged by an ACM or ANM message before the expiry o f a 
timer, a REL message is sent to terminate the session. If  this message is not acknowledged by 
an RLC message, the REL reattempts continue under control o f a timer 7^  (length 4-6s) for an 
interval o f length 60s. Subsequent to this, reattempts continue at a rate o f one per 60s, but 
Reset Circuit (RSC) messages are sent instead o f RELs. The same procedure occurs if the 
original message to fail is itself a REL or RLC message.
It is clear that in overload conditions a large proportion o f ISUP messages may be throttled and 
will trigger one or more REL/RSC reattempts, which inflate the load offered to the network, 
even when call origination rates return to their normal, non-overload levels. This exacerbates 
the overload, increasing the volume or REL/RSC reattempts. We therefore observe an 
‘avalanche’ o f REL/RSCs which takes up a sizeable portion of available network capacity. 
Worse still, REL/RSCs will generally be assigned a higher priority than IAMs, therefore fewer 
new sessions are accepted and call completion rates decrease rapidly. The number o f new IAMs 
is also limited by the availability o f voice circuits: if very few RLC messages reach their 
destination then voice circuits are held and cannot be assigned to new sessions.
In a subsequent study [Smith, 1994b], the author attempts to find a solution to the REL 
avalanche problem. He shows that two obvious approaches, namely limiting the number o f 
REL/RSC reattempts and lengthening the timers controlling these reattempts, do not 
significantly improve call completion rates. Instead, a dynamic algorithm that limits the rate at 
which REL/RSC messages reattempt to the rate at which the network bottleneck (the overloaded 
link, or indeed overloaded STP) can process them, is proposed. The approach is distributed in 
the sense that it involves an algorithm running at every ISUP entity, which uses only locally 
available information including the current rate o f arrival o f RLC messages and the current 
backlog of REL messages for which an RLC has not yet arrived. It is shown that the proposed 
algorithm performs considerably better in terms o f call completion rates then the standard 
reattempt procedure.
The performance degradation due to ISUP REL reattempts discussed above indicates that 
application level recovery procedures can have a strong impact on SS.7 network performance 
during overload. Interplay between the SS.7 protocols and the applications utilising their 
services therefore points towards the desirability o f taking load throttling decisions at the 
application level, rather then at the SS.7 protocol level.
Overload of SS.7 Node Processors
Sustained overload o f STP processors (as opposed to signalling links) is comprehensively 
addressed in [Rumsewicz, 1993; 1994b; Northcote and Rumsewicz, 1995]. In the first o f these
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papers a mathematical analysis (both equilibrium and transient) shows that, in the presence o f 
end-user reattempts, call completion rates can approach zero if the only control used is 
discarding o f messages at the overloaded STP. In the second and third paper an alternative 
approach that employs the TFC procedure is analysed. This approach is somewhat different 
from the MTP nodal controls described in §2.2.1.1, in that backpressure is not used to trigger 
the invocation o f the TFC procedure in another node, rather the TFC mechanism is invoked 
directly at the affected STP. The approach is similar to the NOCP control, in that message 
throttling is assumed to take place, on a priority basis, within the MTP o f the traffic sources. 
Note that although this control is not part o f international SS.7 standards it is specified as an 
option in Bellcore SS.7 recommendations [Bellcore, 1992b], hence it is likely to be 
implemented in many networks, particularly in North America.
Simulation-based analysis of the TFC-based control as applied to STP processor overload 
shows similar control behaviour (over-control and oscillation, degradation in call completion 
rates due to application recovery procedures etc.) as observed by [Smith, 1994a] for link 
overload. However one important difference is highlighted: for the processor overload case, 
requests for generation o f a TFC must join the same processor job queue used for jobs triggered 
by arriving signalling messages, thus the queue size is artificially sustained at a larger value, 
leading to the generation o f more TFCs and therefore a larger degree o f over-control then might 
otherwise be expected.
A  central conclusion o f the analysis is that the rate at which TFC messages are generated plays a 
very important role in the determining call completion rates; this is somewhat at odds with 
[Smith, 1994a] where the emphasis is placed on the degree o f network latency and of the 
duration o f the T15IT16 timers. Rumsewicz shows that varying the rate at which TFCs are 
generated can have a beneficial impact on call completion rates. However this rate must be 
chosen carefully, as it depends heavily on factors such as the number o f sources sending traffic 
to the STP and the STP processing capacity. This implies that adequate call completion rates 
during overload would only be achieved if the rates are set properly for all STPs in the network, 
a tedious and inexact process.
Comparison of National and International Options
A detailed comparative analysis o f the performance of the IO and NOCP controls, as well as a 
combined control in which throttling takes place in both the MTP and ISUP, is provided in 
[Rumsewicz and Smith, 1995]. A mass call-in situation, where there is a large increase in the 
volume o f call requests routed towards a single destination number, is studied. Two separate 
scenarios are modelled: in the first all calls are answered (there is a large pool o f operators 
answering calls) and in the second no calls are answered (approximating the case where there 
may be only a single operator answering the calls). The link connecting an STP to the 
destination SP o f the overload calls is assumed to overload.
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The authors show that, for a range o f overload severity and values o f control parameters, the IO 
provides significantly better call completion rates than either NOCP or the combined strategy. 
In general the combined strategy also performs better than NOCP. The only measure by which 
the IO performs worse than the other two control is fairness,14 it tends to favour SPs that 
originate larger numbers of call attempts during the overload.
It should be noted that the most important reason for the superiority o f the IO in this study is the 
form of the ISUP load throttle. It operates by throttling a variable percentage of IAMs, where 
the percentage increases/decreases in a stepwise manner according to the arrivals o f CIs from 
MTP. A t no stage are other ISUP messages, relating to sessions in progress throttled. This 
minimises the volume of reattempting REL messages, which greatly improves control 
performance.
[Northcote and Rumsewicz, 1995] also compare the IO, NOCP and combined controls, but this 
time in the context o f an STP processor overload. Similar parameters to those described above 
were used. They find that the difference in the performance of the controls is not as great as in 
the link overload case, although NOCP performs worse in more severe overloads. The IO 
control is shown to lead to a degree o f oscillation in call completion rates, however this is not a 
significant drawback, since the mean completion rate is comparable to-the best o f the NOCP and 
combined controls.
Impact of Intelligent Networks and New Services
All o f the studies discussed above address the operation o f the SS.7 load controls in situations 
where all user traffic is associated with the basic ISUP telephony service. However, the 
proliferation o f IN services and mobile networks has meant that a large proportion of the traffic 
now carried by SS.7 networks is originated by TC applications entities, in particular INAP and 
MAP. Signalling traffic relating to IN or mobile service sessions will clearly have different 
characteristics to ISUP traffic, hence it is important to ascertain what impact this has on load 
control performance.
TCAP uses the SCCP connectionless service to transfer data across the SS.7 network, with the 
SCCP GTT capability typically being employed to alleviate the need for application entities to 
have knowledge o f the SS.7 addressing scheme. As discussed in §2.2.1.3, a consequence o f this 
is that it is then impossible for application entities to react to congestion indications arriving 
from the M TP15 and any throttling must take place in the SCCP. We note that since SCCP can 
only throttle traffic on a message basis, it may be inferior to a well-designed ISUP control,
14 The authors consider a control fair " if  each subscriber in the network has, fo r  a randomly selected call 
attempt, an equal probability o f  completing that call. ’’
15 By default the SCCP indicates the arrival o f  congestion indications from the MTP to all its users by 
means o f  the (Y-PCSTATE primitive.
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which can throttle on a call basis by rejecting IAMs first and therefore-avoiding disruption to 
ongoing end-user sessions.
The impact of TC application entity traffic on the operation o f the SS.7 load controls is studied 
in [Zepf and Willmann, 1991; Zepf and Rufa, 1994; McMillan and Rumsewicz, 1996]. In the 
latter two studies overload scenarios in which the SS.7 network carried both ISUP and INAP 
traffic are addressed. The main conclusion of both studies is that the SS.7 load controls (both IO 
and NOCP) are unfair in the sense that those users generating signalling messages o f shorter 
mean length are forced to throttle proportionally more traffic than users transmitting larger 
messages.
SS.7 load controls would ideally have been designed so that the rate at which CIs are received 
by a user part (ISUP or SCCP) reflects the volume of traffic that user part transmits via the 
overloaded resource (be it signalling link or STP). However, to simplify the control procedures, 
they were designed so that TFC generation rates (and hence Cl rates) are derived not from the 
actual bit rate o f messages arriving from a particular user part entity, but from the total message 
rate transmitted by all user part entities residing at a source SP.16 In addition, for every TFC 
arriving at an MTP entity, a Cl is sent to each o f the local user parts, regardless o f which of 
these originated the message that triggered the sending of this TFC.
INAP messages tend to be four to five times longer than ISUP messages. Given that ISUP and 
INAP entities at a source will typically not send signalling traffic to the same destinations the 
difference in their mean message sizes suggests that ISUP user part entities will be forced to 
throttle proportionally more traffic than INAP entities. Simulation results provided by [Zepf and 
Rufa, 1994] and [McMillan and Rumsewicz, 1996] confirm this to be the case.17 [McMillan and 
Rumsewicz, 1996] compare completion rates for INAP and ISUP sessions and show that, for 
the situation modelled (in which ISUP and INAP contribute equally to the overload), 
approximately 80% of ISUP messages are throttled, as compared to only 20% for INAP.
In [Zepf and Willmann, 1991] the authors note that TC application entities often send all 
messages belonging to a single session along the same route through the SS.7 network.18 This 
may lead to asymmetric distribution o f load amongst the constituent links of an SS.7 linkset, 
with some links becoming more prone to overload. However the operation o f the SS.7 load 
controls means that traffic routed towards all the links will be throttled, even if  some o f  the links
16 This simplification was acceptable at the time the MTP specifications were originally developed, since
SS.7 networks at the time predominantly carried signalling messages relating to standard telephony calls, 
all o f  which are o f similar length.
17 To provide a fair comparison both ISUP and SCCP are assumed to have essentially the same load 
throttling procedure: a stepwise throttling o f messages, with no message priorities (in ISUP).
18 This is achieved through the setting of a three-bit field in the SCCP primitive used to transfer data. 
Messages with same value for this field are transmitted over the same signalling links, thus ensuring that 
they arrive at their destination in sequence.
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are loaded at normal levels. The authors propose a modification to the TFC procedure in which 
TFCs indicate overload o f individual links, however it is difficult to see how this could be 
realised in practice without major changes to deployed systems.
[Kihl and Rumsewicz, 1995] note that end-user IN service sessions often involve both INAP 
and ISUP signalling. For example with the Freephone service an INAP query is sent to an SCP, 
which provides a destination number that is then used to initiate a standard ISUP telephony 
session. During an overload the session is then subjected to load throttles in both SCCP and 
ISUP, which raises the question as to whether IAMs relating to Freephone sessions should be 
given priority in ISUP.
One factor not studied is fairness between TC application entities, whose messages are treated 
as a single stream by SCCP. If  there is a difference of the size o f messages produced by two 
application entities then an SCCP throttle based on message counts will result in unfair 
treatment o f the entities sending smaller messages.
Overload Propagation through Trunk Network Actions
Also of importance when considering SS.7 network overload is the action o f various switch 
network management controls that are designed to find alternative routes for call requests when 
an intermediate switch, on what would be a request’s default route, becomes overloaded or 
unavailable. These controls typically involve the sending of messages by an overloading switch 
to its neighbours, which subsequently attempt to re-route requests. An actual overload incident, 
illustrating the manner in which these controls can actually result in the propagation o f SS.7 
overload, is reported in [Atai and Northcote, 1996], The scenario is depicted in Figure 2.9:
Figure 2.9: Overload propagation through operation of switch network management controls.
In this scenario a focussed overload results in the overload of the signalling links towards SP A  
and the TFC procedure is invoked at the two STPs. TFC messages are sent to switch groups 1, 2 
and 3. Switch group 1 does not however throttle all call requests towards the target SP, rather it
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attempts to re-route these requests via switch B . As a result the signalling links connecting the 
STPs to switch B  overload. Therefore the switch network management controls have not 
succeeded in their task o f finding an non-overloaded route to the target SP, rather they have 
propagated the overload and caused further degradation of overall call completion rates.
[Houck et al., 1994] describe a similar scenario, in which network management controls lead to 
overload propagation. However the situation they describe was brought about by a software 
defect that resulted in many switches in the network becoming periodically unavailable then 
available. This led to a significant volume of network management messages that caused severe 
overloading of the signalling network. The authors demonstrated, by means o f simulation, that 
significantly better performance would have been achieved were the network management 
controls turned off. O f course this course o f action may not be appropriate in all situations, so it 
is critical that potential interactions between network management and SS.7 controls are fully 
considered during the network design process.
2.4.1.3 Alternatives to Existing SS.7 Controls
We see from the previous section that the majority of the published literature on the subject of
SS.7 load control is concerned with analysis of the performance o f the control procedures 
mandated in international SS.7 standards. These controls are widely deployed, so research has 
naturally focussed on their optimisation, rather then on the proposal o f alternative controls. 
However, some researchers have recently advocated the adoption of controls that prevent, rather 
than react to the onset o f link/node overload and which take a network-oriented rather than a 
node-oriented approach. Such controls would operate at the application-level and therefore 
would not require changes to SS.7 equipment or protocol stacks.
In [Arvidsson et al., 1997] the authors outline a network-oriented load control strategy 
consisting of a load predictor described as a state machine and a decision procedure formulated 
in Bayesian terms. The approach is based on the recognition that single signals have little or no 
value on their own since customers neither accept, nor pay, for anything but actually delivered 
services and that signalling sessions may differ in value or urgency depending on the service 
they support. They argue that the overall goal should then be to ensure that all accepted service 
requests can be successfully completed and that important services are given priority during 
overload.
In the proposed strategy, a maximum signalling session completion time is assigned to each 
service. The time is set with respect to protocol standards and users’ expectations or, for pure 
load control purposes, simply engineered to match completion times for nearly-overloaded 
networks. Sessions are assumed to consist o f an arbitrary number o f signals. Three distinct 
outcomes of a signalling session, namely successful, unsuccessful, and rejected, are 
distinguished. A request for a service is successful only if the completion time o f the associated
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session is less than or equal to the maximum completion time, and unsuccessful otherwise. A 
rejected service is terminated before any signals are dispatched, thus no network resources, 
except those required to make the rejection decision, are consumed. Each outcome o f  a session 
is assigned, on a per-service basis, values representing the associated revenue and cost to the 
operator.
The strategy is based on the maximisation of network profit, defined as revenue minus costs per 
time unit; this clearly results in the maximisation o f the number o f successful sessions and in 
particular the number o f successful sessions o f those services deemed most valuable by the 
operator. During overload the strategy rejects less profitable sessions, thereby releasing network 
capacity for more profitable sessions. It is noted that, even if  all sessions are considered equally 
important, the overall throughput in terms of successful signalling sessions may be increased by 
a load control that rejects a few requests (the ones which are least likely to become successful) 
at an early stage. This is also a key facet of the strategy: it predicts the outcome o f a session and 
prematurely terminates those sessions that eventually will become unsuccessful, so the available 
network resources are spent on useful work.
Measurements o f signal round trip times between SP pairs are used to estimate two performance 
metrics used in the strategy: the ‘route’ load between the two SPs and the overall load in the 
network. For the latter an estimate o f network load is generated by each originating SP through 
summing all the individual estimated route loads between that SP and all the destination SPs it 
communicates with. Information relating to session round trip times is incorporated into a state 
machine to produce predictions of signal session completion times. The idea is to deliver a 
prediction before the first signal of the session has left the originating node. There is one such 
state machine per origination-destination pair, consisting o f three states and three transitions 
(details can be found in [Angelin, 1996]).
Using this estimate, load control is applied by accepting a signalling session if  the estimated 
session time is less than the maximum allowed time. To incorporate profit maximisation into the 
throttle, Bayesian decision theory is used to combine satisfaction/profits with uncertain 
predictions in order to determine whether it is profitable to accept or reject a service request 
(details can be found in [Pettersson, 1996]). The most profitable action is that which maximises 
the expected value of the gain function, for example it is better to reject a session prematurely if 
an unsuccessful session costs more than a rejected one and there is an uncertainty in the 
prediction.
Simulation results presented in [Arvidsson et a l ,  1997] show that use o f the delay-based throttle 
protects against resource overloads and results in a considerable improvement in throughput 
over standard SS.7 controls. In addition, incorporation of profit maximisation based 
acceptance/rejection results in a further improvement in throughput as well as a significant 
increase in network profit. These results indicate that signalling round trip delays, if  used
Brendan Jennings Page 39 31/05/01
Chapter 2: Background Information and Literature Review
appropriately, provide a valuable metric for applications to gauge the load status o f the netw ork 
and thereby invoke appropriate throttling policies.
One possible criticism o f the strategy is that it does not explicitly protect resources against 
overload: no absolute limits are placed on the number o f sessions that are offered to particular 
resources. In addition, it assumes that service requests are statically routed to specific 
destinations. Later in this thesis we argue that strategies incorporating dynamic routing of 
service requests, whilst protecting against overload, can provide more optimal control solutions.
2.4.2 IN L o a d  C o n t r o l  R e s e a r c h
International IN specifications mandate only a minimal degree of load control functionality; 
they simply support SCPs indication of their current overload status to SSPs. Equipment 
vendors and network operators are therefore afforded a great deal o f freedom when 
implementing IN load controls. Numerous approaches have been proposed and compared in the 
literature; in this section we review the main conclusions of these studies. §2.4.2.1 describes the 
IN models employed, then §2.4.2.2 discusses the results o f analyses o f various controls.
2.4.2.1 Models and Analysis Methods Employed
The majority o f publicly documented IN load control studies focus on control o f a single SCP 
and use a model o f the form depicted in Figure 2.10; examples include [Pham and Betts, 1992; 
1994; Nyberg and Olin, 1994; Smith, 1995; Kihl andN yberg, 1997; Hac and Gao, 1998; Patel 
et al., 2000a; 2000b], The model contains a single SCP, generally modelled as a single finite 
queue with a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) queuing discipline and a single server with constant or 
exponentially distributed service times. The model also includes multiple SSPs, generally 
modelled as servers with an infinite service rate, so they do not overload. Occasionally the 
model includes the SS.7 network, but only as a constant delay experienced by messages passed 
between the SSPs and the SCP (see for example [Kihl and Nyberg, 1997]). First-offered service 
requests are invariably assumed to arrive at SSPs according to Poisson processes.
Figure 2.10: Multi-queue IN model.
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In many studies, for example [Pham and Betts 1992; 1994; Nyberg and Olin, 1994; Kihl and 
Nyberg, 1997; Hac and Gao, 1998], it is assumed that the modelled IN service consists o f a 
single query/response pair of messages exchanged between an SSP and the SCP. In these 
studies the service represented is efther a simple service, like Freephone, requiring only a single 
query/response pair, or alternatively a more complex service for which only the first 
query/response pair is modelled. The latter approach is commonly justified by the fact that the 
studied load controls only throttle at the service level (they throttle initial query messages), thus 
when a request is accepted all further query/response pairs associated with that session are 
granted access to the required system resources. This assumption is somewhat crude, in that it 
ignores that at any given time ongoing sessions place ‘residual’ demands on the SCP and that, 
during overload, sessions can be prematurely terminated due to the discard o f (non-initial) query 
messages at the SCP queue. To overcome these inaccuracies other studies, for example [Smith, 
1995, Northcote and Smith, 1998; Lodge et al., 1999; Patel et al., 2000a; 2000b] do model the 
complete flows o f information associated with sessions of the service(s) modelled.
Many studies model only a single service type; some exceptions are [Northcote and Smith, 
1998; Lodge et al., 1999; Patel et al., 2000a; 2000b]. In all studies except [Lodge et al., 1999; 
Patel et al., 2000a; 2000b], all messages, regardless o f service type, are processed at the same 
rate by the SCP. In general end-user re-attempt behaviour is omitted from the model, exceptions 
here are [Smith, 1995; Northcote and Smith, 1998; Lodge et al., 1999]. I f  included, users are 
assumed to reattempt their service requests following throttling o f the original request and, in 
some studies, following premature session termination. Reattempts are assumed to occur with a 
set probability, after a delay uniformly distributed within a finite range.
Some studies employ variations of the model described above. For example [Northcote 1996; 
Northcote and Smith, 1998] model the SCP as containing two sub-systems (servers), one used 
for Freephone service processing, the other for other ‘complex’ services. [Bedoy et al., 1998] 
model the SCP as a multi-processor system (with each processor modelled as a single queue) 
that also incorporates a local database modelled as a finite-capacity queue. [Kihl and 
Rumsewicz, 1995] model a combined SSP/SCP, referred to as a Service Switching Control 
Point (SSCP), as a finite delay queue and a central processor with an associated infinite job 
queue.
A small number o f studies focus on IN resources other than SCPs. [Lodge et al., 1999; Lodge, 
2000] address overload o f the SSP and employ a relatively complex SSP model incorporating 
three queues relating to various phases in service processing, as well as an additional queue 
representing interaction with a local IP. [Kihl and Rumsewicz, 1996] investigate overload o f IPs 
and employ a model consisting of a single IP, which is connected via a finite number o f voice 
circuits to a single SSP; SSPs seek to acquire a voice circuit for the use of a service session at
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the behest o f one o f a number o f SCPs. There is no queuing at the IP, hence sessions are 
blocked if  the SSPs attempts to acquire a circuit when all circuits are in use.
Due to the relative complexity o f IN models described above, the majority o f studies use 
simulation techniques to analyse the behaviour and performance o f various IN load controls. 
Nevertheless, some studies have employed analytic methods; for example [Newcombe et al., 
1994; Lodge et al., 1999] solve mean queue sizes and delays using the decomposition 
approximation method (cf. §3.1.1.3) and [Kihl and Rumsewicz, 1996] employ fluid flow 
approximation to model IP circuit occupancy.
2.4.2.2 Analyses o f Deployed/Proposed Controls
In this section we review the results o f research studies that analyse the performance of various 
IN load controls in order to ascertain which perform best over a range o f operating conditions. 
We group these studies into four main categories. First are those comparing various detection 
and throttling algorithms for reactive SCP control strategies. Second are those comparing the 
performance o f reactive strategies with Window, the most popular active strategy. Third are 
studies focussing on controls for protecting SSPs, SDPs and IPs from overload. Finally, are 
some more recent studies, which address network-oriented IN load control.
Overload Detection and Load Throttling Algorithms for Reactive Strategies
As outlined in §2.3.1.1 reactive load control strategies require an overload detection algorithm 
resident at the SCP and a load throttling algorithm resident at SSPs. Numerous detection and 
throttling algorithms have been proposed and many studies have compared their performance in 
order to identify the best combination.
[Lodge et al., 1994; Lodge, 2000] investigate the performance o f four overload detection 
algorithms operating in co-operation with a call gapping throttle. The algorithms are QLC, RTC, 
LMC and incoming session rate, where the latter is referred to as Call Count Control (CCC). 
These algorithms are compared under three types o f overload, resulting from: steady mean 
traffic arrival rate, linearly increasing arrival rates and bursty arrival rates. QLC and RTC are 
seen to react slowly to overload onset and LMC is seen to perform badly in response to bursty 
traffic. Although not ideal, CCC exhibits the best performance over the three types o f traffic and 
the conclusion is that it should be chosen above the others. We note that the version of LMC 
examined involves use of an indirect measure of processor utilisation (calculated using message 
arrival rates and a single mean message processing delay) and that a direct utilisation 
measurement will clearly result in more accurate overload detection.
Comparisons between CG and PT have been provided by [Berger, 1991a; Kihl and Nyberg, 
1997; Lodge, 2000]. In all cases it is assumed that CG uses static gap intervals indexed from a 
table, although in general these intervals are approximately optimised for the particular network 
under study. PT is more dynamic, in that the PT coefficients are dynamically computed to
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provide the necessary reduction in expected traffic during the coming control interval. In 
general it is found that both throttles are approximately equal in terms o f protecting the SCP, 
albeit under the assumption that CG gap intervals are appropriate to the network. PT is seen to 
exhibit subscriber fairness, because all SSPs throttle the same proportion of traffic, regardless of 
their size. For the same reason PT is a scalable throttle: not only is it independent o f SSP size, it 
is also independent of the number of SSPs in the network. On the other hand, [Berger, 1991a; 
Lodge, 2000] note that a significant advantage of CG is that it places a strict upper lim it on the 
number o f accepted sessions and therefore is not susceptible to sudden increases in arrival rates, 
as is PT. A particular concern with PT in this regard is its vulnerability to reattempts, which lead 
to increases in offered load, resulting in higher then intended acceptance rates [Smith, 1995].
In light o f the above discussion we can conclude that a CG-based throttle that uses dynamically 
computed gap intervals would combine the fairness and scalability advantages of PT with CG ’s 
strict control over acceptance rates. [Smith, 1995] proposes an adaptive version o f the standard 
ACG control that takes this approach. The control identifies the aggregate message arrival rate 
that can be handled by the SCP, then calculates gap intervals so that all SSPs (regardless o f size) 
reduce their traffic by the same percentage. He finds that the adaptive version provides near 
optimal throughput performance, regardless o f the volume of overload traffic, number o f  SCPs, 
or the overload detection algorithm employed (incoming message rate and dropped message 
measurements are modelled).
[Pham and Betts, 1992; 1994] compare adaptive versions o f CG and LB throttles, in which 
control parameters are dynamically computed by the SCP using its estimates o f actual arrival 
rates at SSPs. In addition, controls are put in place only at those SSPs for which significant 
increases in arrival rates have been observed. Results show that the two throttles give broadly 
similar performance, though LB provides marginally higher throughputs. This is due to LB ’s 
capability to accept requests in bursts, in comparison to CG, which imposes minimal intervals 
between acceptances.
Comparison o f Active and Reactive Strategies
The relative merits of reactive strategies and the active Window strategy is a somewhat 
contentious issue, with studies reaching conflicting conclusions. [Pham and Betts, 1992; 1994] 
compare Window with their adaptive CG and LB throttles and conclude that it provides 
significantly superior throughput performance for a range of operating conditions. They argue 
that this superiority is due to continual feedback to SSPs (at every response message arrival) of 
SCP overload information. [Tsolas, 1992] compares Window with CG, but reaches the opposite 
conclusion, arguing that CG responds more quickly to overload onset. [Lodge, 2000] compares 
Window, static and dynamic CG controls and an optimisation-based strategy, concluding that 
Window can react quicker to overload onset, but considerably overprotects the SCP during 
relatively mild overloads and under-protects it during relatively severe ones. She shows that the
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optimisation strategy gives the best overall control performance of the strategies addressed. We 
address the performance of this strategy in detail in chapter 5.
Window and call gapping are also compared on the basis of ease o f configuration. 
[Tsolas, 1992] argues that if the SCP can indicate an exact gap interval to the SSPs CG ’s 
centralised nature makes it easier to re-configure as new services and resources are introduced. 
In contrast, [Pham and Betts 1992; 1994; Kihl, 1999] argue that placement o f the control at the 
SCP is actually a disadvantage, since it adds significant system complexity. [Lodge, 2000] 
points out that updating Window is non-trivial, since it involves configuration o f  tim er duration 
and window sizes (on a per-service basis) at all SSPs. Indeed, she shows that it is very difficult 
to configure Window in a multi-service environment, making it unsuitable for deployment in 
current and future IN systems.
Control of SSPs/SDPs/IPs
Load control of generic network databases (not specifically IN SDPs) has been addressed by 
[Farel and Gawande, 1991]. The authors investigate a network in which a database receives 
queries from multiple access nodes and propose a control strategy incorporating an internal 
database overload protection mechanism together with an external CG throttle, residing at the 
access nodes. The internal mechanism simply discards arriving queries when the input queue 
size exceeds a specified threshold; the rate o f discards is used to periodically specify one of a set 
o f static gap intervals, which is put in place at all access nodes. Clearly this strategy is directly 
applicable to an IN where multiple SCPs access an SDP.
[Nyberg and Olin, 1995] also address this multiple-SCP, single-SDP scenario, but model 
multiple services, sessions o f which required a different number of queries to the SDP. They 
propose a Window-based mechanism and investigate its performance in terms o f throughput 
maximisation and fairness (in terms o f the amount o f SDP capacity allocated to different SCPs 
and different services). Whilst both o f these studies produced encouraging results it is clear that 
both strategies will suffer from the drawbacks o f CG/Window, as described above. They also 
have the additional disadvantages that placing throttles at the SCP will be a significant drain on 
its resources and that they may terminate ongoing sessions on which significant network 
resources have already been expended.
In [Kihl and Rumsewicz, 1996] the authors address load control for an IP, where the limiting 
resources is the number of available voice circuits rather than processor capacity. The main 
objective for an IP control is thus to maximise circuit utilisation during overload. The authors 
argue that requests for circuits should be throttled at the SCP rather then blocked at the IP; this 
allows differentiation between different classes of request. The following fairness criterion is 
used as the basis for throttling decisions: only requests relating to an overloading service should 
be throttled and other services should be protected. They propose an active strategy, in which 
SCPs apply PT throttles to ‘responsible’ services on the basis o f measurements of the
Brendan Jennings Page 44 31/05/01
Chapter 2: Background Information and Literature Review
per-service offered load, mean IP circuit holding times and blocking probability at the IP. 
Simulation and fluid flow analyses show that the strategy performs well in terms o f maximising 
circuit utilisation in a fair manner. We note that strategy again suffers from being resident at the 
SCP, therefore it uses SCP capacity and terminates ongoing service sessions.
Overload of SSPs is partially addressed in [Kihl and Rumsewicz, 1995], where the performance 
o f IN and SS.7 controls during an SSCP overload is examined. The work concentrates mainly 
on fairness issues in the presence o f independent IN and SS.7 controls and does not address 
overload o f SSPs per se. The latter issue is addressed in [Lodge, 2000], where the two-phase 
optimisation strategy described in §2.3.1.4 is investigated. In the strategy the SCP optimisation 
process provides PT coefficients for all IN services, which are used as inputs into the SSP 
optimisation process, along with the estimated arrival rates, processing requirements and 
relative priority weights o f non-IN services. The process outputs PT coefficients, which serve to 
protect both the SSP and SCP from overload whilst enforcing service priorities such that 
generated profit is maximised. The strategy is shown to protect the SSP (and the SCP) under a 
range o f overload conditions, to which it dynamically adapts its parameters to achieve 
profit-optimal control.
Network-oriented Approaches
In the discussion above nearly all IN load control studies have focussed on node-oriented 
controls that protect a single IN resource from overload; the exception being Lodge’s combined 
SSP/SCP optimisation strategy. The network-oriented control proposed by Angelin, Arvidsson 
and Pettersson {cf. §2.4.1.3) was originally conceived as a generic SS.7 control but has also 
been investigated in the context of IN [Arvidsson et al., 1997]. This strategy uses delay 
measurements as its basis, so it detects overload of all IN (and SS.7) resources, providing 
protection for the whole network. We note that the same argument also applies to Window, 
hence in this regard it too can be considered as network-oriented. However, as noted in §2.1, an 
ideal network-oriented will provide scalable, globally-optimal control, which is not possible 
using Window.
In an IN containing multiple SCPs, the scheme used by SSPs to route service requests plays an 
important role in determining how susceptible individual SCPs are to overload. Clearly a 
dynamic routing scheme, integrated with an appropriate load control, provides the best 
opportunity to optimise SCP resource usage during all traffic conditions. Nevertheless, the 
majority o f IN load control studies have assumed that the network is logically partitioned so that 
every SSP communicates with only one SCP. One exception is [Milito et al., 91], where the 
generic problem o f dynamically distributing a stream, consisting o f several classes o f job, to 
multiple remote nodes with finite input queues, is addressed. The proposed algorithm employs 
Markov decision theory to distribute jobs in order to minimise the probability that they are 
blocked upon arrival at the remote node, whilst differentiating between classes o f job  on a profit
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basis. The authors suggest that this approach can be applied to IN SSPs, however it is not clear 
if  it would give globally optimal performance in the presence of SCPs of varying processing 
characteristics.
The use o f agent technology for IN load control has been investigated by [Patel et al., 2000a; 
2000b; Davidsson et al., 2000].19 Patel et al. describe a multi-agent system realising an artificial 
computational market in which the processing capacity of SCPs is ‘sold’ to SSPs in a manner 
that maximises global utility, which in this case is generated profit?0 This strategy is very 
similar to the token-based strategy we describe in this thesis, but suffers from the auction 
process requiring iterative submission o f bids by SSPs and SCPs, which adds significantly to the 
volume of signalling traffic. Davidsson et al. describe an approach based on (mobile) broker 
agents, which sell SCP processing capacity to SSPs on an autonomous basis, that is, not in the 
context o f an auction.
2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter commenced with an introduction to the aims of and standard approaches to load 
control in telecommunications networks. Following this, a brief description o f Signalling 
System No.7 and Intelligent Networks, with particular emphasis on implemented and proposed 
load controls, was provided. These descriptions show that load control in SS.7/IN networks is 
achieved by means of a number o f essentially independent controls, operating at different 
protocol levels. Each o f these controls attempt to protect a single resource by detecting overload 
and employing simple rate-based throttles, but in an manner not co-ordinated with the operation 
o f other controls.
A typical network supporting IN services incorporates standard SS.7 controls for protecting 
signalling links, controls for protecting STP processors, load throttles in various SS.7 user part 
entities, trunk network controls that automatically re-route traffic during overload, reactive or 
active IN-level controls for protection o f individual SCPs and possibly other IN resources, as 
well as internal, vendor-specific protection mechanisms in each network node. Clearly, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that these controls interact in a manner that provides 
effective and efficient traffic management during overloads.
Considerable research effort has been spent on the analysis o f the operation o f standard SS.7 
and IN load control strategies. Operation o f  the SS.7 controls is to a large degree mandated by 
international standards, so research has concentrated on configuring them for optimal behaviour. 
Unfortunately research studies have identified numerous inherent shortcomings o f the SS.7 
controls; the principle shortcomings are summarised as follows:
19 These works, as well as the work described in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis were undertaken in the 
context o f  the ACTS-MARINER collaborative research project [ACTS-MARINER, 2001].
20 More information on market-based distributed resource allocation is provided in §3.1.4.
Brendan Jennings Page 46 31/05/01
Chapter 2: Background Information and Literature Review
• They are dependent on static parameters such as onset/abatement thresholds, TFC 
generation rates and implementation-dependent throttling policies. These parameters must 
be carefully selected to match a given network if acceptable control performance is to be 
achieved;
• They do not take account o f network latencies and are therefore susceptible to over-control 
and oscillatory behaviour;
• They do not explicitly take account o f application-level recovery procedures, which can 
cause severe degradation in network throughput if throttling policies are not carefully 
designed;
• They are unfair in their treatment o f applications producing signalling messages having 
different mean lengths;
• They operate at lower protocol levels, where it is difficult to make control decisions that 
take into account factors such as service-level priorities and profit.
Whilst careful configuration can help alleviate many of these problems, it is clear that there 
would be significant advantages in realising load throttling at the application-level rather then at 
the SS.7 protocol stack level. In addition, we believe that the best means of detecting overloads 
in an SS.7 network is not by means of explicit overload notification by TFC messages, but by 
means o f end-to-end delay measurements taken at the application level. The superiority o f this 
approach has been convincingly demonstrated by [Arvidsson et al., 1997].
Research on IN load controls has focussed mainly on strategies for the protection o f  individual 
IN nodes, in particular the SCP. The performance of a number of standard active and reactive 
controls has been compared in a number o f studies, sometimes with conflicting conclusions. In 
relation to reactive controls, a number o f SCP overload detection algorithms have been 
investigated, however in practice it is likely that the optimal approach will vary according to a 
vendor’s specific implementation. Regarding load throttles, it is clear that the two most common 
algorithms, call gapping and percentage thinning each have disadvantages, relating to fairness 
and protection from sudden traffic increases respectively. Adaptive versions o f  reactive 
strategies, in particular those incorporating profit maximisation have been shown to 
significantly out-perform standard, static versions. The issue of reactive versus active strategies 
is more contentious, but most studies favour the former because they are seen to be more 
responsive and also simpler to configure. We note however that active strategies such as 
W indow are more network-oriented in nature, since they are capable o f detecting overload 
relating to any network resource that processes service sessions.
The research studies discussed in this chapter have produced considerable insights into the 
operation of the various SS.7 and IN load controls. However, we believe that a major failing o f 
practically all these studies is that they do not employ sufficiently realistic network models.
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Studies o f the SS.7 controls have mainly analysed control performance in a simple network 
topology, containing a single overloaded link/STP, a single destination SP and multiple source 
SPs. Clearly any issues relating, for example, to the overload of multiple links or the placement 
o f SCCP GTT facilities, are not evident from these studies. Similarly, studies o f IN controls 
have completely ignored the presence of an underlying SS.7 network and associated controls, 
despite the fact that experience in the field shows that SS.7 controls can pre-empt and interfere 
with IN-level controls [Atai and Northcote, 1996].
In chapter 4 we employ comprehensive SS.7/IN models to analyse in detail the operation o f the 
SS.7/IN controls in a realistic scenario, involving multiple SSPs, a fully connected STP mesh 
and an SCP, with both IN and ISUP telephony services being fully modelled. A  particular 
emphasis o f this study is to ascertain whether the SS.7 and IN controls can interact in a manner 
that degrades overall network performance.
Besides not taking account o f the potential for SS.7 overloads, existing IN controls do not 
completely fulfil the requirements for a fully-network oriented load control strategy, as outlined 
in §2.1. Even those strategies incorporating adaptive parameter setting and/or profit 
maximisation do not provide for co-ordinated control o f multiple SCPs, or control over other 
resources like SDPs or IPs. We contend that the best way to achieve globally-optimal resource 
usage is to explicitly allocate the capacity of the available resources in a co-ordinated, profit- 
optimal manner. To achieve full flexibility it is also necessary to integrate the dynamic routing 
o f service requests by SSPs with load control. An SSP could then direct service requests to the 
SCP that gives that SSP the best performance because, for example, it has been optimised for 
provision o f the service in question, or is in close physical proximity to the SSP. A strategy o f 
this kind would provide a fully network-oriented load control solution with the flexibility to 
adapt to the demands o f a dynamically changing IN environment.
In chapter 5 we take the first step toward the development of a fully network-oriented IN load 
control by specifying an SCP load control founded on the profit-optimal allocation o f 
processing capacity. The ability o f the strategy to satisfy the basic IN load control requirements 
is ascertained by comparing its performance with two existing strategies. Chapter 6 then 
specifies a number o f enhancements to the basic strategy, providing for control o f multiple 
instances of different IN resource types, minimisation o f SS.7 network load and detection of
SS.7 overload. Taken together these offer a comprehensive and flexible load control solution to 
the IN network operator.
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CHAPTER 3
M e t h o d s  a n d  T o o l s  f o r  P e r f o r m a n c e  
A n a l y s is  a n d  s t r a t e g y  D e v e l o p m e n t
In this thesis we are primarily concerned with the development and performance analysis of 
load control strategies for SS.7/IN networks. Our approach is based on three steps: firstly, 
identification of the shortcomings of existing strategies; secondly, specification o f new 
strategies; and thirdly, analysis o f the likely performance of these strategies. Completion of 
these steps requires the development of detailed models of SS.7/IN networks for use in 
performance analysis and the application o f suitable network control paradigms to develop load 
controls specifically tailored to the requirements of SS.7/IN. In this chapter we provide 
background information on the methods, tools and paradigms we employ. The chapter is split 
into two parts: §3.1 introduces analytic and simulation-based network-modelling, then §3.2 
introduces the methods and paradigms applied in the development of the load control strategies 
we propose.
3.1 NETWORK MODELLING
Modelling is the process o f developing a representation of a physical system for the purpose of 
analysing aspects o f the system’s behaviour. Telecommunications networks are highly complex 
systems, hence when developing a model it is necessary to consider only those aspects o f the 
network of interest. The model is thus a simplification o f the real system, however it should be 
sufficiently detailed to permit valid conclusions to be drawn about network operation.
Telecommunications network models are mathematical in nature; they use symbolic notation 
and mathematical equations to represent the system. Models are classified as being analytic or 
simulation-based, the distinction relating to the type o f method used to acquire the results of 
interest from the model. W hen using analytic models, the deductive reasoning o f mathematics is 
employed to explicitly ‘solve’ the model to provide the necessary data. Although analytic 
models provide exact solutions it is often impossible or impractical to develop a solvable model 
that encapsulates all o f  the system characteristics of interest. Simulation, on the other hand,
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allows development o f more detailed models, which can be ‘solved’ using computational 
procedures. Simulations produce ‘solutions’ specific to particular inputs: models are ‘run’ in 
order to provide sample outputs from which the true system performance measures can be 
inferred.
3.1.1 A n a l y t i c  N e t w o r k  M o d e l l i n g
Analytic network modelling is based on the application of queuing theory, a branch o f 
mathematics which applies the theory of stochastic processes to analysis o f the behaviour of 
queuing systems. This section provides a brief introduction to queuing theory, with the aim of 
providing the information required to understand the analytic models we describe later in the 
thesis. §3.1.1.1 introduces basic probability theory, §3.1.1.2 presents an overview o f stochastic 
processes and §3.1.1.3 briefly describes the application o f stochastic processes to 
mathematically describe queues and networks of queues.
3.1.1.1 Basic Probability Theory
Probability theory is based on the paradigm of a random experiment, that is, an experiment 
whose outcome cannot be predicted with certainty before the experiment is run. It is usually 
assumed that the experiment can be repeated indefinitely under essentially the same conditions. 
Probability theory is concerned with the long-term behaviour as the experiment is replicated. 
For example, if an (unbiased) coin is tossed many times, one intuitively expects that the 
outcome will be heads in approximately half of the cases. Therefore one can state that the 
probability o f a heads outcome is 'A. We will now introduce some of the basic terminology used 
in probability theory.
Consider an experiment having n possible outcomes, denoted o,,...,oB, where the exact 
outcome o f the experiment cannot be predicted in advance. An experiment o f this kind is called 
a random experiment and the set o f all its outcomes is called the space o f  elementary outcomes, 
or the sample space, denoted O — {o„...,oB} . An event is the result o f  a single random 
experiment and comprises a subset A  o f the sample space. A probability measure o f event A , 
denoted P[A\,  is a non-negative number indicating the likelihood o f the occurrence o f that 
event as the result o f a single experiment, or alternatively, the expected frequency o f occurrence 
of the event over multiple experiments. Probabilities are defined so that the sum o f the 
probabilities o f all possible outcomes of an experiment sum to one, P[0~\ = 1.
It is often the case that the actual outcome of a random experiment does not matter, instead 
some other amount, for example the size o f a resulting loss or gain, relating to that outcome is of 
interest. This leads to the concept o f a random variable. The random variable X  is a function, 
defined on the space o f elementary events O , which takes a value X  (o) for each o e O . A 
random variable X  is random in the sense that its value depends on the outcome of the
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experiment, which cannot be predicted with certainty in advance. Random variables can be 
classed as continuous or discrete, depending on whether its range (the set o f values it can take 
on) is discrete or continuous. For any event A , there is a simple random variable /  called the 
indicator variable o f  A , that takes on the value 1 if A occurs and the value 0 if  A  does not 
occur.
We are mainly interested in the probability that a random variable takes a certain value x ,  this 
is denoted as P [X  = x ] . For discrete random variables this leads to the description o f a 
probability mass function  (pmf), denoted p ( x ) , as follows:
p(x ) :=P[X  = x]
Another convenient form for expressing the probabilities associated with a random variable is 
the cumulative distribution function  (cdf). The cdf of a random variable X  is defined as:
iV (* ):= P [X < * ]
and expresses the probability that X  takes on a value less than or equal to x .
Where Fx (x) has a continuous derivative everywhere, a related function, the probability 
density function  (pdf), can be defined as follows:
/ , W f * P -
dx
Note that:
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f f x i x)dx =
J - 00
1
thus the pdf is a function which, when integrated over an interval, gives the probability that the 
random variable X  takes on a value in that interval.
The k  th moment of a random variable X , denoted E [ X k], is defined by:
E [ X k]:= f  x kf x (x)dx
J — oo
The first moment of a random variable X , denoted E[X~\ or X , and known as the expectation, 
or mean, or average value of X , is given by:
E[X]:= f  xfx (x)dx
J — oo
Another important value, the variance o f  a random variable X , denoted V [X ] or <r2x , is given 
by:
V[X] = a 2x  = f  ( x - X ) f x (x)dx
J — oo
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Where the mean and variance o f a random variable X  are known the square o f  the variation 
coefficients (svc), denoted K x , is given by:
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Kx :=
(X )2
If  we consider two random variables, X  and 7 ,  defined for some sample space, then the 
extension o f the cdf for the two variables is defined as:
Fxr(x >y) '■= P [ X < x , Y < y ]
Associated with this function is a joint pdf, defined as:
ax ay
Finally, X  and Y  are said to be independent if  and only if: 
fxr<x,y)  = f x ( x ) f Y(y)
3.1.1.2 Stochastic Processes
A stochastic process (or random process) is a function X (t , o) (commonly denoted X ( t )  for 
simplicity) o f both time and probability space. For a fixed value of t it becomes a function of 
probability space, ie. a random variable, whereas for a fixed value of o it is a function o f time 
and is referred to as a sample function  o f the process. Stochastic processes are widely used to 
model the behaviour o f telecommunications systems, for example, the number o f IN service 
requests arriving at an SSP in a time interval can be modelled as a stochastic process.
The cdf of a stochastic process, denoted Fx (x,t)  is defined as follows:
Fx (x , t ) :=P[X( t)<x \
Furthermore, for n allowable values o f t , {ti,t2,...,tli} , a jo in t c d f  may be defined for the 
process as follows:
^ 'x l ,X 1,...,X„ '=  —  X\> ^ i^ 2)  —  x 2 ’ - " ’ — X n ]
The joint cdf is commonly denoted using the vector notation Fx ( x ; t ) . In order to completely 
specify a stochastic process the values o f Fx (x; t)  must be specified for all possible subsets of 
{x,.}, {/, } and all n . However for many of the interesting and useful stochastic processes it is 
possible to provide this specification in very simple terms. We now list some classifications of 
stochastic processes based on properties they possess.
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Independent Processes
The simplest and most trivial stochastic processes are those for which {Xn} forms a set o f 
independent random variables , so that:
(*i » » t \t i  »•••» tn) = Fx ; t , )FX (x 2',t2 )...FX (x n; tn)
Stationary Processes
A stochastic process X { t) is said to be stationary if Fx ( x ; t ) is invariant to shifts in time for all 
values o f its arguments:
Fx ( x ; t  + r )  = Fx (x; t )
where t  + v is defined as the vector (i, + r,t2 + r,...,tn + r )  .
An associated property, that o f wide-sense stationarity, is held by X ( t )  if  merely its mean and 
variance are invariant to shifts in time. Clearly all stationary stochastic process are wide-sense 
stationary, but not conversely.
Markov Processes and Markov Chains
A stochastic process is classified as a Markov process if  and only if its next state is dependent 
only on its current state and not on any previous values. This can be expressed analytically as 
follows:
P[X( tn+,) = x„+\X ( t ,)  = x x-,X(t2) = x 2;...;X(tn) = x„] = P[X(t„+]) = xn+\X ( tn) = x j
A Markov process with a discrete state space is referred to as a Markov chain. Markov chains 
can be either discrete-time or continuous-time. For a discrete-time Markov chain the instants at 
which the state changes are preordained (a state transition takes place at each instant even if  the 
state does not change as a result o f the transition). For a continuous-time Markov chain the state 
transitions can take place at any instant in time. O f particular interest is the random variable 
describing how long a Markov chain remains in its current state before a transition to another 
state occurs. For a discrete-time Markov chain this time can be shown to be geometrically 
distributed, whilst for a continuous-time Markov chain it is exponentially distributed.
A widely-used graphical representation o f a Markov chain is that o f a state-transition diagram. 
In a state-transition diagram the discrete states of the chain are represented by labelled circles, 
which are connected by directed arrows representing the probability that when the current state 
is that at the source o f the arrow the state after a state transition will be that at the arrow 
destination. A simple state transition diagram is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1 Exam ple state-transition  diagram  representation of a M arkov chain.
Birth-Death Processes
A birth-deathprocess is a (discrete- or continuous-time) Markov chain in which state transitions 
only take place between neighbouring states. If, with no loss of generality, the set o f integers is 
chosen as the discrete state space then the birth-death property requires that that if X n = i , then 
X n+]= i~  1, i ,or / +1 and no other value. Birth-death processes play an important role in 
queuing theory, since they provide a means of modelling a queuing system where the time 
intervals approach zero (a continuous-time process), so that only a single event, an arrival or a 
departure, can occur during an interval.
The probability o f a birth-death process being in a particular state k  at time t is denoted by 
Pk(t) ,  where:
Pk(t + AO = Pk(0  - (Ak + /-ik)AtPk(0  + Ak_tAtPk_t(t) + /JkAtPk+l(0  + o (0  k  > 1 
P0 (t + A 0  = P0 (0  -  4)AtP0 (0  + Mi (0  + ° (0  k  = o
where Ak is the birth rate (or arrival rate), representing the rate at which births (arrivals) occur 
when the population (number in the system) is k  ; and ¡ik is the death rate (or departure rate), 
representing the rate at which deaths (departures) occur when the population (number in the 
system) is k  . The above equations can also be written in the form:
= \ APk-\ ( 0  -  ( A  + Mk )Pk ( 0 + mA ,  (0 , k  > l 
^ = - V U 0 + /V U 0 , k  = o
at
Semi-Markov Processes
We noted above that for discrete- and continuous-time Markov chains the time spent in a state 
respectively obeys a geometrical or exponential distribution. In a semi-Markov process the time 
the process remains in a state obeys and arbitrary probability distribution. However, at the 
instants o f state transitions, the process behaves just like a Markov chain, at those instants the 
process is referred to as an embedded Markov chain.
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Random Walks
A random walk is a Markov chain in which the next state the process occupies is equal to its 
current state plus a random variable, whose value is drawn independently from an arbitrary 
distribution; this distribution, however, does not change with the state o f the process. Expressed 
analytically, a sequence of random variables { Xn} is referred to as a random walk if
x „ = i u ,
i=1
where £7,,£/2,... is a sequence o f independent random variables with a common, arbitrary 
distribution.
Renewal Processes
The renewal process is a specific application o f the random walk; it counts the transitions made 
by the process as a function o f time -  U(t)  equals the number o f transitions that have taken 
place by time t (it is also assumed that the process begins in state 0, ie. U(0) = 0 ).
The Poisson Process
The Poisson process is widely used in queuing theory for the modelling o f arrival processes 
such as the sequence o f times at which calls are originated by users of a telephony network. It is 
a special case of the birth-death process in which the arrival rate is constant and the departure 
rate is zero in all states {Ak = A, p,k = 0 V k ). Therefore we have:
P ( t) = ^ L e * k > 0 , t > 0  
k k\
which is known as the Poisson distribution.
For a Poisson process, the average number o f arrivals in (0,t)  is At and the variance o f the 
number of arrivals in the same time interval is also equal to A t. The interarrival times o f a 
Poisson arrival process are exponentially distributed, ie. the pdf o f the interarrival times is given 
by:
f i t )  = for*  t > o
The mean of the exponential interarrival time distribution is yx , while its variance is . The
exponential distribution also exhibits the memoryless property, whereby the distribution o f the 
time until a future arrival is independent o f the time since the last arrival. Therefore if, at some 
random time t , an estimate o f the time that will elapse until the next arrival is evaluated then 
the result will be independent o f the time that has elapsed since the last arrival.
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Bernoulli Trials
Bernoulli trials are a stochastic process widely used to model a sequence of independent generic 
trials that can result in two outcomes, success or failure, where the probability o f success is p  
and the probability o f failure is (1 -  p ) . Analytically we can describe the Bernoulli trials process 
with a sequence o f indicator random variables / 2, , where the j " 1 indicator variable is 
used to describe the outcome of trial j . Therefore we have:
P[ I j = \ \  = p  
PUj =0] = ( l- /7 )
3.1.1.3 Queuing Theory
Queuing theory involves the study and analysis o f  the behaviour o f queuing systems, where a 
queuing system is any system in which arrivals place demands upon a finite-capacity resource 
[Kleinrock, 1975]. Queuing theory is concerned with estimating values such as the mean queue 
size, mean waiting time or length of idle period, which are key metrics used for the evaluation 
of the performance of many systems.
In general the length of a queue depends on the mean arrival rate (of customers), the mean rate 
at which arrival demands are serviced (the service rate) and on the statistical fluctuations o f 
these rates. Clearly, when the mean arrival rate exceeds the system capacity the queue will grow 
in an unbounded manner. However, even where the mean arrival rate is less than system 
capacity queues will sometimes grow, due to clustered arrivals and/or variations in demands; the 
effect of these variations will be greater when the arrival rate approaches the maximum capacity 
o f the system. We now introduce some o f the basic terminology used in queuing theory.
In order to completely specify a queuing system the stochastic process(es) that describe the 
arrivals to the system and the structure and discipline of the server(s) must be described. The 
arrival process to a queue is typically described in terms o f the probability distribution o f the 
interarrival times o f usage requests, denoted A( t ) , where:
A(t)  = / ’[time between arrivals < i]
The mean arrival rate to the queue is denoted X , giving the mean interarrival time as x/ x . The 
svc of A(t)  is given by Ka = cr2AX2. An arrival stream may be comprised o f more than one class 
o f arrivals, which may be described by different interarrival distributions.
The server process of a queue is typically described in terms of the probability distribution o f 
the service times o f request processed by the queue, denoted B ( x ) , where:
B(x)  = ^[service time < x]
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The mean service rate o f the queue is denoted f i , giving the mean service time . The svc o f
B( x ) given by Ks = crj/i2. It is possible for a queue to contain more than one server and it is 
possible that distribution of service times will differ for each server.
The load of a queue, denoted p ,  is a measure of the proportion of time the queue server is busy;
it is calculated as p  = ^ . An important structural description of a queue is that o f the queuing
discipline, which describes the order in which requests are taken from the queue and allowed 
into service. Some common queuing disciplines are First-In-First-Out (FIFO) and Last-In- 
First-Out (LIFO). Some queuing disciplines distinguish between classes o f request arrivals on 
the basis o f priority, with higher priority requests being granted preferential access to the server. 
The extent o f storage capacity available in the queue to hold waiting requests may also be 
limited, the number of requests that can be stored is often denoted by K  .
A fundamental result in queuing theory is L ittle ’s Law, which states that the mean number of 
requests in a queuing system (denoted N ) is equal to the mean arrival rate o f requests to the 
system (X) ,  times the mean time spent by requests in the system (denoted T ):
77 = 27’
Queues can be classified according to the widely-used shorthand notation A l B l n ,  where A 
describes the queue’s interarrival time distribution, B  describes its service time distribution and 
n is the number of servers in the queue. Values which A  and B  can take on include 
exponential (M), deterministic (D), Erlangian (E) and general (G). We will concentrate here on 
the M I  M l  1 queue, which is widely used in the modelling o f telecommunications networks.
The M /M /1 Queue
The M /M /1  queue is a single server queue with a Poisson arrival process and an exponential 
service time distribution. Therefore both the arrival rate, X and the service rate, ¡j. are 
independent of both time and the state o f the arrival and service processes.
The mean number of requests in the queue is given by:
N  = - P
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1 - p
and the variance of the mean number o f requests is given by:
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The average time spent in the system is given by
j   /  r*
l - p
The svc o f both the interarrivals to the queue and the service times is given by 
Ka = 1, Ks m \
A significant result relating to the M / M / 1 queue is B urke’s Theorem, which shows that, in 
steady state, the output of a stable M /M /1  with interarrival rate X is a Poisson process with 
the same rate X . An important consequence of this is that the formulae listed above can also be 
applied to a network of M / M / 1 queues, but only if the network is feedforward (there is no 
feedback between any o f the queues in the system) and all queues have only a single service
Networks o f Queues
The study o f computer systems and communications networks often requires analysis of 
queuing systems characterised by complex service disciplines and networks o f interconnected 
queues. Unfortunately the range of queuing networks for which solutions are known in an 
explicit form is limited to so-called Jackson and BCMP (Baskett, Chandy, Muntz and 
Palacios) classes o f network. Jackson networks are systems of queues o f unbounded length 
having independent service times, distributed according to exponential Iaw i1 with no 
distinction being made between different classes of customer. Open systems, which receive 
customers from the exterior according to a Poisson process, or closed systems, containing a 
constant number o f customers, are permitted. BCMP are somewhat more general in nature, in 
that they allow for the existence o f different classes of customers and service disciplines other 
than First-In-First-Out. Therefore, in order to analyse networks involving different classes of 
customers, with service time dependent on class (as would be the case for a reasonably realistic 
IN queuing model) it is necessary to employ an approximate method.
A number o f approximate methods for queuing network analysis are available. The most widely 
used among these are the decomposition method, which consists o f studying each queue o f the 
network along with characterisation o f intermediate streams; mean value analysis, which 
involves the study of the first moments o f the mean numbers in each queue; the aggregation 
method, which involves study of the system group by group, where groups are characterised by 
weak interactions with the exterior; and the isolation method, which consists o f isolating each 
queue and studying it formally taking into account the effects of interaction with the exterior.
21 These laws can have parameters that depend on the length o f  the respective queue.
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Other approximation methods involve iterative methods or the lead to numerical solutions and 
are generally more difficult to employ than those listed above.
For our fully analytic IN model (presented in §5.3.2) we require an analysis method that is 
applicable to queuing networks exhibiting the following characteristics:
• Openness: in an IN service requests arrive from a source external to the networks and depart 
to some external sink;
• Poisson arrival process: it is reasonable to approximate the arrivals o f IN service requests as 
a Poisson process;
•  Support for multiple classes of customer: INs typically support multiple service classes, 
with individual service sessions comprising different message types, each placing different 
processing demands on IN resources;
•  Exponentially distributed service times: it is reasonable to assume exponentially distributed 
service times for messages processed by IN resources (the mean service time for different 
messages types may o f course vary).
The results we require from our analytic model in order to evaluate the performance o f various 
load control strategies are the mean load, queue length and (if possible) delays for each service 
type. Mean arrival rates and hence mean loads can be calculated directly by inspection of the 
queuing network, but queue lengths and delays must be provided by the analysis method.
Since we require the analysis method to support multiple classes of customer approaches based 
on Jackson and BCMP networks are not usable and an appropriate approximation method must 
be chosen. O f the available approximation methods the simplest one to apply that provides the 
necessary outputs is the decomposition method. This was therefore chosen for the development 
o f our analytic model.
The Decomposition Method for Queuing Network Approximation
The decomposition method provides an approximation of the mean queue lengths and delays by 
means of a queue-by-queue decomposition of the network. The method involves the formulation 
o f a set of linear equations that approximately express the svc o f the intervals between two 
departures from station i (interdeparture times), denoted C(. , in terms o f the svc of the 
interdeparture times for all other stations in the network. These set o f equations are solved and 
their solutions allow calculation o f the svc of the interarrival times at each station, denoted K a ,. 
Knowing A, and Kai , the mean queue length o f station / can be calculated by means o f 
Kingman’s formula and mean delays using Little’s Law.
Central to the decomposition is the assumption that the departure process from every station in 
the network is a renewal process (the time interval between successive departures does not
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depend on the length o f previous intervals). Clearly this assumption is exact in the case where 
all stations have a Poisson arrival process and exponentially distributed service times, which is 
the case for the analytic IN model we develop in chapter 5. Generally, the method is not 
applicable where some stations contain more than a single server or when the queuing discipline 
at any stations is other than FIFO. We will now provide the formulation o f the decomposition 
equations and outline how their solution can be used to calculate mean queue lengths and mean 
delays. A detailed derivation o f the formulation of the equations can be found in [Harrison and 
Patel, 1993].
Consider a queuing network consisting o f J  stations. Let the stations in the network each 
support R  classes o f customer and let r denote an arbitrary customer class. Let XJr denote the 
mean rate of arrival o f class r customers at station j . For each customer class there is a stream 
of arrivals from the exterior, with arrival rate denoted XQr and svc denoted Ka0r ( j  = 0 is used 
to denote the exterior). The total arrival rate to the system, denoted X , is given by:
R
;'Or
r=1
Each station j  has a mean service for class r customers ¡djr and svc Ks j r . Upon departure 
from station i a customer o f class r will arrive at station j  as a customer o f class r' with a 
probability denoted p jrJr, . The relative frequency of the number of visits by a customer of class
r to station i is denoted by eir. The values for e!r are the solutions of the following system of 
linear equations:
R ( J
eir = Z  Y uejr'Pjr'jr + Por'Jr
r=1 ^=1
The load at station j  due to customers o f class r , denoted p j r , is then given by:
p , - & -Mj,
The mean total load at station j , denoted p } is given by:
R
P j = Y P j rr=1
Similarly the mean arrival rate at station j  , denoted Xj is given by:
r=1
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Using the terminology defined above the decomposition equations for station j , 1 < j  < J , can 
be written as follows:
C j = - 1 + X  PjrMjr (KSjr + 1) + 0  ~ Pj )(&<* J + 1 + ^P j )
r=\
where:
KaJ = X - ' f j [(Ck - l ) PkJ+l]AkPkj
¿=0
with:
R R 2
r'= l \
The set of linear equations in C . , 1 < j  < J  can be solved simultaneously and the results used to 
calculate Ka} , 1 < j  < J . Knowing X} and Ka} , the mean length of the queue at station j , 
denoted Lj can then be calculated using Kingman’s formula:
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x , Pj j Ka j +Ks j )
2(1 - P j )
The mean delay at the yth station can then be obtained by applying Little’s Law:
The mean delay for each customer in passing through the network can be obtained by simply 
summing the mean delays at each queue for every queue visited (or re-visited) by the customer
3.1.2 Sim ulatio n-B ased  N etw ork  M odelling
Simulation is the imitation o f the operation of a real-world process or system over time 
[Banks, 1998]. It involves the generation o f an artificial history of a system, given specific 
inputs, and the observation o f that artificial history to draw inferences concerning the actual 
performance characteristics o f the system. Because simulation models can be built to closely 
mirror the behaviour o f aspects o f a real system without significant simplifying assumptions 
they are particularly useful for the modelling of highly dynamic systems, whose behaviour 
cannot be easily modelled analytically.
The most common form o f simulation is know as discrete event simulation; it relates to the 
modelling o f systems whose state variables change only at those discrete points in time, points 
at which events occur. This is the case with most telecommunications networks, where the
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behaviour o f interest is almost always o f a discrete nature (for example the arrival o f a data 
packet at a node, or the end o f a telephone call).
Events in a discrete event simulation model occur as a consequence o f the completion of system 
activities, where activities typically involve the processing of an object passing through the 
system by a system resource. Objects often compete for resources, possibly joining queues to 
wait for the resource in question to be released by another object. The model is executed over 
time, by a mechanism that moves simulated time forward. System state is updated at each event, 
along with the capturing and freeing o f resources that may occur at that time. Models are 
invariably implemented as software programs with inputs provided by random number 
generators that emulate stochastic behaviour typical o f the real world.
The simulation models described in this thesis were implemented using the OPNET™ 
simulation model development environment [OPNET, 2001]. OPNET is a hierarchical, 
object-oriented development environment that is designed specifically for modelling and 
analysis o f communication networks. It provides a hierarchical graphical interface for model 
specification in which network, node and process models are combined to realise a complete 
network model, as well as a range of tools for the specification o f simulation inputs and filtering 
and analysis o f outputs.
OPNET network models define the position and interconnection of communicating entities, or 
nodes. Each node is described by a block structured data flow diagram, or OPNET node model, 
which typically depicts the interrelation o f processes, protocols and subsystems. Each 
programmable block in a node model has its functionality defined by a process model, which is 
defined by means of C programming code encapsulated within a graphically laid out 
state-transition diagram. Specification o f processes in C is facilitated by an extensive library o f 
support functions providing a range o f simulation services.
3.2 LOAD CONTROL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
In this section we briefly introduce three approaches used in the specification o f the load control 
strategies whose performance we analyse in chapters 5 and 6. §3.2.1 gives an overview of 
mathematical optimisation and linear programming, whilst §3.2.2 and §3.2.3 introduce 
Market-based Control and Ant Colony Optimisation, two paradigms for network control that 
have been developed by the research community in recent years.
3.2.1 M athem atical  Optim isation
Mathematical optimisation is the process of ascertaining the existence o f and evaluating either 
the maximum or minimum value o f a mathematical function and the values o f function 
parameters which result in this optimal value, subject to a number o f (equality or inequality)
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constraints. The function to be optimised is referred to as the objective function. The possible 
values o f the objective function, subject to the constraints, form a feasible region; the 
optimisation process returns the point giving a maximum/minimum value o f the function.
Optimisation problems are classified as linear or non-linear, depending on whether or not the 
objective function and all constraints are linear in nature. The simplest and most widely used 
class o f optimisation problems are known as linear programming problems, in which the 
objective function and all constraints are linear. Linear programming problems can be expressed 
analytically in the form :22
Minimise cx 
s.t. Ax = b
j t > 0
Where x  is the vector o f variables to be solved for; A is a matrix o f known coefficients; and c 
and b are vectors o f known coefficients. Note that usually A  has more columns than rows, so 
A x - b  is therefore quite likely to be under-determined, leaving great latitude in the choice of 
x  with which to minimise c x .
The most commonly employed method for solving linear programming problems is the simplex 
method, which involves visiting a progressively improving series o f trial solutions, until a 
solution is reached that satisfies the conditions for an optimum. The simplex method exists in 
two forms, the single-phase form which requires that all constraints are upper-bounded and the 
two-phase form which can handle constraints for which lower-bounds are defined.
In chapter 5 we compare the performance of an IN load control strategy we develop with that of 
a similar strategy in which load control parameters are calculated as the solution of a linear 
programming problem. The linear programming problem is formulated in a manner such that 
the objective function and the constraints are linear and all parameters are upper-bounded, hence 
the single-phase simplex method can be used to provide a solution. The LP_SOLVE library 
[Berkelaar and Dirks, 1995] written using the C programming language was used to implement 
the single-phase simplex method in our performance analysis studies.
3.2.2 M a rk et-B ased  Control
Market-based control is a paradigm for the design and implementation o f distributed resource 
allocation and optimisation problems involving the maximisation/minimisation o f some global 
measure. With this paradigm system entities emulate a real market by trading commodities with 
each other. The producers and consumers (referred to as agents) o f system resources are
22 This is the standard form representation o f a linear programming problem. General linear programming 
problems, containing inequality constraints and upper/lower bounds on x  can always be expressed in this 
form.
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therefore modelled as the self interested decision makers described in standard microeconomic 
theory. Resource allocation decisions are governed by a market price system in which agents 
interact by offering to buy or sell commodities at given prices. Market-based control systems 
typically are centred around algorithms for finding the general equilibrium  o f the market, that 
is, a set o f prices such that supply meets demand.
In order to model the bidding behaviour of agents utility functions , which encapsulate the 
preferences o f a consumer are employed. A high value o f the utility function for some 
consumption bundle means that such a bundle is preferred over a bundle with a lower utility 
function value. An example utility function for a single commodity is illustrated inFigure 3.2. 
Apart from the utility function each agent has associated with it an endowment (initial 
allocation) o f each commodity.
Utility
Figure 3.2: Example single commodity utility function.
If  a number o f agents can trade commodities in such a manner that all agents have higher utility 
after the trade, then the agents are motivated to trade commodities with each other. Clearly, if 
trading is performed in the context o f a price-based market (every commodity is evaluated in 
terms o f another commodity or using a monetary unit) each agent will face the optimisation 
problem o f how to maximise its utility given the prevailing market prices and its utility 
function.
General equilibrium is found when a set of prices is found such that the amounts that all agents 
wish to buy and sell (given their utility functions) sums to zero for each commodity. The change 
in allocation that an agent desires o f a particular commodity at certain price levels, certain 
endowments and a certain utility function is referred to as the net demand for that commodity. 
General equilibrium can then also be defined as the situation in which the sum o f all net 
demands (the aggregate excess demand) is zero for all commodities. The equilibrium for a 
single commodity (partial equilibrium  in a multi-commodity market) is illustrate in Figure 3.3.
Given the above discussion, we see that the central problem in developing a market-based 
control system is designing an algorithm that finds the equilibrium allocation o f commodities. 
The search for equilibrium is commonly implemented so that agents submit bids to an 
auctioneer during the search. From these bids the auctioneer updates its information and
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requests new bids in a iterative fashion; once equilibrium is found the commodities are allocated 
using the equilibrium prices. Computing the equilibrium and doing (re-)allocation only when 
the equilibrium has been found is referred to a tâtonnement process.
Quantity
Figure 3.3: Illustra tion  o f partia l equilibrium .
There are two approaches, price-oriented and resource-oriented, used to realise tâtonnement 
processes in market-based control implementations. Price-oriented approaches search for a set 
o f prices such that the supply meets demand using price as the free search parameter; if at an 
auction iteration, the demand for a commodity exceeds supply, the price o f the commodity is 
increased for the next iteration. A  well-known realisation o f this approach is the WALRAS 
system [Wellman, 1993] which has been applied to applications such as ensuring quality-of- 
service for multimedia applications [Yamaki et al., 1996] and IN load control [Patel et al., 
2000a; 2000b],
Resource-oriented approaches differ from price-oriented approaches in that the quantity traded, 
not the price is used as the free search parameter. The auctioneer sets the allocation o f 
commodities to agents at each iteration and agents report how much they are prepared to pay for 
an additional small amount o f each commodity. The auctioneer then takes these declarations 
into account when changing the allocation in the next iteration; agents with high willingness to 
pay get more, the others less. The algorithm terminates when, for all commodities, all agents are 
willing to pay the same price for a small amount of the commodity.
In chapter 5 we develop a IN load control strategy employing a resource-oriented market 
algorithm to allocate the resources o f an SCP. In the approach utility functions are formulated in 
terms o f the profit generated by successful sessions o f IN services and resources are allocated so 
that overall profit is maximised.
3.2.3 An t  C olo ny  Optim isation
Ant Colony Optimisation is the application o f approaches based on the behaviour o f real ant 
colonies to static and dynamic optimisation problems. The approach has been applied to 
problems such as routing in circuit- [Di Caro and Dorigo, 1998] and packet-switched 
[Schoonderwoerd et al., 1997] networks as well as to combinatorial optimisation problems such 
as the travelling salesman problem [Dorigo and Gambardella, 1997]. These studies have
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demonstrated that ant-based distributed control can have many advantages in 
telecommunications applications, for example: high performance in terms o f maximising call 
throughput; scalability; and adaptability to different network topologies, traffic patterns and 
transient overloads.
Individual ants are very unsophisticated insects from a behavioural point o f view, however 
colonies o f ants, acting as a collective, are capable o f performing relatively complex tasks, such 
as building and protecting their nest, forming bridges, colony emigration and finding the 
shortest routes from the nest to a food source. Such behaviour arises through indirect 
communication between the ants, affected through modifications induced in the environment, a 
process named stigmergy. An example of stigmergy is the means foraging ants use to quickly 
find the shortest path to a food source: individual ants following a particular path will deposit a 
type o f highly volatile hormone, called a pheromone, giving rise to a pheromone trail for that 
path. In general, ants faced with a decision between alternative paths will follow the path for 
which the pheromone trail is strongest. However, the shortest path will tend to acquire stronger 
trails more rapidly (since the ant’s round trip time will be shorter and thus more pheromone will 
be deposited), thereby causing more ants to follow it. This results in positive feedback, ensuring 
that the shortest path is quickly identified and utilised by the majority of the foraging ants.
The trail laying behaviour described above can be readily applied to routing in 
telecommunications networks by replacing the routing tables in network nodes by tables o f 
probabilities representing the ‘pheromone strength’ for onward routes from that node. Every 
node has a pheromone table for every possible destination in the network, with each table 
having an entry for each outgoing link. These entries represent the probability that influences 
whether an ant (or call, or data packet) selects that particular trail (ie. outgoing link) in order to 
reach its destination.
Assuming that the routing tables in network nodes are structured as described above, there are a 
number o f ways in which they can be used to realise an ant-based routing strategy. For example, 
as described in [Schoonderwoerd et al., 1997], a number of ants can be continually launched 
from every network node destined for a randomly chosen node. At every node an ant passes 
through it chooses an outgoing link based on the probabilities in the local pheromone table for 
its destination. In addition ants update the pheromone tables associated with their source node, 
by increasing the probability for the link they just arrived on and proportionally decreasing the 
probabilities for all other links. Updating o f pheromone probabilities in this manner will directly 
affect future ants/calls/packets travelling towards the ant’s source node: calls/packets travel 
from their source to destination by choosing, at every node they pass through, the outgoing link 
for which the pheromone probability relating to their destination node is the highest.
The process o f encouraging ants to avoid routes through the network that are overloaded is 
achieved by progressively reducing the value by which the ant increments a probability in the
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pheromone tables as the ant grows older. Ants passing through an overloaded area will be 
delayed significantly thus their influence on pheromone tables will be lesser than that o f ants 
that have taken more favourable routes. Ongoing manipulation o f routing tables by ants should 
have the effect that optimal routes (given the network topology and current traffic patterns) 
through the network are established and should be able to adapt to overloads, or resource 
failures.
In chapter 6 we present a modified version o f the pheromone-based routing scheme outlined 
above which is used by SSPs to decide which SCP an IN service request should be routed 
towards. SSPs are thereby encouraged to favour SCPs which are in close physical proximity 
(because round-trip delays are shorter for these SCPs) and/or can be reached via non-overloaded 
routes.
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CHAPTER 4
P e r f o r m a n c e  A n a l y s is  o f  St a n d a r d  SS.7/IN 
L o a d  C o n t r o l s
A large body of publicly available literature has discussed the results o f numerous studies 
regarding the performance o f standard SS.7 and IN load controls. However, these studies 
typically employ overly simple network topologies and do not investigate the effects of 
simultaneous invocation o f SS.7 and IN controls. The goal of this chapter is to further enhance 
the understanding o f SS.7/IN control operation by addressing both these aspects. Our results 
also help us identify the inherent limitations o f existing SS.7/1N controls and the basic 
characteristics o f an alternative approach that would overcome them.
We commence in §4.1 by providing an overview of the two SS.7/IN models we employ in our 
study. The first o f these is quasi-analytical in nature and is described in §4.2, while the second is 
simulation-based and is described in §4.3. §4.4 presents and discusses the results o f seven 
different overload scenarios, for which the performance of the load controls is analysed. Finally, 
§4.5 summarises the results, draws overall conclusions regarding the operation o f the SS.7 and 
IN load controls and identifies desirable characteristics of an alternative approach.
4.1 OVERVIEW OF SS.7/IN MODELS
This section introduces the quasi-analytic and simulation models used to analyse the operation 
o f the SS.7 and IN load controls. It provides an overview of the network topology, the load 
profiles studied and the various SS.7/IN network element models. Only those characteristics 
common to both the quasi-analytic and simulation models are discussed here; details specific to 
each model type can be found in §4.2 and §4.3.
4.1.1 N etw o r k  T opology
A key goal in the design o f the quasi-analytic and simulation models is to facilitate the 
modelling o f realistic overload scenarios; therefore it is important to model a SS.7/IN network 
topology similar to those implemented by network operators world-wide. SS.7 networks are
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typically deployed using a hierarchical mesh-like arrangement o f STPs that forms the backbone 
o f the network, with all SPs being directly linked to a pair o f the mesh STPs.23 We model a 
network containing a fully connected mesh o f four STPs, a single SCP and two ‘groupings’ of 
six switches (each having the same characteristics); the topology is illustrated by Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: SS.7/IN netw ork  topology for quasi-analytic and sim ulation models.
In many existing networks not all switches incorporate SSF functionality and m ust therefore 
route all IN service requests to an SSF-enabled switch. However, as network operators 
increasingly use IN to deploy high-volume services such as Number Portability and Pre-paid 
there is a trend towards incorporating SSF functionality in as many switches as possible. In our 
study we assume all twelve switches are SSF-enabled, so the potential effects o f switches 
forwarding IN requests to each other during overload conditions are ignored.
Another significant simplification is to completely omit the trunk network from the models. In 
particular, no limits are placed on the number of voice circuits that may be concurrently set-up 
between two SSPs. In real networks the unavailability o f trunk network resources during 
overload would cause the rejection o f service requests, thereby limiting the load offered to the 
signalling network. In addition, the operation o f switch network management controls and their 
impact on load offered to the signalling networks is not considered. Ignoring the impact o f 
switch network management controls is justifiable as [Houckei al., 1994] have shown that their 
activation can lead to the propagation of overload and that networks perform better in their 
absence (c / §2.4.1.2). Their omission also allows us to focus on the particular interactions 
between the SS.7 and IN controls.
23 To improve fault-tolerance, nodes in an SS.7 network are typically deployed as mated pairs, only one 
o f which is active at a time. As the pair share a single SS.7 point code we can model mated pairs as a 
single entity. We do not model scenarios in which a mated pair is taken out o f service, thus the SS.7 
procedures that deal with recovery from this type o f failure have been omitted from our models.
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A major focus o f the study is to analyse the interaction between the SS.7 and IN load controls in 
scenarios where both SS.7 and IN resources are susceptible to overload. As outlined in 
[Atai and Northcote, 1996], overloads o f this nature have been observed in real networks. The
SS.7 load controls were designed to cope with the overload of SS.7 links, but as described in 
§2.4.1.2, their application to STP processor overload has also been investigated. We assume 
here that only SS.7 links and not STPs overload; as shown by [Rumsewicz, 1994b] the 
oscillatory throttling behaviour o f traffic sources (SSPs) is broadly similar in both cases. On the 
IN plane we focus on overloads o f the SCP central processor, since the SCP is the physical 
entity whose behaviour is most critical to IN performance. We ignore the possibility that 
overloads o f SDPs or IPs may occur. In addition, we assume that each SSP incorporates an SRF 
and that the SCP incorporates an SDF, thus IPs and SDPs do not appear in Figure 4.1.
For simplicity we assume that the linksets shown in Figure 4.1 each contain only a single link. 
The routing scheme is such that SSPs and the SCP send half of their outgoing traffic over each 
o f their two outgoing links. STP1 and STP3 send half of their traffic for Group B SSPs or the 
SCP over each if  the two links connecting them to STP2 and STP4; similarly STP2 and STP4 
send half o f their traffic destined for Group A SSPs over each of the two links connecting them 
to STP1 and STP3. This routing scheme means that the links connecting STP1 with STP3 and 
STP2 with STP4 do not carry any traffic, so they have been omitted from the models. Links 
between SSPs and STPs clearly carry a significantly smaller volume o f signalling traffic than 
links interconnecting STPs or connecting the SCP to its STP pair, therefore the latter have also 
been omitted from the models. Link/node failures and the associated SS.7 recovery procedures 
are not modelled. Figure 4.2 below illustrates those links that have been fully modelled. In this 
study we investigate scenarios in which links may become overloaded in either the ‘forward’ or 
‘reverse’ direction, thus it is convenient to think of each link as actually consisting o f two 
unidirectional links. We use the link numbers assigned in Figure 4.2 throughout the chapter.
oooooo ooo
Figure 4.2: Links included in the quasi-analytic and simulation models.
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Both the quasi-analytic and simulation models support the three service types described in 
§4.1.2; one is ISUP telephony, whilst the other two are IN services. ISUP telephony involves 
the exchange o f signalling messages between two SSPs in the network. We model only ISUP 
telephony service sessions where the two SSPs are in different groups.24 Overloads may occur 
for any o f the three service types and originate in one or both of the SSP groups.
4.1.2 Suppo rted  Services
This section describes the actions and signalling messages I Information Flows (IFs)2S involved 
in a successful service session of each of the three modelled service types. In keeping with the 
goal o f developing realistic SS.7/IN models, an effort has been made to reproduce as accurately 
as possible the characteristics of the signalling sequences and processor requirements that would 
apply in a real network. It should be noted that detailed data on services and processing 
requirements is not made publicly available by operators and equipment vendors, hence the 
values used here are estimates only; they are based to a large extent on the values used by other 
researchers and informal discussions with network operator and equipment vendor 
representatives. The three supported services are ISUP Telephony, IN Freephone and IN 
Televoting; each will now be described.
4.1.2.1 ISUP Telephony
The ISUP Telephony service involves the set-up and subsequent tear-down of a voice path 
between a calling and called party (assumed in our models to be attached to two different SSPs 
in different SSP groups). Only the SS.7 signalling associated with the service session is 
modelled; no account is taken o f the trunk network. The signalling sequence is based on that 
described in the SS.7 ISUP recommendations and is illustrated byFigure 4.3. In this figure the 
horizontal arrowhead lines depict the signalling messages and the vertical lines represent both 
the functional entities and the passage o f time (from top to bottom). The illustrated sequence 
pertains to a session where the callee answers his/her telephone and the caller terminates the call 
by putting his/her telephone on-hook.
The sequence o f actions involved in the session is as follows:
• Caller goes off-hook and dials the number o f the callee;
24 ISUP telephony sessions between switches in the same group load only the STPs and the links 
connecting the STPs to SSPs. Since overload of both these resource types is not addressed it is not 
necessary to model intra-group sessions.
25 Information Flows are used in IN recommendations to specify the information that can be passed 
between IN FEs. IFs are mapped to operations invoked by the INAP entity associated with the originating 
IN FE; operations are then encapsulated within TCAP messages transferred over the SS.7 network.
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SSP SS.7 SSP
1- Ringing Time 
>■ Conversation Time
Figure 4.3: Signalling sequence for successful ISUP Telephony service session.
• The dialled digits are collected by the call processing application, which recognises that the 
callee is attached to a remote switch. The call processing application requests the local ISUP 
entity to initiate contact with the remote ISUP entity;
• The ISUP entity sends an Initial Address Message (1AM) to the remote ISUP entity via the
SS.7 network;
• The remote ISUP entity receives the IAM and under instruction from the local call 
processing application, returns an Address Complete Message (ACM) indicating that the 
called number is valid;
• The call processing application at the callee’s SSP rings the callee’s telephone;
• The callee goes off-hook, triggering the call processing application to request ISUP to send
a Answer Message (ANM) to the caller’s ISUP entity;
• The ANM is received and the call processing applications set up a voice path between the 
caller and callee;
• At the end o f the conversation the caller (in this case) goes on-hook, triggering the call 
processing application to request ISUP to send a Release Message (REL)\
• The REL is received by the callee’s ISUP entity and the call processing application requests
that a Release Complete (RLC) is sent to the caller’s ISUP entity;
• The RLC is received and the call processing applications tear-down the voice path.
r---------------- 1
ISUP
I__
Initial Address Message (IAM)
: Address Complete Message (ACM)
T
Answer Message (ANM)
Release (REL)
Release Complete (RLC)
ISUP
__i
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Table 4.1 below shows the message lengths for the ISUP Telephony service used in the models. 
These values are the same as those used by [Smith, 1994a],
Table 4.1: Message lengths for ISUP Telephony service.
M essage Type M essage Length in Bytes
IAM 48.0
ACM 20.0
ANM 18.0
REL 22.0
RLC 17.0
4.1.2.2 IN  Freephone
When an end-user accesses the Freephone service he/she dials a number with a special prefix 
(often 1800 or 0800) and is connected to a customer service agent or automatic announcement, 
with the cost o f the service session being charged to the Freephone customer. The network 
operator allocates the number dialled by the end-user; when it is dialled the call processing 
application (the CCF) recognises it as a request for the Freephone service. The request is 
forwarded to the SCF, which accesses its SDF to translate the dialled number to the actual 
destination number o f the Freephone customer. This number is passed to the SSF; control is 
ceded to the CCF, which proceeds to set-up the call to the destination number. In addition, the 
billing system is updated to ensure that the Freephone customer, not the end-user, is charged for 
the service session (we have not modelled the charging aspect in our study).
The sequence o f IFs for the IN portion o f the Freephone session is illustrated inFigure 4.4. This 
IF sequence, along with the analogous sequence for IN Televoting (presented in §4.1.2.3) are 
based on the sequences described by [Lodge, 2000] and use the IN CS-1 IF types, as defined in 
[ITU, 1993b],
SSP
I--------------------------------1 r
SRF SSF
SS.7
Analysed Information
SCP
I I-------------------------------------- 1
SCF SDF
Select Route
Search
Search Result 
< --------------
I_________________________I I___________________________J I_________________________ I
Figure 4.4: Information Flow sequence for IN portion of Freephone service session.
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The sequence o f actions involved in the session is as follows:
• The end-user goes off-hook and dials the customer’s Freephone number;
•  The CCF recognises the end-user has requested an IN service and suspends normal call 
processing, passing control to the SSF;
• The SSF creates an Analysed Information IF containing the dialled digits and forwards it to 
the SCF;
• The SCF receives the IF and creates a new instance of the Freephone service logic program;
• The Service Logic Program Instance (SLPI) creates a Search IF and sends it to the SDF, 
which translates the number via a database access and returns it to the SCF within a 
Search Result IF;
• The SCF forwards the result o f  the number translation to the SSF by means o f a
Select Route IF;
• The SSF instructs the CCF to continue normal call processing using the destination number 
supplied by the SCF.
Successful completions o f the IN portion o f the session are immediately followed by a request 
for an ISUP Telephony session. We assume that the ISUP entity treats requests for these 
‘follow-on’ ISUP calls in the same manner as other ISUP requests (they are subject to ISUP 
load controls as normal).
For both the quasi-analytic/simulation models and for both IN Freephone and IN Televoting we 
assume that all signalling messages containing IFs sent from the SSF to the SCF are o f length 
100 Bytes, whilst those containing IFs sent from the SCF to the SSF are of length 120 Bytes.
4.1.2.3 IN Televoting
Televoting services allow a customer to collect data from a large population o f end-users, 
typically by means o f automated announcements and digit collection. They are regularly used 
by local or national media to run competitions or perform opinion polls. When an end-user dials 
the designated number, he/she is connected to an announcement system and instructed to select 
options by dialling sequences o f digits. The data entered by the end-user is used to update a 
database and the end-user’s selections are then acknowledged. The sequence o f (announcement, 
digit collection, database update, acknowledgement) may be iterated a number o f times 
depending on the customer’s requirements. The IF sequence for the version o f Televoting 
modelled in this study is illustrated byFigure 4.5; it involves two announcement phases and one 
database update.
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Time-'
Announce 
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Figure 4.5: Inform ation  Flow  sequence for IN  Televoting service session.
The sequence of actions involved in the session is as follows:
• The end-user goes off-hook and dials the customer’s Televoting number;
• The CCF recognises the end-user has requested an IN service and suspends normal call 
processing, ceding control to the SSF;
• The SSF creates an Analysed Information IF containing the dialled digits and forwards it to 
the SCF;
• The SCF receives the IF and creates a new instance o f the Televoting service logic program;
• The SLPI creates and sends a Connect to Resource IF to the SSF that requests a voice path
be opened between the end-user and the SRF;
• The SLPI creates and sends a Prompt and collect user information IF to the SRF requesting
that the indicated announcement be played and the digits dialled in response by the end-user
be collected;
• The SRF returns the end-user dialled digits within a Collected User Information IF;
SSP SS.7
r ~
SRF
L .
SSF
I r -
Analysed Information
Connect to Resource
Prompt and collect 
user Information
Collected User 
Information
Play Announcement
Specialized 
Resource Report
Disconnect 
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• The SLPI creates an Modify Entry IF and sends it to the SDF, which updates the relevant 
database entry and confirms the update to the SLPI by means o f an Modify Entry Result IF;
• The SLPI creates and sends a Play Announcement IF to the SRF, requesting that the 
indicated announcement be played;
• The SRF plays the announcement and returns a Specialized Resource Report IF as 
confirmation;
• The SLPI creates and sends a Disconnect Forward Connection IF to the SSF requesting it to 
tear-down the voice path between the end-user and the SRF;
• The SSF cedes control to CCF for further call processing.
4.1.3 SS.7/IN N e t w o r k  E l e m e n t  M o d e l l e d  F u n c t i o n a l i t y
The section provides an overview of the functionality o f the SS.7/IN network elements included 
in the quasi-analytic and simulation models. Particular emphasis is placed on the choice of 
parameter values for the SS.7 and IN overload detection and load throttling procedures.
4.1.3.1 Modelled STP Functionality
The models can contain two types of STP: ‘standard’ STPs, incorporating the functionality of 
the MTP and ‘enhanced’ STPs, which additionally incorporate an SCCP entity that performs 
GTT. We assume that STPs have a single central processor that carries out the MTP3 and (if 
present) SCCP functionality, together with separate processors for handling incoming and 
outgoing signalling links. The central processor is assumed to be of infinite capacity, so packets 
experience no queuing or processing delays when passing through it. We describe the modelled 
STP functionality by first describing the modelled MTP functionality and then describing the 
modelled SCCP functionality. It should be noted that these descriptions also pertain to the SSP 
and SCP, which also contain MTP and SCCP entities.
MTP Entity
As described in §2.2 the main purpose of the MTP is to reliably transport signalling messages 
(MSUs) between signalling nodes in the SS.7 network. Both the quasi-analytic and simulation 
models incorporate the MTP routing functionality, using the routing scheme described in §4.1.1. 
We do not model STP or link failures and therefore omit the comprehensive and complex MTP3 
failure recovery procedures from the model.
The MTP3 TFC procedure, using the 10, is modelled in detail in both models. This procedure 
ascertains the overload level o f all outgoing links through measurements o f the current size of 
the link queue. For both models, the overload onset threshold was set to 1400 Bytes and the 
overload abatement threshold was set to 800 Bytes (these are the values recommended by 
[Manfield et al., 1994]). During the period in which an outgoing link is overloaded a TFC
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message is generated for every n = %th MSU processed by the link. The TFC indicates overload 
of the SP indicated in the M SU’s DPC field and is sent to the SP indicated in the M SU’s OPC 
field. Note that SS.7 recommendations mandate that all management messages including TFCs 
are assigned a higher priority level than other signalling messages, hence they will not be 
affected by any link overloads on their route through the network. Specific details o f the manner 
in which the TFC procedure, including queue size estimation and TFC generation, is realised for 
the quasi-analytic and simulation models can be found in §4.2 and §4.3.
SCCP Entity
As described in §2.2, SCCP adds capabilities to those o f the MTP in order to provide a full 
Network Layer service to its users. These capabilities include GTT, which translates arbitrary 
network addresses (typically dialled digits) into SS.7 point codes. This functionality is often 
deployed in STPs within an SS.7 network; in our models SCCP/GTT can be optionally 
deployed in STP2 and STP4. In such a scenario, SSPs forward INAP messages to one o f these 
STPs. Upon arrival they are passed to the local SCCP entity, which changes the value in their 
DPC field to that of the SCP and passes them back to the MTP for transfer to the SCP.
We also model a SCCP load throttle closely resembling the standardised ISUP load throttle. As 
discussed in §2.2.1.3, load throttles implemented for the SCCP connectionless service are 
generally similar in nature to the ISUP load throttle, so the latter has been used as the basis for 
standardisation. Our SCCP load throttle updates its overload status for destination signalling 
points by responding, under the control o f two timers (which we label 77 and 72), to the arrival 
o f CIs from the MTP. Throughout this study we set the duration of 77 to 0.35 and the duration 
o f T2 to 5.1i.26 Our version o f the throttle employs percentage thinning, rejecting at random a 
percentage o f the messages arriving at the SCCP entity that are addressed to the overloaded 
destination. In this study we have set the number o f overload levels to four. Specifically, 0%, 
33%, 67% and 100% of messages are rejected at overload levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 respectively, 
where level 0 indicates no overload and level 3 indicates severe overload.
4.1.3.2 Modelled SSP Functionality
The focus o f this study is on the analysis of the performance o f the SS.7 and IN load controls in 
the presence o f SS.7 link and/or SCP processor overloads. In view o f this, SSPs are modelled in 
a relatively simple manner. We assume a similar processor architecture to that used for 
STPs: processors for handling signalling links and a single central processor o f infinite capacity, 
which carries out all MTP3 and user part functionality. Therefore, we do not address the manner 
in which overloads of SSP resources would impact on the operation o f the SS.7/IN load
26 These values are chosen arbitrarily, but are within the allowed range of values for the ISUP 729 and 
730 specified in SS.7 recommendations.
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controls. We describe the SSP model by first describing the modelled ISUP functionality and 
then describing the modelled functionality of the two IN entities, the SSF and the SRF.
ISUP Entity
In our models the ISUP entity maintains the originating and terminating call state process 
instances for each invoked ISUP Telephony service.27 This involves modelling o f end-user 
behaviour and the realisation o f the signalling sequence shown in Figure 4.3. A description of 
the signalling sequence can be found in §4.1.2.1 and the details of how it is modelled can be 
found in §4.2 and §4.3.
Also included is the ISUP load throttle, which is modelled in accordance with the standardised 
10 ISUP throttle (described in §2.2.1.1). We set the duration o f timer T29 to 0.3s and the 
duration o f timer T30 to 5.1s. We employ three overload levels, as follows: level 0 indicates no 
overload so no messages are throttled, level 1 indicates mild overload so all IAM messages are 
throttled, finally level 3 indicates severe overload with all message types being throttled. IAMs 
are given a lower priority than the other ‘call progress’ messages since the latter are associated 
with service sessions already admitted to the network and on which network resources have 
already been spent.
SSF Functional Entity
In our models the SSF FE maintains the Basic Call State Model (BCSM) instances for the IN 
Freephone and IN Televoting services,28 the IF sequences for which are described in §4.1.2.2 
and §4.1.2.3. It manages the complete SSP-side processing of a IN service session from trigger 
detection; through instantiation o f a BCSM instance for the session; handling o f 
communications with the other IN entities; and finally, session termination.
The SSF FE also includes the ACG load throttle. This throttle accepts/rejects requests for IN 
services using call gapping intervals, the lengths of which are dictated by ACG messages, 
periodically sent by the SCF to the SSF. The version of ACG we model is based on that 
described in [Northcote and Smith, 1998], which bears close resemblance to the controls 
deployed in existing IN systems. A gapping throttle can be put in place for each traffic source at 
an SSF; we consider a source to be constituted by all the requests for a particular service type 
that originate at a particular SSP.
We employ thirteen separate overload levels, which index the table o f interval lengths listed in 
Table 4.2 below (these values are those standardised in [Bellcore, 1994; 1995]). Upon ACG
27 These call state process models incorporate functionality associated with both the ISUP entity and the 
CCF.
28 The BCSM is used in IN recommendations to provide a model o f a telephony session containing 
trigger points, which, if  armed, can result in the invocation o f  an IN service sessions. BCSM  instances 
should reside in the CCF, however for simplicity we place them in the SSF functional entity model.
Brendan Jennings Page 78 31/05/01
Chapter 4: Performance Analysis o f Standard SS.7/TN Load Controls
arrival, the actual gap interval length that is put in place is calculated by randomising between 
90% and 110% the table value indexed by the overload level contained in the newly arrived 
ACG message. Level 0 has a gap interval length o f Os and is used to indicate that gapping is 
currently inactive. Control refreshing is not used, that is, gap interval timers are not reset upon 
arrival of a new ACG message. We do not model the use of a gap duration, since the SCFs 
periodically send ACG messages and so its use is unnecessary.
Table 4.2: Gap interval lengths for the ACG throttle.
Overload Level Gap Interval (s)
0 0
1 0.1
2 0.25
3 0.5
4 1.0
5 2.0
6 3.0
7 4.0
8 6.0
9 8.0
10 11.0
11 16.0
12 22.0
SRF Functional Entity
We do not address overload o f SRF resources in this study, hence we assume that there are an 
infinite number o f voice circuits and associated resources available for servicing requests for 
announcements and data collection. We assume that the time required to set up these circuits is 
negligible. Therefore the only delay incurred at the SRF is the delay between the arrival of the 
INAP message requesting an action and the generation of the appropriate response message. 
This is the delay relating to the playing o f announcements and data collection. The values for 
these delays differ slightly between the quasi-analytic and simulation models; details can be 
found in §4.2 and §4.3 respectively.
4.1.3.3 Modelled SCP Functionality
For the SCP we again employ a processor architecture in which a single central processor 
carries out the high-level functionality and peripheral processors handle the signalling links. The 
central processor has a service rate that we vary for the different scenarios addressed. As a 
simplification, we assume that all messages arriving at the SCP experience the same processing 
delay. We assume that the time the central processor spends assigning its overload level
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generating ACG messages is negligible.29 The central processor has a single input queue whose 
capacity is 15,000 Bytes. Messages arriving when the queue is full are discarded; we assume 
that discarding requires no processing resources. We will describe the remainder o f  the SCP 
model by first describing the modelled SCF functionality and then describing the modelled 
functionality o f the SDF.
SCF Functional Entity
The SCF functional entity incorporates the SLPs for the IN Freephone and IN Televoting 
services, the IF sequences for which are described in §4.1.2.2 and §4.1.2.3. The complete SCP- 
side processing o f the IN service sessions from SLPI instantiation, handling o f communications 
with other IN entities and SLPI termination.
In our models the SCF functional entity also includes the ACG overload detection procedure, 
which is again based on that described in [Northcote and Smith, 1998]. At measurement 
intervals of duration 10s an overload level is assigned to the SCP using a processor utilisation 
based measurement. The overload level is assigned using the following algorithm, which is 
designed with the aim o f to ensuring that the utilisation is kept between a lower threshold value 
(we use 0.8 Erlangs) and an upper threshold value (we use 0.9 Erlangs):
If utilisation > upper_threshold and current_level < max_level then:
new_level = current_level + 1
else
If utilisation < lower_threshold and current_level > 0 then: 
new_level = current_level - 1
The number o f overload levels is thirteen, corresponding to the thirteen gap intervals that can be 
used by the SSF ACG throttle. We assume that the SCF employs autonomous ACG messages to 
inform the SSFs o f the SCP’s overload status. Each time a new overload level is assigned, ACG 
messages are sent to all SSPs in the network. The ACG messages indicate the overload level, 
which is then used to index the gap interval for each of the sources corresponding to that SSP. 
Therefore, once the SCP overloads the same gap interval will be put in place for all sources
(unless the ACG is lost or excessively delayed in the SS.7 network).
SDF Functional Entity
The SDF functional entity models the reading and updating of a database in response to requests 
arriving from the SCF. We assume that the delays for databases reads and updates are 
incorporated into the processing delay for the INAP message that arrived at the SCF and 
triggered the SCF to contact the SDF. We do not address the potential for the SDF/database to 
be the bottleneck in the network.
29 In real systems the assignment o f  ACG overload levels is often the responsibility o f  a management 
system running on a separate processor.
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4.2 SS.7/IN QUASI-ANALYTIC MODEL
The SS.7/IN quasi-analytic model combines analytic techniques with random number 
generation to evaluate the transient behaviour o f the SS.7 and IN load controls. It employs and 
significantly enhances a hybrid modelling approach originally proposed in [Zepf and Willmann, 
1991]. The structure o f the model is illustrated inFigure 4.6. It is comprised o f three sub-model 
types:30 an ISUP user part sub-model, an IN user part sub-model31 and a resource sub-model for 
the modelling o f resource utilisation, queue sizes and overload detection. The IN user part 
sub-model supports Freephone and Televoting, whilst the ISUP user part sub-model supports 
ISUP telephony. All services are modelled in accordance with the specifications in §4.1,2?2
The user part sub-models take as inputs current service request arrival rates, the characteristics 
o f the supported services and the current parameters of the SS.7 UP and IN load throttles; they 
output the per message type volumes o f traffic offered to network resources for a given iteration 
interval. The resource sub-model uses user part sub-model outputs, along with information on 
the traffic held in link/SCP queues at the start of the iteration interval, to calculate mean 
utilisation and mean queue lengths for the iteration interval. It also models generation of 
TFC/ACG messages by overload detection procedures. This section provides a brief overview 
of the three sub-models; a fuller specification of each is provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.6: Structure o f SS.7/IN Quasi-Analytic Model.
IN Session 
"Completions
30 There are multiple instances o f the user part sub-models: each SSP has one ISUP and one IN sub-model 
instance, whilst the SCP has one IN sub-model instance. There is only one resource sub-model instance.
31 The IN user part model incorporates aspects o f  the functionality of SCCP, INAP, the IN SSF/SCF and 
the service logic for the supported services.
32 It would be straightforward to modify the traffic models to support a different mix o f services with 
different characteristics.
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4.2.1 O v e r v i e w  o f  ISUP S u b - M o d e l
The ISUP sub-model provides a model of the ISUP messages generated by ISUP telephony 
service sessions and the operation of the ISUP load throttle. First-offered service requests are 
assumed to arrive according to Poisson arrival processes, where the mean arrival rates for 
particular SSPs can vary with time over the course of the iterative analysis. ISUP service session 
message sequences are modelled in accordance with §4 .1.2.1, with the assumption that the 
callee always answers and that the caller initiates session termination. The duration o f the 
ringing time is a constant value o f 3s (10 iteration intervals) and the duration o f the 
conversation time is exponentially distributed, with a mean value o f 160.85 (536 iteration 
intervals).33 The sub-model also supports service request reattempts as follows: all service 
requests which are throttled by the ISUP UP controls, or whose sessions are prematurely ended 
due to discard of IAM, ACM or ANM messages (not RELs/RSCs) reattempt with 
probability PR . Reattempting requests re-enter the network after a delay uniformly distributed 
in the range (7], T2) seconds. The maximum number of times a request may reattempt is 
limited to RMAX .
We model the operation o f a ISUP load throttle (relating to a single destination ISUP entity) as 
an embedded Markov chain.34 The state transition diagram for the embedded Markov chain is 
illustrated in Figure 4.7. The state k  is defined as the throttle’s current load level for the 
destination user part, where k  ranges from value 0 (no load throttling) to K  (maximum load 
throttling).
Pi(0) Pi(1) Pi(2) Pi(K-1)
Pd(1) Pd(2) Pd(3) Pd(K)
Figure 4.7: Embedded Markov chain for modelling UP load throttling.
The embedded points in time are the instants at which the load level changes, due either to the 
arrival of a Cl (triggered by a TFC arrival) whilst 729  is inactive (load level increases) or to the 
expiry o f 730 (load level decreases). Pd(k) denotes the probability o f decreasing the load level 
whilst in state k  and Pj(k) denotes the probability of increasing it whilst in state k  . The values
33 This value was chosen to be in broad agreement with the simulation model, which employs a detailed 
model based on the distributions described in [Bolotin, 1994].
34 Although the length o f time the load throttle spends in a particular state (load level) follows an arbitrary 
probability distribution (it is dependent on TFC/CI arrival times) at the instants it does change state the 
new load level depends only on the current load level. We therefore have an embedded M arkov Chain 
(cf  §3.1.1.2).
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of these probabilities depend on a number o f factors, such as tT29 (the duration o f T 29) and 
tT30 (the duration o f 7 3 0 ), the state k  and link overload status.
In order to simplify the analysis of the transient behaviour o f the ISUP load throttling procedure 
we assume that that changes o f load level k  and other parameters only occur at discrete time 
instants tn , n = 0 ,1 ,2 ,..., at the end of each iteration interval. We can then use mean values 
over these intervals for the analysis. As a further simplification we choose the iteration interval 
length /)1+I -  tn = tT29 and tT3Q = A ■ tT29, where A is an integer. The former is a natural choice, 
since all CIs arriving while T29  is active are ignored; this means that the load level can only 
change a maximum of once per iteration interval.
We assume that all messages (including TFCs) are generated according to Poisson processes. 
TFC messages are generated in proportion to arriving message rates, therefore, since we also 
assume that TFCs always arrive at their destination during the same interval they are 
generated,35 they also will arrive at SSP according to Poisson processes. Given this assumption, 
it is straightforward to calculate the probability of the arrival of a Cl at an ISUP user part whilst 
the relevant T29  timer is inactive. The probability of Cl arrival is also the probability, P,(k),  
that the load level k  is increased. If we let tn denote iteration interval number n,  X,rFC (tn) 
denote the mean arrival rate of TFCs during iteration interval tn , r r 29(i„) denote the portion of 
the iteration interval for which T29 is active, then Pt(k)  is given by:
/ > . ( £ )  =  1  —  g ~ * - T F C  ( , n ) [ , 7'29 - * T V >  ]
Random number generation is used at each iteration to decide whether a Cl does actually arrive 
and, if  one does, the exact time during the iteration interval at which it does (the latter is used to 
calculate the time for which T29 will be active in the next iteration interval).
Knowledge o f Cl arrivals during the current iteration interval is used to update the load level for 
the next interval. I f  a Cl arrived for a destination user part the corresponding load level is 
incremented. I f  no Cl arrived and the relevant timer 730 is active a check is made to ascertain 
if 730 expires; if  it does the load level is decremented (Pd(k) - 1).
4.2.2 Ov erview  of I ¡SAP Sub-M odel
The IN sub-model provides a model o f the traffic generated by sessions o f the Freephone and 
Televoting services and of the operation o f the ACG and SCCP load throttles. First-offered 
service requests are again assumed to arrive according to Poisson processes and service sessions
35 TFCs are management messages, so will be given the highest priority with the MTP. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that they always arrive promptly at their destination.
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are modelled in accordance with the descriptions in §4.1.2.2 and §4.1.2.3. End-user reattempts 
are modelled in a manner analogous to that outlined for the ISUP sub-model.
The model o f the operation o f the ACG load throttle is predicated on the assumption that all IN 
service requests arrive according to a Poisson arrival process;36 given this, it is straightforward 
to estimate how the presence of a gap interval modulates the level o f accepted service requests. 
Let T'(tn) denote the mean interarrival time o f service requests, A \t„ )  denote the mean arrival 
rate o f service requests, g(tn) denote the gap interval length, T(tn) denote the mean 
interdeparture rate o f accepted requests from the ACG throttle and A(tn) denote the mean 
departure rate o f accepted requests. Because of the Poisson arrival process interarrival times will 
be exponentially distributed. The memoryless property o f the exponential distribution means 
that the mean interdeparture time in the presence o f gapping is given by:
nt„) = g(t„)+r(ta)
Therefore:
1 ,  X 1 v A '(/„)
= 2('n)+T 7777 => M O  = -A(t„) o v "' A'(t„) 1 + * ( / .) * ’(/„)
The SCCP load control is modelled in accordance with the description given in §4.1.3.1. Load 
levels for destination SCCP entities are updated in response to Cl arrivals and timer expiry in a 
analogous manner to the ISUP control, described previously. Load throttling is achieved on a 
stepwise basis with an increasing percentage o f the traffic being throttled as the load level 
increases, as the load level is incremented. I f  we denote by A'{tn) the arrival rate o f messages to 
the SCCP throttle, by A(tn) the departure rate o f accepted messages from the SCCP throttle, by 
kSCCp the current SCCP load level and by K SCCP the maximum SCCP load level, we then have:
] _ k SCCP
K-SCCP
n o
4.2.3 O v e r v i e w  o f  SS.7/IN R e s o u r c e  S u b - M o d e l
This section describes the iterative procedure to calculate the utilisation and queue lengths for 
links/SCPs, TFC generation rates and SCP overload levels. A t each iteration the volume o f 
message traffic offered to all resources in the network for the iteration interval is computed. 
This includes messages held in the resources queue at the start o f the iteration interval, messages 
arriving directly from user parts and messages arriving from other resources.
36 Note that in the presence o f end-user reattempts this is an approximation.
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The topology and routing scheme of the network being modelled will dictate the order in which 
the calculations for the various resources can be made.37 For example in the network topology 
used for this study (Figure 4.2, page 70) L0, L2, L4 and L6 direct traffic towards L 8 and L10, 
therefore their utilisation must be calculated before the load offered to L 8 and L10 can be 
computed. The full order in which resource utilisation and queue lengths are calculated for this 
network topology is illustrated in Figure 4.6, page 81.
Because the load offered to a resource queue differs from iteration to iteration (it consists o f a 
different mix o f message types) it is necessary to keep track o f both the number and position of 
messages o f various types held in a queue, so that resource utilisation can be accurately 
calculated. To achieve this, the concept o f ‘message groupings’ is introduced: a message 
grouping is the set o f messages offered to a resource queue during one iteration interval. Queues 
are modelled as ordered lists o f message groupings and resource utilisation is calculated on the 
basis that groupings at the head o f the list are processed before those at the tail.
Once the queue lengths and utilisation of all the links and SCPs in the network have been 
calculated, the next step is to assign an overload status to each link and an overload level to the 
SCP. Link overload status is assigned according to the 10 procedures described in §4.1.3.1: if  a 
link is overloaded one TFC is generated for every N  messages sent by the source user part to a 
the destination user part and processed by the link in question during the current iteration 
interval. The SCP overload level is assigned on the basis of a processor utilisation measurement, 
as described in §4.1.3.3.
4.3 SS.7/IN SIMULATION MODEL
The SS.7/IN simulation model uses discrete event simulation (cf. §3.1.2) to provide a detailed 
model o f the operation o f the transient behaviour of the SS.7 and IN load controls. The flow of 
traffic through the network is modelled on a packet-by-packet basis, facilitating the modelling 
of complex behaviour that can not be easily modelled using rate-based approximation (as used 
in the quasi-analytic model). This added flexibility is gained at the expense of significant added 
complexity in model development and greatly longer execution times to produce results for 
overload scenarios. This section provides a description of the simulation model characteristics 
not addressed in the overview o f the models provided in §4.1.
37 There may be network topologies with routing schemes for which it would be impossible to define an 
ordering that would allow all resource’s utilisation and queue lengths to be calculated in this manner. In 
such circumstances the model as described here could not be employed.
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4.3.1 STP S i m u l a t i o n  M o d e l
The structure o f the enhanced STP simulation model is illustrated in Figure 4.8 (the standard 
STP model is similar, the only difference being the absence o f the SCCP functional block). The 
figure shows the functional blocks that constitute the model and the flow of MSUs, CIs and 
other indications between them. Also shown is the mapping of the blocks to the processors upon 
which their functionality is executed.
Figure 4.8: S truc tu re  of enhanced STP sim ulation model.
The SCCP functional block implements GTT and the SCCP load throttle; the MTP3 Signalling  
Message Handling (SMH) block implements the MTP 3 routing functionality and the MTP3 
Signalling Network Management (SN M f8 block implements the TFC procedure, all as described 
in §4.1.3.1. The remaining functional blocks provide a detailed model of the signalling links; 
these were not modelled in detail in the quasi-analytic model. Since an STP can be attached to a 
number o f signalling links there will be multiple instances o f the link-related functional blocks.
Real SS.7 links are bi-directional, utilising a retransmission procedure in which signal units 
transmitted in one direction are acknowledged by signal units later transmitted in the other 
direction. As noted in §4.1.1 we adopt the convention o f treating links as two unidirectional 
links, thus the MTP1 Transmit and MTP1 Receive functional blocks refer to end-points o f  two 
of the numbered links in our network topology. These two links are ‘paired’ in the simulation
38 Both the SMH and SNM are defined as MTP functional blocks in SS.7 standards.
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model in order to facilitate operation o f the MTP2 acknowledgement procedure. The MTP1 
functional blocks transmit/receive signal units at 64Kbps (exceptions are those relating to links 
between STPs and SSPs, which are modelled as being of infinite capacity); neither link 
disturbances nor link failures are modelled.
The MTP2 functional block partially models the MTP2 retransmission procedure, maintaining 
both a Transmission Buffer (TB) and a Retransmission Buffer (RTB) and implementing a 
Go-back-N  acknowledgement procedure. Since link disturbances are not modelled the MTP2 
error monitoring functions and signal unit retransmission are not included. Similarly, link 
failures do not occur, hence the MTP2 link recovery and associated functions have not been 
modelled.
The task o f Link Monitor functional block is to report the overload status o f  its associated 
outgoing signalling link to MTP3. To do so it continually monitors the size of the link queue. It 
assigns the overload status based on traversals o f the link overload onset and abatement 
thresholds. This is done in accordance with the 10 (so the overload status is either TRUE or 
FALSE).
4.3.2 SSP S i m u l a t i o n  M o d e l
The structure o f the SSP simulation model is illustrated in Figure 4.9. The MTP3 and SCCP 
functional blocks operate in the same manner as described in the previous section, however the 
blocks relating to the signalling links do not. As outlined in §4.1.1 the links connecting SSPs to 
STPs are to be excluded from our study. To achieve this the MTP1 functional blocks in the SSP 
(and the corresponding pair in the STP) are modelled as having an infinite service rate. As there 
will be no link queues a Link Monitor functional block is not included. The SSF and SRF 
blocks implement their functionality as described in §4.1.3.2, so are not discussed further here.
The SSP simulation model includes traffic generator functional blocks for each o f  the three 
supported services. These blocks generate first-offered requests for their associated service at 
random time intervals, exponentially distributed around a specified mean. This mean value can 
vary over the course of a simulation run, allowing for the modelling of a range o f overload 
scenarios. Other functional blocks in the simulation model trigger the traffic generators to 
generate service reattempts after an original service request has been throttled or abandoned due 
to message discard.
The ISUP functional block maintains originating and terminating call state processes for ISUP 
telephony service sessions, models user behaviour during those sessions and implements the 
ISUP throttle. The simulation model includes a user behaviour model that is more realistic than 
that employed for the quasi-analytic model. It is based on the findings o f [Bolotin, 1994], in 
which an analysis of real traffic data is performed and the results used to develop a model o f
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end-user behaviour for ISUP telephony. In our model 3% of calls are ‘short calls’ (relating for 
example to credit card validations), the ‘conversation’ time for which are uniformly distributed 
in the range (Is, 3s). The remainder are ‘standard calls,’ o f which 11% terminate due to a busy 
called line, 11% terminate due to no answer and 78% proceed as normal. I f  the callee’s line is 
busy the caller is assumed to go on-hook immediately. If  the callee’s line is ringing the caller 
goes on-hook after a random delay uniformly distributed in the range (10s, 15s). I f  the callee 
answers he/she will do so after a random delay uniformly distributed in the range (Os, 15s). For 
answered calls the conversation time is randomly selected using a call holding time distribution 
o f the kind defined by [Bolotin, 1994], This distribution characterises mainly residential traffic 
and is a mixture of two lognormal distributions with an overall mean call holding time of 161s 
and a coefficient o f variation of 2 .O.39
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Figure 4.9: S tructu re  of SSP sim ulation model.
39 More precisely the distribution is characterised by the following parameters (cf. [Bolotin, 1994]): 
a  = 0.35,//! = 1.37,cr, = 0.36, /u2 = 2.32,cr2 = 0.58.
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4.3.3 SCP S i m u l a t i o n  M o d e l
The structure of the SCP simulation model is illustrated in Figure 4.10. The signalling link 
related, MTP3 and SCCP functional blocks all operate in the same manner as described above 
for the STP model. The SCF and SDF blocks realise the functionality described in §4.1.3.3, 
namely the instantiation and termination of SLPs, handling of communications with other IN 
entities and the reading/updating o f service-related information in the database.
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Figure 4.10: S tru c tu re  of SCP sim ulation model.
4.4 ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE OF SS.7/IN LOAD 
CONTROLS
In this section we present results obtained using the quasi-analytic and simulation models. 
Analysis o f these results demonstrate the performance characteristics o f the SS.7 and IN load 
controls when operating independently o f each other and the interactions that may occur when 
they are invoked simultaneously. The results are presented as seven scenarios, in which network 
parameters and load profiles are varied such that different subsets o f network resources 
overload. The scenarios were developed with the aim of achieving the following goals:
1. Partial validation o f the efficacy o f the quasi-analytic and simulation models through 
reproduction o f previously demonstrated behaviour of the SS.7 and IN load controls;
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2. Exploitation o f the m odels’ use o f a realistic network topology to add to the understanding 
of the behaviour of the SS.7 and IN load controls;
3. Analysis of the performance of the independent operation of the SS.7 and IN load controls 
in overload conditions not addressed in the literature;
4. Analysis o f overload conditions in which the SS.7 and IN load controls are invoked 
simultaneously and the identification o f any harmful or beneficial interactions.
The first three scenarios relate to the operation of the SS.7 and IN load controls in isolation and 
address goals 1 and 2; the remaining four scenarios address goals 3 and 4. For the first three 
scenarios results obtained using both the quasi-analytic and simulation models are presented. 
Discounting effects relating to differences in features modelled (for example, ISUP REL/RSC 
reattempts are included in the simulation model only) both model types are seen to produce 
similar results. For brevity we use only results obtained using the quasi-analytic model for the 
final four scenarios.
We employ three performance metrics in our analyses, namely: resource utilisation, resource 
input queue size, and service session offer/completion rates. Resource (SCP or link) utilisation 
gives an indication o f how efficiently load controls utilise resources during high load conditions.
SS.7 standards recommend signalling links never experience sustained utilisation levels greater 
than 0.8 Erlangs. For the SCP we have previously stated that ACG aims to keep its processor 
utilisation between the levels o f (0.8, 0.9) Erlangs.
Resource queue sizes also give an indication of the how efficiently load controls utilise 
resources. In addition, they give an indication of both the queuing delays experienced by 
signalling messages and whether or not messages are discarded due to full queue occupancy. 
Large queuing delays clearly have an adverse impact on the quality-of-service received by the 
end-user, whilst message discards often lead to premature termination o f  service sessions and 
therefore have a very detrimental effect on overall network performance.
Although useful, resource utilisation and queue size are somewhat crude metrics o f load control 
performance. In particular, they do not take into account whether resource processing time or 
queue space respectively is used for a useful purpose. For example, during an overload a link 
may process signalling messages relating to a service session which has been prematurely 
terminated due to an abandonment by the end-user. We therefore require a metric that gives a 
more end-user centric performance measure. This is provided by service session 
offer/completion rates, which give an overall indication of the grade-of-service received by 
end-users and an indication o f the level o f  revenue earned by the network operator.
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4.4.1 S c e n a r i o  1: O v e r l o a d  o f  SCP O n l y
Our first scenario addresses the operation o f ACG under the assumption that when the SCP 
overloads the SS.7 links do not. This mirrors the analyses o f previous researchers who have 
addressed the operation of the ACG control. Our goal in repeating this work is twofold: firstly 
to provide a degree o f validation o f the quasi-analytic and simulation models, secondly to serve 
as a reference for later scenarios in which interactions between SS.7 and IN controls are 
investigated.
We set the SCP processing capacity so that the SCP will overload at an offered load level that is 
insufficient to cause overload of any o f the mesh or SCP links. In normal load conditions the 
traffic profile is as follows: 60% of service requests offered to the network are for ISUP 
Telephony, 25% are for IN Freephone and 15% are for IN Televoting. An equal mean number 
of requests for each service type arrives at each SSP in the network. The volume o f Freephone 
and Televoting requests is such that the mean SCP load is 0.4 Erlangs during normal load 
conditions. During overload40 the level o f Televoting requests arriving at group A SSPs is 
increased so that the first-offered load to the SCP is 1.4 Erlangs. This increase occurs in a single 
step at time 600s and the subsequent decrease occurs in a single step at time 1200s?1 End-user 
reattempt behaviour is included for all three service types.
Figure 4.11 shows the SCP processor utilisation and queue size obtained using the 
quasi-analytic and simulation models. Both processor utilisation graphs show the mean value of 
utilisation since the previous sample instant, with the sampling period (10s ) being the same as 
the control interval used by ACG. The quasi-analytic model queue size graph shows mean 
values of queue size for each iteration interval, with the iteration interval length being the value 
o f T29 (0 .3s). The simulation model queue size graphs shows the actual queue size at the 
sampling instant, a sampling period o f 0.3s is again used.
In Figure 4.11 we see a large degree o f oscillation of the SCP processor utilisation beyond the 
target range o f (0.8, 0.9) Erlangs. This is an artefact of the use o f a small number o f tabulated 
values (thirteen) for gap interval calculation. Clearly, for this overload scenario, thirteen gap 
interval values cannot provide sufficiently fine-grained control o f input traffic to keep the 
utilisation within the specified thresholds. We also observe a significant difference between the 
size o f the SCP queue predicted by the quasi-analytic and simulation models: the queue 
periodically becomes saturated in the quasi-analytic model, but this only occurs at the start of 
the overload in the simulation model. As we discuss below, this is related to the difference in 
acceptance behaviour for the Televoting service in the two models.
40 Throughout the remainder o f the text we use the term ‘overload’ as a shorthand for the period o f  time 
that the offered load is increased. It is not meant to imply that any resources actually become overloaded
41 A step input occurring at these times is the input load profile used for all simulation runs described in 
this chapter.
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Figure 4.11: SCP utilisation and queue size. Left: quasi-analytic model. R ight: sim ulation model.
Figure 4.12 shows offer and completion rates per second (calculated as moving averages with 
window 10s for the quasi-analytic model and mean values every 10s for the simulation model) 
for all service types. Since the SS.7 mesh links are not overloaded, there is no discernible 
impact on the completion rates of ISUP sessions during the period o f SCP overload. The 
difference in the time for the ISUP offer and completion rates to converge is due to variations in 
the modelling o f conversation delays between the two model types.
We see that, during the overload period, the rate of offered Televoting (and Freephone) requests 
increases significantly beyond the first-offered rate; this is due to end-user reattempt behaviour. 
Reattempts not only have the effect of intensifying the overload, they also result in it persisting 
for some time after the abatement o f the increase in first-offered Televoting load. The volume of 
reattempts is larger in the simulation model than in that quasi-analytic model; this relates to the 
manner in which reattempt volumes are calculated (the quasi-analytic model is less accurate as 
an approximation method is used). The volume of reattempts impacts on acceptance rate 
behaviour for the two IN services (acceptance rates are not presented here but for Televoting 
and Freephone mirror closely the completion rates shown in Figure 4.12). For Televoting in 
particular the degree o f oscillation in Televoting acceptance rates is higher in the quasi-analytic 
model, with a higher number o f acceptances at the oscillation peaks. The latter increases the
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burstiness o f the volume o f messages being sent to the SCP, which is the primary cause o f the 
periodic queue build-ups evident in Figure 4.11. During overload there is also a discernible 
decrease in the completion rates for the Freephone service, together with a corresponding slight 
increase in the offered rate due to reattempts. There are two factors that contribute to this: firstly 
ACG controls are put in place for all IN services, at all SSPs, secondly some Freephone 
messages will get discarded at the SCP queue.
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Figure 4.12: Service session offer/completion rates. Left: quasi-analytic model. R ight: sim ulation 
model. Top: ISUP Telephony. M iddle: IN  Freephone. Bottom: IN Televoting.
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The results presented for this scenario are in broad agreement with those presented in [Smith, 
1995; Northcote and Smith, 1998], where the operation o f the ACG control is investigated in 
great detail. Our results point towards many o f the same conclusions o f these works, for 
example: static table-driven controls can not provide suitable fine-grained control in all 
circumstances, service types not contributing directly to the overload suffer, as do SSPs not 
contributing directly to the overload. In chapter 5 we present a more comprehensive analysis, 
comparing the operation o f ACG with two more complex, adaptive and revenue-maximising IN 
load control strategies.
4.4.2 Scenario  2: ISUP Overload  of M esh  L inks
The second scenario we describe addresses the operation o f the SS.7 load controls in isolation. 
As with scenario 1 we demonstrate behaviour previously analysed by other researchers, 
although in the context o f a more realistic network model. Firstly, we illustrate how the ISUP 
load throttles lead to oscillations of link utilisation and queue size; secondly, the negative 
impact of REL message reattempts on call completion rates is demonstrated. In addition, we 
show that poor performance o f the SS.7 load control can lead to the propagation o f overload and 
consequent undesired load throttling.
In scenario 2 the normal load offered to the network is supplied equally by the group A and 
group B SSPs and is equivalent to a loading of 0.4 Erlangs on each o f the mesh signalling links. 
This load is generated by requests for the ISUP Telephony service only (there are no requests 
for Televoting or Freephone). Overload occurs due to an increase in the volume of requests 
arriving at the group A SSPs. Once increased, the volume o f signalling load is equivalent to a 
first-offered load of 1.4 Erlangs on those mesh signalling links that transmit signalling messages 
from group A to group B (links 0, 2, 4 and 6).
Figure 4.13 shows the utilisation and queue size for link 0 for the full duration of the simulation 
run, obtained using both model types. Figure 4.14 (page 96) shows ‘close-ups’ of the link 0 
utilisation and queue size. From Figure 4.13 we see that once the load offered to the link 
increases, the queue size quickly exceeds the overload onset threshold (1400 bytes), causing 
TFC procedure invocation at STP1. This causes STP1 to send TFCs for group B SSPs to the 
group A SSPs, which then commence load throttling. Because o f the speed o f overload onset all 
group A SSPs receive TFC messages at approximately the same time, leading to a high degree 
o f synchronicity in their throttling behaviour. The links thus become starved of messages, TFC 
generation stops causing the SSPs to subsequently increase their accepted load, again with a 
high degree of synchronicity. This synchronicity causes oscillations in link utilisation and queue 
size, as evident from the figure.
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Figure 4.13: L ink 0 utilisation and queue size. Left: quasi-analytic model duration.
Right: sim ulation model.
The quasi analytic results presented in Figure 4.13 show the persistence o f link overload beyond 
the time at which the volume of first-offered load decreases, due to the end-user reattempt 
behaviour. For the simulation model end-user reattempt behaviour is omitted for this scenario, 
so that the effect o f ISUP REL reattempts on overload persistence and completion rate 
degradation can be quantified in isolation. Results for the simulation model are similar to those 
obtained using the quasi-analytic model to the degree that they demonstrate the oscillatory 
behaviour o f the controls. However with the simulation model, the observed degree o f 
synchronisation o f the SSPs in Figure 4.14 is much greater then observed for the quasi-analytic 
model, with the link utilisation actually dropping to zero for the much of the time during 
overload.
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Figure 4.14: L ink  0 utilisation and queue size. P a rtia l sim ulation run  duration.
Left: quasi-analytic model. R ight: sim ulation model.
The most significant difference between the results obtained using the quasi-analytic and 
simulation models is that the simulation model shows that the overload condition persists long 
after the level o f offered load decreases. This is due to the REL reattempt behaviour. When 
ISUP messages are throttled or discarded at link queues, the originating ISUP entity sends 
REL/RSC messages under the control o f timers (c /  §2.4.1.2 for details of this procedure). As 
shown by [Smith, 1994b], this leads to an avalanche o f REL messages offered to the links. 
Reattempting RELs and RSCs displace other messages types, so link overload persists and the 
majority of processed messages are REL/RSCs. This is confirmed by Figure 4.15, which shows 
that approximately 90% of messages processed by the link are REL/RSCs, increasing from a 
value o f approximately 20% during normal conditions.
In our model there are no limits on the number o f REL/RSC reattempts that can be generated by 
ISUP entities. In real networks, operators are likely to either statically restrict the number of 
reattempts that can be made or employ a dynamic restriction algorithm such as that proposed by 
[Smith, 1994b]. Therefore our model is overly pessimistic, as indefinite persistence o f overload 
would not happen in a real network. However the results do demonstrate the importance of
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ensuring that the behaviour o f signalling user parts or higher level applications do not 
exacerbate overload situations.
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Time (s)
Figure 4.15: Sim ulation model. L ink 0 percentage of link utilisation relating to REL messages.
We now address the potential for overload o f mesh links transmitting traffic in one direction to 
cause propagation of overload to those mesh links transmitting in the opposite direction. In this 
scenario the signalling messages carried by a link relate to ISUP Telephony sessions and 
generally trigger the destination SSP to send one or more messages in response. If  there is a 
sufficient volume of response messages generated during an overload then links 1, 3, 5 and 7 
may also become overloaded. This leads to the invocation o f the TFC procedure at STPs 2/4 and 
the throttling o f load by the group B SSPs. This is despite the fact that the group B SSPs are not 
the source o f the overload traffic.
Figure 4.16 shows the utilisation and queue sizes for link 1 obtained using the quasi-analytic 
and simulation models. These graphs show that link 1 does indeed become overloaded and the 
utilisation and queue sizes oscillate subsequent to the group B ISUP load throttles being 
invoked. It can be seen that the onset of overload happens some time after the onset o f overload 
of link 0. The delay is related to the cumulative effect of ringing and conversation times, which 
delay the generation o f response messages. Again the overload persistence effect o f REL 
reattempts is evident from the results obtained using the simulation model.
The results discussed above show that the oscillatory behaviour of the load controls, together 
with the REL reattempting behaviour o f ISUP, means that mesh links are under-utilised during 
overload and that those messages transmitted may be predominantly reattempting REL/RSCs. 
We now address the impact this has on the session completion rates for end-users. Figure 4.17 
shows the rates per second o f offered, started and completed ISUP sessions as obtained using 
both model types.
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Figure 4.16: L ink 1 utilisation and  queue size. Left: quasi-analytic model. 
R ight: sim ulation model.
F igure 4.17: M oving average o f session offer/start/com pletion rates. Left: quasi-analytic  model. 
R ight: sim ulation model.
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For the quasi-analytic model we observe that when overload commences end-user reattempts 
cause the offered rate to increase significantly before eventually abating near the end o f the run. 
Invocation o f the ISUP throttle means that the rate o f started sessions is less than the offered 
rate. More significantly the completion rate gradually reduces to a low o f only approximately 
25% of the started rate, before gradually recovering when offered load abates.
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In the simulation model end-user reattempts are omitted, however the rate at which sessions are 
started rapidly goes to and remains at zero. This is due to the ISUP load throttles all staying at 
either level 1 or 2 (in both cases IAMs are throttled) but never reaching level 0 (where all 
message types are accepted). When one of the ISUP throttles changes from level 2 to level 1 a 
large volume of (predominantly REL/RSC) messages is accepted. Upon reaching the links, 
these messages quickly trigger the sending o f TFC messages and CIs are received by the ISUP 
entities before the throttle can change to level 0 and accept IAMs. Therefore the increase in the 
volume of ISUP messages (caused by reattempting RELs/RSCs) that is offered to the network 
has a hugely adverse effect on the rate o f session acceptances.
This scenario has clearly demonstrated the detrimental effects o f ISUP REL/RSC reattempts, 
however as alluded to above, operators are likely to take measures to avoid or minimise the 
impact of REL/RSC avalanches [Smith, 1994b], Even if automatic REL avalanche prevention 
procedures are not deployed, network management systems are likely to raise alarms that would 
ensure that overloads do not persist indefinitely in the manner depicted here. For this reason and 
in order to facilitate quantitative analysis o f the operation of the core SS.7/IN load control 
operation in various situations, we omit the REL reattempting behaviour in the simulation runs 
used for the remaining scenarios in this chapter. Therefore, it is important to note that the 
performance of the controls as described below is likely to be worse in a real network in which 
REL reattempt behaviour is not properly controlled.
4.4.3 Scenario  3: ISU P /IN  Overload  of M esh  L inks
In scenario 3 we address the operation of the SS.7 load controls in a network supporting both 
ISUP and IN services. Scenario 2 illustrated the poor operation of the controls in terms of 
oscillatory behaviour and completion rates; here we focus here on the unfairness o f the controls 
in their treatment of different user parts and service types. We first demonstrate the desirability 
o f including a load throttle in SCCP and then investigate the operation of the SCCP load throttle 
specified in §4.1.3.1.
For this scenario we assume that GTT is not in operation at STP2 and STP4, hence SSP SCCP 
entities perform GTT and messages are addressed directly to the SCP. We assume that SCP 
links never overload, therefore the presence or absence o f GTT at the STPs has no effect on the 
load throttling behaviour.42 In normal load conditions the mesh links are loaded at 0.4 Erlangs, 
with an equal load contribution from sessions of ISUP Telephony and Televoting (there are no 
Freephone sessions). During overload the first-offered load to the mesh links is 1.4 Erlangs, 
with the increase relating to IN Televoting requests arriving at the group A SSPs only. To
42 If  GTT were present at the STPs and both mesh/SCP links overload, IN message streams from SSPs to 
the SCP would be subject to SCCP throttling at both the SSP and the STP.
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enable a quantitative comparison o f the fairness with which user parts and services are throttled 
we omit from the models end-user reattempt behaviour and ISUP REL/RSC reattempts.
We first address the case where there is no load throttle incorporated into SCCP, which means 
that CIs arriving at SSP SCCP entities are ignored. Figure 4.18 shows the utilisation and queue 
size for link 0, obtained using both the quasi-analytic and simulation models. In the absence of 
reattempts, the utilisation o f the link returns to normal promptly after the abatement o f high 
offered load. An obvious difference between the two models is that queue is shown to be 
frequently fully occupied in the quasi-analytic model whereas it never is in the simulation 
model. This is primarily related to the different ISUP Telephony user behaviour models 
employed: with the simulation model there are busy/unanswered calls and longer mean 
conversation times, so there are not so many messages processed during the overload period.
3000
I — UNK 0 Queue Size
Time (s) Time (s)
Figure 4.18: L ink  0 utilisation and queue size. No SCCP controls. Left: quasi-analytic model.
R ight: sim ulation model.
Figure 4.19 shows the service session offer and completion rates obtained using the 
quasi-analytic and simulation models. Due to the absence o f SCCP load throttles only ISUP 
sessions are throttled during overload, so ISUP completion rates are significantly less than the 
offered rates. In contrast, Televoting sessions remain largely unaffected. These results show 
that, without SCCP controls, ISUP entities are forced to throttle an unfairly large proportion of
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their offered load. This would also, be the case if, for example, an increase in the volume of 
Televoting requests were solely responsible for the overload. Indeed, in such circumstances 
Televoting would be contributing the majority of the traffic carried by the links so the queues 
would remain continually full and a large number of messages would be discarded and sessions 
prematurely terminated. Therefore, some form of SCCP load throttling is not only desirable 
from a fairness viewpoint but is necessary in order to protect against very severe degradation in 
completion rates.
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Figure 4.19: M oving average of session offer/com pletion rates. No SCCP controls.
Left: quasi-analytic model. Right: sim ulation model.
Figure 4.20 shows the offer and completion rates as obtained from the quasi-analytic and 
simulation models for the case where the load throttle is incorporated into the SCCP. In this 
instance we see that sessions of both ISUP and Televoting are throttled, but ISUP not as 
severely as previously. Approximately 62% of the ISUP offered requests result in completed 
sessions during overload whilst the corresponding value for Televoting is approximately 55%?3 
Thus the SCCP and ISUP throttles working in tandem do not result in completely equitable 
treatment o f the two service types.
43 These values were obtained from the quasi-analytic model results.
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Figure 4.20: Q uasi-analytic model. M oving average of session offer/com pletion rates.
SCCP controls present. Left: quasi-analytic model. R ight: sim ulation model.
A major contributing factor to the smaller completion rate percentage for Televoting is that 
sessions o f this service type involve the transfer of seven signalling messages between the SSP 
and the SCP, whereas for ISUP only five messages are passed between the two SSPs. There is 
thus a greater probability that Televoting sessions are prematurely terminated due to a message 
being throttled. Therefore, even though ISUP and SCCP throttles operate fairly in terms of the 
proportions of messages they throttle, they fail to take into account that sessions o f different 
service types involve varying numbers o f messages. In addition, they do not take into account 
message sizes and therefore do not treat services fairly in terms o f their contribution to the load 
they place on network resources [Zepf and Rufa, 1994; McMillan and Rumsewicz, 1996].'14
An additional complication in regard to the fairness o f the combined operation of the ISUP and 
SCCP load throttles is that successful IN sessions often lead to the set-up of a ‘follow-on’ ISUP 
Telephony session. A good example is the IN Freephone service, which involves a number
44 In this discussion we ignore the important consideration that during overloads a network operator may 
not want to have services treated in the manner we describe as ‘fairly.’ On the contrary, services may 
generate different levels of revenue or may be seen as more important from the end-user point-of-view 
and the operator may want to afford these higher priority during overload. We return to this point in 
chapters 5 and 6.
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translation and the set-up of a call to the translated number. If, as we assume here, the request 
for the ISUP Telephony call is subject to the ISUP load throttle as normal then, during overload, 
the end-user’s service request must, in effect, pass both the SCCP and the ISUP throttles. Thus 
there is a more complex relationship between the relative rates then for the ISUP/Telephony.
We now investigate the case where the network supports only ISUP Telephony and IN 
Freephone services, with requests of both types resulting in equal contributions to link load 
during normal conditions. Overload of mesh links results from an increase in the rate o f arrivals 
of requests for IN Freephone only at the group A SSPs. Figure 4.21 shows the offer and 
completion rates for both service types, obtained using the quasi-analytic and simulation 
models.45 In these graphs the increase in the number of arriving ISUP requests corresponds to 
the number of successfully completed Freephone sessions. We see that both Freephone and 
ISUP requests are throttled, so the actual completion rate for Freephone end-users is less than 
that indicated by the Freephone graph.
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Figure 4.21: M oving average of session offer/com pletion rates. SCCP controls present. 
Left: quasi-analytic model. R ight: sim ulation model.
45 The noticeable difference in Freephone completion rates is due to the different ISUP user behaviour 
models employed in the two model types. The simulation model includes busy/unanswered calls and 
longer conversation delays, so there are less ISUP messages transmitted during the overload, with the 
results that proportionally more Freephone messages are throttled then in the quasi-analytic model.
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4.4.4 S c e n a r i o  4: O v e r l o a d  o f  F o r w a r d  SCP L i n k s  O n l y
In this scenario we address overload situations in which forward SCP links, but neither mesh 
links nor the SCP, initially overload. Forward SCP links carry only IN traffic, so the importance 
o f deploying SCCP load throttles becomes clearly evident in this context. We first demonstrate 
that poor performance ensues if an SCCP load throttle is not deployed and then show that 
deployment o f the SCCP load throttle does not actually result in performance improvement.
As indicated at the start o f §4.4 for this and the remaining three scenarios we present results 
obtained using the quasi-analytic model only. In normal conditions the ratios o f service arrival 
volumes are set as follows: ISUP 60% : Freephone 25% : Televoting 15%. Overload is caused 
by an increase in the arrival rate of Televoting requests at group A SSPs, to a level 
corresponding to a first-offered load o f 1.4 Erlangs for each of the two forward SCP links. For 
this scenario SCP capacity is set to a value sufficient to ensure the SCP does not overload. In 
addition we also assume the reverse SCP links will not overload as a result of response traffic 
generated by the SCP.46
The first results we present relate to the case where there is no GTT in place at STP2 and STP4, 
the SCCP load throttle is absent and end-user reattempts are not modelled. Figure 4.22 shows 
the link utilisation and queue size for link 0 and link 8, obtained using the quasi-analytic model. 
These graphs show that mesh links do not overload but the SCP links do; this is because the 
group B SSPs, which provide half o f the overload traffic, do not utilise the mesh links for 
communication with the SCP. The absence o f SCCP load throttling at STP2 means that the load 
on link 8 is not decreased, so the link remains overloaded and a significant number o f messages 
are discarded.
Figure 4.23 shows the service session offer and completion rates for all three service types. No 
IN service requests are throttled, nevertheless many accepted sessions will be prematurely 
terminated due to discards at the SCP links. This can be clearly seen for the Televoting service, 
for which only approximately 60% of the offered sessions complete successfully. Freephone 
sessions are also affected in the same manner, though the smaller number o f messages in a 
Freephone session means that the completion percentage is significantly higher than that for 
Televoting. The drop in Freephone completion rates during overload also manifests itself as a 
reduction in ISUP offer/completion rates due to the consequent decrease in the number o f 
generated follow-on ISUP sessions.
46 The scenario where reverse SCP links do overload is addressed in §4.4.6. 
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Figure 4.22: Q uasi-analytic model. L ink  utilisation and queue size. No reattem pts, no SC C P load 
throttling . Left: L ink 0. R ight: L ink 8.
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Figure 4.23: Q uasi-analytic model. M oving average of service offer/completion rates.
No reattem pts, no SC C P load throttling . Left: ISUP. Centre: IN  Freephone.
R ight: IN Televoting.
We now investigate the impact o f end-user reattempts. The high level o f Televoting sessions 
terminated due to discards at the SCP link queues will result in a large volume o f reattempts, 
increasing greatly the load offered to the network. Therefore, there will be potential for overload 
propagation to the mesh links and completion rate degradation for both non-IN and IN service 
types. Figure 4.24 shows the utilisation and queue size for link 0 and link 8 for this case; it 
shows that reattempts do indeed lead to propagation of overload to the mesh links. We see that
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Televoting reattempts quickly cause the forward mesh links (link 0) to overload and, because of 
the lack o f an SCCP throttle, keep the link queues saturated for the duration o f  the increase in 
first-offered load. Once the first-offered load abates, the proportion o f Televoting traffic 
decreases and the oscillatory effects o f the operation o f the ISUP load throttles become evident. 
Overload and queue saturation o f mesh links mean that significant numbers o f both Televoting 
and ISUP messages continue to be discarded.
Figure 4.25: Q uasi-analytic model. M oving average of service offer/com pletion rates. W ith 
reattem pts, no SCCP load control. Left: ISUP Telephony. Right: IN  Televoting.
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Figure 4.24: Q uasi-analytic model. L ink  utilisation and  queue size. W ith rea ttem pts, no SC C P load 
throttling . Left: L ink 0. R ight: L ink  8.
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Figure 4.25 shows the session offer and completion rates for the three services; it shows that all 
services are severely affected by the reattempt-triggered overloads. These results provide further 
evidence of the necessity o f deploying some form of load throttling in SCCP entities.
We now investigate whether the inclusion of the SCCP load avoids the severe performance 
degradation observed in its absence. We assume that GTT is in operation at STP2 and STP4, so 
that link 8 overload will trigger SCCP throttling at these nodes. We employ the same load 
profile as previously and model end-user reattempt behaviour. Figure 4.26 shows the link 
utilisation and queue size for link 0 and link 8. We see that, upon overload onset, the operation 
of the SCCP load throttle leads to oscillation of link 8 utilisation and queue size, caused by the 
on-off throttling oflN A P messages at STP2. This oscillatory behaviour is expected as the SCCP 
load throttle is based on the ISUP throttle. Under-utilisation o f link 8 (and link 10) means that a 
greater number o f INAP messages are discarded then in the previous case. The volume of 
end-user reattempts increases accordingly, further exacerbating the overload and degrading IN 
session completion rates. In addition, SCCP load throttling at the STPs does not protect the 
mesh links from overload, so ISUP completion rates are again effected (though not as severely 
as previously). The impact on completion rates is shown in Figure 4.27; clearly the SCCP load 
throttle has (in this scenario at least) little positive impact on network performance.
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Figure 4.26: Q uasi-analytic model. L ink utilisation and queue size. W ith reattem pts, S C C P load 
thro ttling  and  G T T  a t STPs 2/4. Left: L ink 0. Right: L ink 8.
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Figure 4.27: Q uasi-analytic  model. M oving average of service offer/com pletion rates. W ith 
rea ttem pts, SC C P load thro ttling  and GTT a t STPs 2/4. Left: ISUP Telephony.
R ight: IN  Televoting.
4.4.5 S c e n a r i o  5: O v e r l o a d  o f  F o r w a r d  SCP L i n k s  a n d  SCP
For scenario 5 we examine the potential for simultaneous overload o f SCP forward links and the 
SCP itself. This would be a possibility in the case where the cumulative rate at which SCP links 
can process IN messages exceeds the rate at which they can be processed by the SCP. We 
employ the same load profile used previously, but set the SCP capacity so that the increase in 
the volume of Televoting requests is sufficient to overload both it and the forward SCP links.
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Figure 4.28: Q uasi-analytic  model. L ink  utilisation and queue size. Left: L ink 0. R ight: L ink  8.
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Again we assume that the reverse SCP links do not overload. GTT is in-place at STP2 and 
STP4, the SCCP load throttle is operational and end-user reattempt behaviour is modelled.
Figure 4.28 above shows the utilisation and queue size, obtained using the quasi-analytic model, 
for link 0 and link 8. We see that while mesh link 0 does not overload, the link 8 queue size 
quickly surpasses the overload onset threshold once the volume of Televoting requests 
increases. However, link 8 recovers after approximately 50s and only briefly overloads again 
during the remainder o f the overload situation. This is due to the onset o f overload at the SCP 
(illustrated by Figure 4.29), which causes the activation o f the ACG throttle at the SSPs. In 
reducing the load offered to the SCP, ACG also reduces the load offered to the forward SCP 
links. Indeed ACG protects the links more effectively than did the SCCP load throttle 
investigated previously: the link queues do not saturate, queuing delays are reduced and 
relatively few messages are discarded. Figure 4.30 shows the offer and completion for the three 
services; these graphs are broadly similar in form to those ofFigure 4.12, page 93, which relate 
to the scenario where only the SCP overloads.
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Figure 4.29: Q uasi-analytic  model. SCP utilisation and queue size.
Brendan Jennings Page 109 31/05/01
Chapter 4: Performance Analysis o f Standard SS.7/IN Load Controls
u t -
■ ■ ■ ■ £
K
ij|
900 1200 1500 1800
Figure 4.30: Q uasi-analytic  model. M oving average of service offer/com pletion rates. 
Left: ISUP Telephony. C entre: IN Freephone. R ight: IN Televoting.
4.4.6 S c e n a r i o  6: O v e r l o a d  o f  R e v e r s e  SCP L i n k s
Reverse SCP links are those links that the SCP uses to send response messages to its STP pair 
for forwarding to SSPs. Like other links, reverse SCP links are susceptible to overload, but there 
are two additional factors that indicate that they may overload either before or instead of 
forward SCP or mesh links. The first is that SCP response messages are often longer than the 
corresponding query messages; therefore, an equal number of messages can represent a greater 
load offered to reverse links then to the forward links. The second factor is that IN service 
sessions may be unbalanced in terms of the number of messages sent from the SSP to the SCP 
compared to those sent in the opposite direction. This is the case for our Televoting service, 
which involves three messages sent from SSP to SCP, but four in the opposite direction. We 
note that from the point o f view of overall performance, overload o f a reverse link (either SCP 
or mesh) is particularly undesirable, since it leads to the throttling or discarding o f messages 
generated as a result o f significant processing at the SCP.
In this scenario we employ a load profile similar to that used for the previous two scenarios but 
with the volume of first-offered load during overload being set such that reverse SCP links, but 
neither forward SCP links, the SCP, nor mesh links, initially overload. We assume that all 
response messages generated by the SCP are of length 120 Bytes (as opposed to 100 Bytes for 
query messages arriving at the SCP). GTT is operational at STP2 and STP4 and load throttles 
are activated at all SCCP entities. The latter is assumed to include the SCP SCCP entity, whose 
throttle will be invoked by CIs triggered by the arrival of SCP-generated response messages 
arriving at an overloaded reverse link.
Figure 4.31 shows the utilisation and queue size for a reverse SCP link (link 9) and a reverse 
mesh link (link 1). Figure 4.32 shows the SCP utilisation obtained using the quasi-analytic 
model; we see that the SCP does not overload at any time. Although the SCP itself does not 
overload the reverse SCP link does, causing the SCP SCCP entity to throttle SCP response 
messages. We again observe the oscillatory nature o f the SCCP load throttle, which results in
Brendan Jennings Page 110 31/05/01
Chapter 4: Performance Analysis o f  Standard SS.7/IN Load Controls
throttled and discarded response messages and overload persistence due to end-user reattempts. 
The load offered to link 1 is not sufficient to overload it for a sustained period; this is due both 
to a portion o f the reverse SCP link load being destined for the group B SSPs and the remaining 
portion, destined for the group A SSPs, being dispersed over four (rather then two) links.
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Figure 4.31: Q uasi-analytic model. L ink utilisation and queue size. Left: L ink 9. R ight: L ink  1.
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Figure 4.32: Q uasi-analytic model. SCP utilisation.
Brendan Jennings Page 111 31/05/01
Chapter 4: Performance Analysis of Standard SS.7/IN Load Controls
End-user reattempts triggered by premature session terminations due to messages discarded at 
the reverse SCP links serve to increase the volume o f IN messages sent by the SSPs to the SCP, 
thereby increasing the load offered to both the forward SCP links and the SCP itself. In this 
scenario the resultant increase in load offered to the SCP does not drive it into overload, 
however this is not the case for the forward SCP links. Figure 4.33 shows the utilisation and 
queue size for link 0 and link 8. We see that the load offered to link 8 increases until the 
overload onset threshold is surpassed, SCCP load throttling then commences at STP2 and STP4 
and the link queue size starts to oscillate. We note that onset o f forward SCP link overload will 
serve to somewhat decrease the level o f load offered to the reverse SCP links, however this 
decrease is o f insufficient magnitude to impact upon their overloaded state.
Overload of the forward SCP links further increases the volume o f end-user reattempts, which, 
as shown in Figure 4.33, lead to overload of the mesh links. This further exacerbates the 
overload, which grows in severity and persists well beyond the abatement of the increase in 
first-offered load. Overload o f mesh links also means that completion rates for non-IN services 
are degraded to some degree, despite the fact that the overload originates in a part o f the 
network not used by those services.
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Figure 4.33: Q uasi-analytic model. L ink utilisation and queue size. Left: L ink  0. Right: L ink  8.
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In this scenario forward, SCP links, reverse SCP links and mesh links overload, thus a large 
proportion o f the IN messages are throttled or discarded. We therefore expect to see a severe 
degradation in completion rates for IN service sessions. Figure 4.34 shows the service session 
offer and completion rates for the three services. As in previous scenarios end-user reattempts 
increase the number of offered IN service requests and only a small number o f these result in 
successful sessions. Completion rates for both IN services are very poor, falling below their 
non-overload levels. The slight degradation in completion rates for ISUP towards the end o f the 
run is a result o f the onset of overload of the mesh links.
Ttat[*| Tlaa (■(
F igure 4.34: Q uasi-analytic model. M oving average of service offer/com pletion rates.
Left: ISUP Telephony. C entre: IN  Freephone. R ight: IN  Televoting.
4.4.7 S c e n a r i o  7: O v e r l o a d  o f  SCP a n d  R e v e r s e  SCP L i n k s
For our final scenario we address the potential for simultaneous initial overload o f the reverse 
SCP links and the SCP. The same load profile and network parameters as used previously are 
employed again, except that the SCP capacity is lowered so that it becomes overloaded once the 
level o f Televoting requests is increased. We present results for two separate cases (relating to 
two values o f SCP capacity), for which different behaviour with regard to the invocation o f  the 
ACG load throttle is observed.
For the first case, the SCP capacity is such that the SCP first-offered load is 0.95 Erlangs. 
Figure 4.35 shows the SCP utilisation, obtained using the quasi-analytic model. Instead o f the 
oscillatory pattern normally associated with the invocation o f the ACG mechanism, the 
utilisation is seen to stay, for the most part, within the target utilisation levels. This behaviour is 
related to the overload of the reverse SCP links (illustrated in Figure 4.36). Overload o f the 
reverse SCP links results in message throttling by the SCP SCCP entity and some message 
discarding when the link queues saturate. Many o f these messages will be the response 
messages at the start o f a Televoting session, so the sessions are prematurely terminated and the 
SCP is freed from processing further messages it would normally receive to complete the 
sessions. Overload o f the reverse links thus serves to lower the load offered to the SCP; the 
reduction ensures that, in this case, SCP utilisation remains mostly within acceptable levels.
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Figure 4.35: Q uasi-analytic model, SCP utilisation.
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The effect o f ‘better’ control of SCP utilisation can be seen from the session offer and 
completion rates, shown in Figure 4.37. Comparing against the scenario 1 rates (Figure 4.12, 
page 93), in which only the SCP overloads, we see that in this scenario a greater percentage of 
the offered sessions complete successfully. However, this apparent improvement is at the 
expense o f the throttling/discarding o f SCP response messages relating to ongoing service 
sessions. In contrast, for scenario 1 ACG controls SCP utilisation by throttling service requests,
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to a large degree avoiding the problem of premature session termination. Proper invocation o f 
the ACG throttle would therefore be a more desirable (though of course flawed) means o f  SCP 
load control from the point o f view o f maximising overall network performance. These results 
provide an example of how the operation o f the SS.7 controls can detrimentally interfere with 
the operation o f the higher-level IN control.
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Figure 4.37: Quasi-analytic model. M oving average of service offer/completion rates.
Left: ISUP Telephony. Centre: IN Freephone. Right: IN Televoting.
If the capacity of the SCP is lower than that used for the previous case, the reduction in SCP 
offered load resulting from reverse SCP link overload may not be sufficient to keep SCP 
utilisation within acceptable limits and ACG will be properly activated. To investigate this 
possibility, we adjust the capacity o f the SCP so that its first-offered load becomes 1.15 Erlangs. 
Figure 4.38 shows the utilisation and queue size for the SCP and reverse SCP link 9. We see 
that the SCP is initially heavily overloaded, to the extent that its queue becomes saturated. This 
leads to activation of ACG and subsequent oscillatory behaviour, as previously discussed. 
Gapping remains in place until the overload situation abates.
We observe a reduction in offered load due to reverse SCP link overload: the SCP queue stops 
filling completely, but the reduction is not sufficient to interfere with the operation o f ACG. 
From the link 9 graphs we see that the reverse SCP links still overload, but not as severely as in 
the previous case. However these overloads still trigger message throttling by the SCP SCCP 
entity and consequent premature session termination. To quantify the impact o f message loss 
through SCP SCCP load throttling, we compare the offer and completion rates for the cases 
with and without reverse link overload (the latter is scenario 1, but we use a different SCP 
capacity and offered load volume). Figure 4.39 shows moving averages (window 100s) o f the 
offer and completion rates for the two IN service types. We see that completion rates are 
broadly similar for both cases and that the major difference relates to the Televoting offer rates. 
Reverse SCP link overload results in sessions being prematurely terminated; these sessions will 
reattempt as normal and therefore the level of offered load increases. The presence o f these 
prematurely terminated sessions leads to a greater degree of end-user dissatisfaction, which is 
highly undesirable from the network operator’s viewpoint.
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Figure 4.39: Quasi-analytic model. Comparison of offer/complete rates between cases where links 
are and are not overloaded. Left: IN Freephone. Right: IN Televoting.
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4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We now summarise the main findings o f the analysis of the seven overload scenarios. 
Scenarios 1 and 2 were designed to replicate, using our models, the behaviour o f IN ACG and 
the SS.7 TFC-based load control that has been previously demonstrated in the literature. 
Scenario 1 showed that static, table-driven IN controls like ACG are unlikely to act with 
sufficient granularity o f control to meet SCP utilisation targets and prevent message discard at 
saturated SCP input queues. They therefore lead to poor session completion rates for the 
services supported by the SCP. Scenario 2 demonstrated the inherently oscillatory behaviour o f 
the SS.7 load controls, which results from temporal over-control and source synchronisation. 
The impact of end-user reattempts and (more dramatically) ISUP REL/RSC message reattempts 
on prolonging overload beyond the time at which first-offered traffic levels abate, was also 
demonstrated. Both control oscillation and reattempt behaviour were shown to result in very 
severe degradation in session completion rates.
Scenario 2 exploited the use of a full mesh topology in our network models to demonstrate 
overload propagation caused by the inadequate performance of the SS.7 load controls. For this 
scenario, mesh links initially overloaded in one direction (due to an overload at the group A 
SSPs), but this overload was not adequately controlled and subsequently led to overload onset 
o f the mesh links in the opposite direction. This overload propagation resulted in load throttling 
at the group B SSPs, despite the fact that they were not the source of the original overload.
Scenarios 3 and 4 addressed the requirement for SCCP load throttles in SS.7 networks carrying 
IN-related signalling traffic and analysed the operation of a typical SCCP load throttle. 
Scenario 3 argued the case for SCCP load throttles on the basis that they are necessary to ensure 
some degree of equitable treatment o f SS.7 user parts during overload. In particular, the issue of 
fairness between the level o f load throttling applied to ISUP and SCCP user parts was 
addressed. Factors such as the varying number of signalling messages in sessions o f  different 
session types, the presence o f hybrid ISUP/IN services and differences in throttling algorithms 
were shown to adversely affect fairness when measured in terms of comparative completion rate 
percentages.
In scenario 4 only forward SCP links overload, so SCCP load throttles are clearly required to 
protect these links from sustained overload. The performance o f the SCCP throttle was 
investigated and shown to suffer from similar drawbacks to those o f the ISUP throttle. 
Moreover, for this scenario, the operation of the SCCP throttle was seen to have no positive 
effect during the overload situation. This was due to message throttling by SCCP entities at 
those STPs where GTT takes place; IN messages are independently throttled here and at the 
originating SSPs. Over-throttling leads to an increase in the volume of reattempts and hence 
increased prolongation o f the overload situation.
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Overload o f both the forward SCP links and the SCP was investigated in scenario 5. It was 
shown that although SCCP load throttles were initially invoked to control link loads, it was the 
invocation o f the ACG throttles that had the most significant effect, as they provided effective 
control of the link. For this case, the higher-level ACG control was demonstrated to be much 
superior to the lower level SS.7 control.
Scenario 6 addressed the potential for reverse SCP link overload, due to SCP response messages 
being larger than query messages and/or service sessions comprising more response than query 
messages. The scenario results demonstrated that reverse SCP link overload can indeed occur 
and, when it does, it leads to undesired throttling and discarding o f SCP-generated response 
messages. This results in premature session termination and consequent degradation o f 
completion rate performance. The potential for end-user reattempts caused by prematurely 
terminated sessions to result in overload of forward SCP and mesh links was also demonstrated; 
this phenomenon exacerbates further the degradation of completion rates.
The final scenario investigated overload o f reverse SCP links simultaneously with overload of 
the SCP. Two separate cases were addressed. In the first, reverse SCP link overload caused a 
reduction in the load offered to the SCP, which kept its utilisation within the desired range. 
However, this came at the price o f highly undesirable premature session terminations. In the 
second case, the reduction in load offered to the SCP was insufficient to prevent it from 
overloading and ACG was invoked. It was observed that although the operation o f ACG meant 
that the load offered to the reverse SCP links was reduced, there was still a significant amount 
of message throttling/discarding and consequent premature session terminations. This scenario 
thus represented a clear example o f invocation o f the lower level SS.7 controls having a 
negative impact on the performance o f ACG.
Given the analysis results summarised above, we can make a number o f general remarks 
regarding the performance o f the standard SS.7/TN load controls:
• Standard SS.7 and IN load controls detect overload after its onset and depend for their 
success on the values o f a small number of statically-defined parameters. They react to 
overload, rather then preventing it. Moreover, the success o f the reaction is highly 
dependent on the suitability o f the statically-defined control parameters to factors such as 
network size and topology, service characteristics and offered load volume. Results 
presented here show that the static nature of the controls leads to oscillatory behaviour, 
causing premature session termination, overload propagation and poor completion rate 
performance;
• SS.7 load controls that throttle traffic on a message basis do not provide adequate load 
control performance. Results presented here show that throttling on a message basis, even 
where a priority-based system is employed, is inadequate and can lead to premature session
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termination and poor completion rate performance. Message-based throttling may also lead 
to the invocation o f user part recovery procedures, such as REL/RSC reattempts, which 
have a severely detrimental impact on network performance in overload conditions;
• SS.7 SCCP load throttles perform badly, particularly in networks where GTT is in place at 
STPs. Results presented here show that not only will SCCP load throttles suffer from the 
same problems as does the standard ISUP load throttle, but their deployment has no 
favourable impact in situations in which they would involve SCCP throttling at both 
originating SSPs and other GTT-enabled nodes. The need for some form of control o f SCCP 
signalling traffic is clear, however our results indicate that the SCCP itself may not be the 
ideal place for such a control to reside;
• The presence of independent, uncoordinated load controls at both IN and SS.7 planes can 
lead to unintended and potentially harmful control interactions. For example, we have 
shown that in the presence of reverse SCP link overload, message throttling due to the 
operation o f SS.7 controls degrades the performance of the higher-level IN ACG control. 
This supports the view that SS.7/IN resources should be controlled in a more integrated 
manner;
• Low-level SS.7 controls do not have available sufficient service-related information to 
allow them automatically ensure that high-level goals, such as fairness in the treatment of 
different service types, are attained. For example, our results show that the completion rates 
for different service types are highly dependent on factors such as the average number o f 
messages in the sessions of particular service types. Furthermore, the uncoordinated 
operation o f SS.7 and IN controls means that hybrid services like Freephone will be 
over-throttled in many overload situations. These observations point towards the desirability 
o f application-level controls that can be easily configured to mirror network operator 
preferences regarding service priorities and fairness aspects.
Given these remarks we can identify some basic characteristics o f an SS.7/IN load control
strategy that would the drawbacks of currently-deployed approaches. These characteristics are
as follows:
1. Preventative control: the strategy should primarily be focussed on the prevention of 
overloads, rather then reacting to them. One means of achieving this is through explicit 
resource allocation together with the enforcement of absolute limits on the number of 
sessions that can be accepted in a give timeframe;
2. Reactive control using delay measurements: Where it is not possible or practical to 
explicitly allocate all critical network resources, the strategy should employ reactive control. 
However, this aspect o f the control should rely solely on measurements that are locally 
available in SSPs in order to detect overload onset. In particular, the use of response delays
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for overload detection has been shown to be an attractive means for detecting overloads 
from the edge of the network [Arvidsson et al., 1997];47
3. Dynamic computation o f  control parameters: Controls depending on static parameters 
cannot adapt to changes in traffic patterns, service mix and resource availability. An 
alternative is the use o f dynamic approaches, which adjust control parameters in response to 
changes in network/traffic conditions;
4. Co-ordinated control: the strategy should co-ordinate the control of multiple instances of 
the different types resource types so that overall network performance is optimised.
5. Application-level control: placement o f load controls at the application-level has the 
advantages of controlling traffic on a per-session basis (thus avoiding the problems with 
message-based controls discussed above); allowing the network operator greater control 
over aspects like fairness and service priorities; and avoiding major changes to 
already-deployed equipment and software systems.
In chapters 5 and 6 we develop a network-oriented SS.7/IN load control strategy that exhibits 
the characteristics listed above. Chapter 5 first specifies an SCP load control strategy founded 
on the explicit, profit-optimal allocation o f SCP processing capacity and using a token-based 
paradigm. Chapter 6 then expands this approach to facilitate fully network-oriented control over 
both SS.7 and IN resources.
47 We note that use o f delay measurements offer an alternative means of detecting overload o f signalling 
links due to IN and/or ISUP traffic (or indeed other traffic types). Such measurements will trigger 
(application-level) load throttling which would alleviate the link overload. This offers an alternative to the 
use o f SCCP-based load throttles, which as we have shown, give extremely poor performance, 
particularly in scenarios where GTT is deployed in SS.7 network STPs.
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CHAPTER 5 
A  T o k e n -b a s e d  St r a t e g y  f o r  IN  S C P  L o a d  
C o n t r o l
Our first step towards development o f a network-oriented approach to load control for 
Intelligent Networks is to specify a strategy that provides effective control of the processing 
resources o f a single SCP. The strategy is based on the use of tokens, allocations o f which are 
dynamically computed on the basis of the current volume and make-up o f offered load, in a 
manner that seeks to optimise generated profit. This dynamic behaviour contrasts sharply with 
the static nature o f table-driven controls deployed in existing INs.
We commence in §5.1 by describing the concepts upon which the token-based approach is 
founded and providing a specification o f the token generation algorithm. §5.2 outlines two IN 
load control strategies we use for a comparative analysis of the performance of the token-based 
strategy, then §5.3 provides an overview o f the analytic and simulation models employed for 
this analysis. Results o f the analysis are presented and discussed in §5.4. Finally §5.5 draws 
overall conclusions regarding the strategy’s performance.
5.1 SPECIFICATION OF TOKEN-BASED STRATEGY
The token-based strategy (TOKEN for short) is based on two fundamental contentions. The first 
is that, where the processing charactersitics o f a resource (here an SCP) is well known,48 a load 
throttle that enforces absolute limits on the number o f admitted usage requests can guarantee 
that overloads do not occur. O f course there will typically be usage requests o f different classes 
vying for access to a resource, so during overload the problem arises as to which should be 
admitted. Our second contention is that the best solution to this problem is to endeavour to
48 Equipment manufacturers provide network operators with specifications o f  the performance o f SCPs 
under varying operational conditions. These may contain, for example, details of the relationship between 
the rate at which query messages arrive at the SCP and the mean processing delay for these queries. We 
assume that processing delays are independent o f  message arrival rates, although in reality this is unlikely 
to be the case. It would be possible to modify the token generation process to take into account a non­
linear arrival rate / processing delay relationship in order to maximise SCP performance. Formation o f 
‘processing requirement’ bids could then be done on a proprietary basis by each equipment manufacturer.
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maximise the total p r o fi t49 generated by successful requests. This differs from traditional 
approaches to load control, in that we focus more on the network operator viewpoint: maximise 
profit whilst maintaining high quality o f service, rather than on the equipment manufacturer 
viewpoint: maximise resource throughput in all load conditions.
In the strategy we enforce absolute limits on the number o f admitted service requests through 
use of tokens. A token is representative o f the amount of SCP processing capacity required by a 
session o f a particular service type. Service requests are admitted only if an appropriate token is 
available, in which case the token is ‘consumed’ by the request. At the start o f control intervals 
o f fixed length tokens, collectively corresponding to a pre-specified SCP target capacity, are 
generated and distributed to the SSPs, where they replace the previous allocations.
The token generation process aims to maximise generated profit. Profit values are assigned to 
each service type (and possibly also on a per-SSP basis) by the network operator; they take into 
account aspects such as revenue generated by successful sessions of that service, financial 
penalties associated with rejecting a session o f that service type and customer-perceived service 
importance. Besides profit values, other inputs to the process are the available SCP processing 
capacity, the total processing requirements o f sessions of the various service types and per-SSP, 
per service type estimates o f the future service request arrival rates. These are referred to as 
bids', the former two are supplied by the SCP itself and the latter are sent to the SCP by SSPs. 
The outputs o f the process are per-service, per-SSP, per-SCP token allocations, which are sent 
to the SSPs, where they dictate the number o f requests for each service that the SSP can accept 
over the coming control interval.
The SCP available processing capacity bid is formulated by simply multiplying the target 
capacity by the length of time for which tokens will be valid. However, more complex 
approaches that, for example, take into account the future processing requirements o f currently 
ongoing service sessions, would be possible. For SSP bids we assume that the intervals between 
token generations are small enough that the number of requests that arrived in the previous 
interval will be a sufficiently accurate estimate o f the number that will arrive in the coming 
interval.50 Again more complex formulations, for example taking into account traffic trend 
analysis, would be possible.
49 We use profit as a generic term to represent any form o f prioritisation.
30 For ‘short’ measurement intervals, of the order of tens of seconds, arrivals o f requests for telephony 
calls have be shown to be sufficiently well approximated by the Poisson arrival process. Since IN service 
requests originate from telephony calls it is invariably assumed in the literature that they also exhibit 
similar behaviour. Therefore, assuming that the control interval is suitably small, the num ber o f arrivals in 
one period should be a sufficiently accurate estimate o f the number arriving in the following interval 
(although the estimate will clearly be inaccurate if  there is a sudden change in the overall mean arrival 
rate).
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The token generation algorithm is a resource-oriented market algorithm that maximises 
expected profit by allocating tokens one-by-one, such that the expected increase in profit is 
maximised for every token allocated. To do so, it associates a price with every token allocated, 
with price being defined as the profit value o f the associated service times the probability that 
the token will be consumed. Clearly the probability o f token usage will be higher the higher the 
magnitude o f the bid sent by the SSP and will decrease as tokens are allocated in response to 
that bid. For an arbitrary SSP bid this relationship can be expressed as a utility function, which 
relates expected profit to the number o f allocated tokens. This utility function will be convex, 
because expected profit will increase as does the number of allocated tokens and the magnitude 
o f these increases will tend to zero as the number o f allocated tokens goes to infinity. Clearly 
the global utility function, which is simply the sum of all the utility functions for all the 
submitted bids, will then also be convex. Overall expected profit can then be maximised through 
use o f a greedy algorithm, which successively allocates tokens such that each allocation is the 
one that produces the largest increase in utility at the smallest cost in terms o f price per unit of 
SCP capacity. The algorithm proceeds by iterative examination of all possible candidate 
allocations, terminating when SCP target capacity has been allocated.
The operation o f the token generation process is illustrated in Figure 5.1. SSP bids are 
represented as white circles and tokens allocated in response to these bids as coloured circles. 
As the generation algorithm iterations proceed tokens are generated and the remaining supply o f  
SCP processing capacity diminishes. When the algorithm terminates the token allocations are 
sent to the SSPs,51 where they are consumed under the control of a token spending algorithm. In 
non-overload conditions more tokens than the number requested will be allocated in response to 
all bids, whereas during high load conditions at least some SSPs will be allocated less tokens 
than the number requested. Tokens are not additive between control intervals, hence when a 
new token allocation is received by an SSP it replaces the previous allocation.
5.1.1 Specification  of T o k en  Generation  Algorithm
We now specify the token-generation algorithm in detail. Assume an IN consists o f a single 
SCP, K  SSPs and supports J  service types; let k  and j  denote an arbitrary SSP and service 
type respectively. Let rk( j ) denote the profit generated by a successful session of service 
type j  originating at SSP k  . Let the total available capacity bid by the SCP be denoted by c 
and let the total processing costs associated with a type j  service session be denoted by p ( j ) .
51 In our analyses we assume that the total time taken for SSPs to send bids, for the execution o f  the token 
generation process and for SSPs to receive token allocations is negligible. In addition, we assume 
error-free transmission o f both bids and token allocations.
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Let qk{ j ) denote the bid o f SSP k  for tokens o f service type j  and let nk ( j )  denote the 
number o f tokens allocated in response to this bid.
All SSPs maintain J  pools o f tokens, one for each service type. When the SSP admits a type j  
service request into the network one token is removed from token pool j . I f  pool j  is empty 
then, until the token pools are refilled, all further requests for the service type j  will be 
rejected. Token pools are refilled as a result of the token generation process, which is executed 
at the start of control intervals o f duration T  time units.
Tokens are generated such that expected overall utility, measured as total profit generated over 
the next T  time units, is maximised. The method is to allocate tokens one by one such that the 
expectation o f marginal utility to marginal cost is maximised in each allocation. During the 
process records are kept of the total remaining supply o f processing capacity and the price per 
allocation of tokens.52 These records are denoted by s and ck( j ) respectively.
The marginal utility o f an additional token is the profit expected from that token; it is computed 
as the profit associated with a successful session times the probability that the token will 
actually be consumed. Let uk( j ) denote the marginal utility associated with allocating a type j  
token to SSP k  and let nk( j )  denote the total number of type j  tokens allocated to SSP k  
during the preceding iterations. By interpreting the expected number o f service requests qk( j ) 
as the average of a Poisson distribution, we obtain uk ( j )  as:
ukU )  = rkU)  S
52 Token allocation prices are not used in the single SCP case studied in this chapter, however they play 
an important role in the distributed token generation case described in Chapter 6.
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The marginal cost o f an additional token can be simply interpreted as the total processing 
capacity expended by the SCP on the session associated with consumption of the token. Let 
v(y) denote the marginal cost associated with issuing a type j  token. We have:
v( j )  = P( j )
Let a ( j , k )  -allocation refer to assigning a type j  token to SSP k  . The marginal utility per 
marginal cost o f such an action, which we denote by Sk( j ) ,  is:
<5k( j )  = uk( j ) / v ( j )
Sk ( j )  expresses the derivative of the utility function with respect to the processing required for 
a { j , k)  -allocation. The algorithm seeks to maximise total overall utility by distributing the 
resources in a series o f allocations such that each allocation results in a maximal increase in 
overall utility. The optimal allocation in each step is thus the one with the highest derivative.
It is possible that more then one candidate allocation will provide the same maximum increase 
in utility.53 From the viewpoint of achieving global utility any candidate allocation can be 
selected at random. We recognise however that this situation is an opportunity to apply 
secondary criteria when making such allocations. A multi-step ‘culling’ procedure, where at 
each step a number o f candidate allocations are eliminated can be employed, after which one of 
the remaining candidates can be selected at random. In the algorithm statement below we 
provide some example elimination criteria, though other types of criteria would also be possible.
We can now state the algorithm formally. For ease of computation a recursion-based approach 
is employed for updating uk( j ) at each iteration of the algorithm. For this approach x k( j )  is 
used to denote the probability that there will be exactly nk( j ) arriving requests for service type 
j  at SSP k  during the coming control interval and IT* ( j )  is used denote the probability that 
there will be more then nk ( j )  arriving requests for service type j  at SSP k  during the coming 
control interval.
Step 1: Initialisation.
Forall SSPs k  = \,...,K  do:
For all service types j  = 1,..., J  do:
Set token allocations nk( j )  = 0 and prices ck( j )  = 0.
53 In general, the only time that multiple allocations provide the same maximum increase in utility is 
where the SSP bids are the same. If  these bids are based on counts o f previously arrived requests then this 
will be a relatively infrequent occurrence. However, it is possible that a network operator may choose to 
fix bids for certain services, in which case the culling procedure will be frequently invoked.
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Set n k( j ) - e  qkU).
Set n k( j )  = l - 7Tk ( j ) .
Set marginal utilities uk ( j )  = rk (_j ) U k ( j )  .34 
For all service types j  = 1 do:
Set marginal costs v ( j ) = p ( j ) .
Set remaining SCP processing capacity s = c .
Step 2: Identify optimal allocations.
For all SSPs k  = \,...,K  do:
For all service types j  = do:
List all candidate allocations that maximise 5k ( j ) .
Step 3: Arbitrate between optimal allocations.
For all SSPs k  = \,...,K  do:
For all service types j  - 1 do:
If  allocation ( j ,  k )  is in the candidate list then:
Criterion A: Step size.55
If  p (J) < Pmsx0 )  » where p max( j )  = , then:
Eliminate candidate allocation ( j , k ) .
Criterion B: Provider concentration,56
K
I f  ^ T n k (y)>«min (y)> where nmin ( j )  denotes the minimum number o f tokens 
1
54 Initially we have nk(j)  = 0 . Hence:
^ k ( f )  c ~qk (j) 
w!
-<4k U) rk ( j ) k ~ e 9kÜ))
w=1
= rk( j ) n k(j)
55 To maximise expected overall utility, larger steps in terms of resources spent must be preferred to 
smaller ones (larger values of p( j )  means we have larger values of probability of token usage and/or 
rk (j ) ). This is achieved by identifying the maximal step size among the allocation candidates and 
eliminating the ones with smaller step sizes.
56 To ensure stability against sudden load changes with respect to specific services, the SCP is encouraged 
not to focus on particular services. This is achieved for each service by identifying the allocation 
candidates that refer to the lowest number of issued tokens and eliminating the ones where more tokens 
have been issued.
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allocation for any o f the service types j  = 1 then:
Eliminate candidate allocation ( j ,  k ) .
Criterion C: Fairness.51
I f  nk( j ) /  qk( j )  > mk ( j ) ,  where mk( j )  denotes the minimum o f the proportions 
o f demands satisfied for any o f the SSPs k = l,...,K and service types 
j  = , then:
Eliminate candidate allocation (j , k ) .
Selection.
Randomly select allocation ( / , £ ')  from those remaining in the candidate list.
Step 4: Perforin optimal allocations.
Set «*.(■/') = « * '( / )  + l - 
Set ct,(j ' )  = ck,(j ' )  + uk.(j ' ) .
Set s = s - p ( j ' ) .
Step 5: Update internal variables.
Set n k, ( /  ) = n k\ j ' ) q k, (.j ' ) / n k, ( /  ) .
Set n k, ( f )  = n ki ( j ' ) - n k. ( j ' ) .
Set uk. ( f )  = rk,(f)T lk, ( f ) .
Step 6: Loop statement.
If  s > 0 then:
GOTO Step 2.
Else:
STOP.
When the token generation process terminates the supply o f SCP processing capacity will have 
been distributed in an profit-optimal manner between the SSP demands. Token allocations are
57 To ensure fairness, even under conditions where the demand is much higher or much lower than the 
supply (in which case marginal utility for candidate allocations may be all 0 or rk( j )  respectively, 
independent o f  current allocation nk( j ) ) ,  fairness in relative allocation is encouraged. This is achieved 
for each SSP and service type by identifying the allocation candidates for which the lowest allocation of 
tokens relative to demand have been issued and eliminating those having higher relative allocations.
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transmitted to the SSPs, which use them to replenish the token pools. Token allocations are not 
additive between intervals, thus new allocations invalidate old ones.
5.1.2 S p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  T o k e n  S p e n d in g  P r o c e s s
I f  service requests arriving at an SSP are simply allowed to consume tokens if any remain, then, 
in high load conditions, token pools will quickly deplete at the start o f  the control interval. This 
can lead to large increases in the SCP queue size at the start o f the interval, resulting in a 
significant increases in response delays for end-users. To avoid this, we specify a token- 
spending process that ensures tokens are consumed at an approximately steady rate for the 
duration o f the control interval. The process employs percentage thinning to regulate the 
acceptance o f service requests. At sub-intervals of the control interval, PT coefficients for each 
service type are updated, using estimates of the number o f requests that will arrive before the 
end o f the control interval and the number of remaining tokens. Arriving service requests are 
subjected to a percentage thinning throttle using the relevant PT coefficient as parameter58 We 
now specify the PT coefficient updating and token spending algorithms.
5.1.2.1 PT Coefficient Updating Algorithm
Let r  denote the length o f the sub-intervals; r  is chosen such that T  = A.t , where A  is some 
integer. Let a e  (1, A) denote the current sub-interval number. Let y ' (j ) denote the estimated 
number o f arrivals o f requests for service type j  until the end o f the control interval and let 
n ' ( j ) denote the number o f tokens remaining for service type j . Let m.^a) denote the number 
o f requests for service type j  which arrived during sub-interval a and let m' ¡(a)  denote the 
number o f these that were accepted. Finally let p a(J)  denote the probability o f acceptance o f a 
request for service type j  (this is the PT coefficient). The algorithm contains two steps: the first 
(Initialisation) is executed at the start of the control interval and the second (Update PT 
coefficients) is executed at the start o f each sub-interval.
Step 1: Initialisation.
Set £7 = 1.
For all service types j  do:
Set / ’( j )  = qk( j )  , where qk( j )  is the number o f requests for service type j  that arrived 
over the duration o f the previous control interval.
Set n' ( j )  = nk( j ) .
58 A undesirable side-effect of employing this algorithm is that it is possible for a small number tokens to 
remain unused at the end of the control interval even though requests were rejected. However, we believe 
that this can be tolerated given that we achieve a high degree of control over the SCP queue size.
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Set p a( j )  = min(l, n ' ( j ) / y ' { j ) ) .
Step 2: Update PT coefficients.
For all service types j  = do:
Set n'(J) = n ' ( J ) - m ' j  ( a ) .
Set =
a 7T,
Set p a( j )  = min(l, r i ( J ) / f ( j ) )  ■
Set a = a +1.
5.1.2.2 Token-spending Algorithm
With the token-spending algorithm arriving service requests are simply subjected to a 
percentage thinning throttle, which dictates whether they are to be rejected or accepted. The 
algorithm is as follows:
Select a random number X  uniformly distributed in the range (0.0,1.0).
If X < p a( j )  then:
Service request is accepted.
Else:
Service request is throttled.
5.1.3 TOKEN S t r a t e g y  E n h a n c e m e n t  f o r  C o n t r o l  o f  
‘L e g a c y ’ SSPs
In this section we address the deployment of the TOKEN strategy in a network containing 
‘legacy’ SSPs, that is SSPs not having the capability to control IN traffic using tokens, but 
which do employ some standard load throttle like call gapping.39 In this scenario the SCP forms 
bids on behalf o f the legacy SSPs using its knowledge o f the number o f initial service session 
messages received from the each legacy SSP during the last control interval and the gap interval 
length it set at the beginning of that interval. The token generation process proceeds as normal 
and, once completed, token allocations for the legacy SSPs are converted into appropriate gap 
intervals. We assume that the SCP is able to indicate to the legacy SSPs an actual gap interval 
duration, as opposed to an overload level. Were this not possible the SCP would require 
knowledge o f the gap interval tables at the SSP, to allow it indicate an overload level that gives 
the most appropriate gap interval.
59 It would also be possible to convert token allocations into parameters of other throttle types. For brevity 
we only consider call gapping here.
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5.1.3.1 Estimation o f SSP Service Request Arrivals
To produce an estimate o f service request arrivals at the legacy SSPs during the previous 
interval, denoted q ‘k( j ) ,  the SCP uses the calculation described below. For the case where the 
gap interval set at the start of the previous interval, denoted g k( j ) , is such that g k( j )  < T , the 
calculation makes use o f  the number o f initial service session message arrivals measured at the 
SCP, denoted dk ( j ) . The basis of the calculation is that the estimated length o f time the gap
timer was inactive in the previous interval, denoted t'maclive, divided by the interval length T  , is 
equivalent to the proportion o f accepted service requests, that is:
i^nactive _  di U )
T qkU)
The gap timer is activated for each accepted request, hence for the case where g k (j ) < T we 
have:
K,ac^=T - d kU)-gkU)  i f  SkU)  < T
Note that the above is an estimate as it makes the simplifying assumption that the gap timer is 
not active at the end o f the control interval. Substituting for r*mclive in the first expression and 
solving for q'k( j ) yields:
■?;(/)= </ s * v > < TT ~ d k( j ) . gk( j )
For the case where g k( j ) > T  the gap timer may be active over the full duration o f the control 
interval, in which case it is not possible for the SCP to estimate the SSP arrival rate. For this 
reason we let the SCP simply use its last non-zero measurement o f arrivals of initial messages 
for service type j  coming from SSP k  , which we denote d \  (j ) .  That is:
q \ U)  = d \ U )  i f  S k U ) - t
5.1.3.2 Conversion of Token Allocations into Gap Intervals
The calculation for conversion of a token allocations, nk{ j ) , into a corresponding gap interval, 
gk( j ) ,  is based on the intention that in the coming interval SSPs will a c c e p ts  most the same 
number service requests as the number o f tokens allocated. This number will thus be the 
maximum number o f times the gap timer is permitted to be activated during the coming control 
interval. Furthermore, the maximum total amount of time for which the gap timer will be active 
should ideally equal the proportion o f requests to be rejected times the control interval length.
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Thus, for q'k( j )  ^  0 , we have:
nk{j)-gk{ j ) =  1 - " * C y  a  1
When q[{j)  = 0 we set the gap interval to the control interval duration. Therefore, we have:
g t U )  = <
T if  9*0') = 0
5.2 STRATEGIES USED FOR COMPARISON
In order to analyse the likely performance o f the TOKEN strategy both quantitatively and 
qualitatively it is necessary to compare it with one or more other IN load control strategies. 
Ideally it should be compared with both a ‘traditional’ strategy, of the sort currently deployed in 
IN systems, as well as with a more advanced strategy that is also adaptive60 in nature and seeks 
to maximise generated revenue/profit. We do both, comparing TOKEN with the ACG strategy 
(described in §2.3.1.3) and Lodge’s optimisation strategy (described in §2.3.1.4).
The version o f the ACG strategy implemented for this study is the same as that used in 
Chapter 4 (c f  §4.1.3.2 and §4.1.3.3), which is in turn based on the ACG specifications, 
[Bellcore, 1994; 1995]. To summarise: overload detection takes place at the SCP using 
measurements o f processor utilisation and a mapping rule that produces one of 13 overload 
levels, in a manner intended to keep processor utilisation in the range (0.8, 0.9) Erlangs during 
overload. The overload level is calculated every T  = 10s and indicated to all SSPs in the 
network by means o f autonomous ACG messages. SSPs activate gapping on all sources; we 
assume all requests for a service type at an SSP constitute a single source. Gap intervals lengths 
are indexed by the overload level from the table o f Bellcore-standard values, but they are 
randomised in the range (90%, 100%) for each source before being put in place. Neither control 
refreshing, nor a gap duration parameter are used.
The version o f the optimisation strategy (which we refer to as OPT) studied here is closely 
based on the general strategy description provided in §2.3.1.4, the major difference being that, 
since SSP overload is not addressed, we do not have an optimisation process in operation at the 
SSPs. The service type weights used in OPT play a similar role to the profit values used in 
TOKEN. To ensure direct comparison we set the revenue values, R j , used in OPT equal to the
TOKEN profit values, rk ( j ) , additionally assuming that for the TOKEN strategy profit values
60 In describing a strategy as adaptive we simply mean that it computes load throttle parameters in a 
dynamic manner and so ‘adapts’ to the prevailing load conditions.
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are the same at all SSPs (rk( j )  = r ( j )  V k e  {1,..., K } ). We also set the values o f all the OPT 
Quality-of-Service levels, qj ,  equal to 1. Thus the weight for service type j  is given by:
R fl  jescpjMscp,j r (J)escpjMscr.j
C O , ~  -   —  ~ — -----------------   —J SCP,j ~  J  J
X! R j 1 j e SCP j M s c p j J/C/> s c p j M s c p .j
]=\ >i
In the absence o f SSP optimisation, the PT coefficients calculated by the SCP will be those put
in place by the SSPs, ie. pkj(t) = p aSCpk / (0  • Assuming that available SCP processing value and
service processing costs used in TOKEN are expressed in terms of fractions o f the total SCP 
processing capacity then the OPT maximum SCP load equals the TOKEN SCP available
processing capacity, that is p ^  = c . Given the above, the SCP optimisation problem can be 
stated as follows:
K .1
Maximise Y Y r ( j )pak (t)qk (j ) 
subject to the constraints:
(t)eScr iqk O')I. SC P  L o a d :
M  H  M s c p j
II. Bounds on p ak j (t )\  0 < p ak j ( t ) <\  V k  €.{\,...,K), j
III. Weighting: v  k  e  {1,..., AT}, j , f e { [ , . . . , J } w i t h j  *  j '
p k . (t ) G > s c p  ■ where o}SCpy ~ max((3JV(..p|1 ,...,ojSCP i )
5.3 DESCRIPTION OF NEW IN MODELS
For this chapter we address IN SCP load control in isolation and ignore the potential for SS.7 
overloads or failures that may adversely effect overall performance.61 It is therefore possible to 
completely omit SS.7 resources from our models, which consequently are much simpler than 
those used for the chapter 4 analyses. An additional advantage of omitting SS.7 is that it is 
feasible to employ a more sophisticated approximation technique (Decomposition) for 
development o f a (fully) analytic model. This section provides an overview of the ‘new’ 
simulation/analytic models and describes the service types modelled.
61 This issue is re-visited in Chapter 6 where the Token-based load control strategy is enhanced in order to 
provide protection against SS.7 overload and equipment failures.
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5.3.1 S i m u l a t i o n  M o d e l
The simulation model uses discrete event simulation to model the flow o f traffic through the IN 
network on a packet-by-packet basis. The network topology employed consists o f a single SCP 
and K  SSPs; it is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The signalling network used to transfer messages 
between SSPs and the SCP is not modelled, with messages sent from one node arriving 
instantaneously at the input queue of the destination node with no messages being lost, having 
errors or arriving out-of-sequence. No functionality associated with the underlying voice-circuit 
network is modelled. SSPs are of three sizes, where size relates to the rate of IN service requests 
arrivals at that SSP during normal load conditions. The sizes are small, medium and large with a 
respective arrival rate ratio of 1 : 3 : 7; there are an equal number of SSPs of each size in the 
network.
K/3 Small SSPs K/3 Medium SSPs K/3 Large SSPs
Figure 5.2: N etw ork Topology for IN Sim ulation Model.
5.3.1.1 SSP Model
The SSP model is similar to that employed for the simulation model used in Chapter 4. It 
contains a single central processor o f infinite capacity, hence signalling messages experience 
zero queuing and processing delays at the SSP and SSPs never overload. SSPs contain the 
following functional blocks: Service Request Generators, the SSF and the SRF.
The Service Request Generator functional blocks generate IN service requests according to 
independent Poisson processes with rate Xk . requests per second (this rate may vary over the
course o f a simulation run) for each service class j  and SSP k respectively. All requests o f a 
particular service type arriving at a particular SSP are assumed to use the same GTA for 
communication with the SCP. End-user reattempt behaviour is modelled as follows: when a 
service request is throttled by the SSF or when a message associated with a service session is 
dropped or discarded at the SCP the end-user will reattempt the session with a probability of 
0.7. Reattempts are scheduled after a random delay uniformly distributed in the range (60s, 90s). 
The end-user will re-attempt a service request a maximum of 2 times. In addition we assume
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that all calls are answered; in other words, the number o f humans available to answer calls 
during overload conditions is not a limiting resource.
The SSF functional block maintains the BCSM instances for the supported services. It models 
the complete SSF-side processing of an IN service session, through BCSM instance 
instantiation, communication with other IN entities and session termination. It also realises the 
load throttles associated with the various load control strategies studied. The SRF functional 
block is assumed to contain an infinite number of voice circuits and associated resources, hence 
it never overloads. The only delay experienced at the SRF relates to the user delays involved in 
the playing o f announcements and digit collection (these delays are specified in §5.3.3).
5.3.1.2 SCP Model
The SCP model is also somewhat similar to that used in chapter 4. It contains a single central 
processor that has the capacity to execute c = 28,000,000 instructions per second. Signalling 
messages arriving at the SCP require the execution o f a different number o f instructions, 
depending on their type; details o f signalling message processing requirements are provided in 
§5.3.3. The SCP has a single input queue that can hold a maximum of 500 messages; we assume 
that all messages are o f the same size, 100 Bytes. I f  the queue is full then all arriving messages 
are discarded, with no associated processing cost. I f  messages have been waiting in the queue 
for longer than t = 2s by the time they commence processing they are dropped, a process that 
involves expending 24,000 instructions.
SCPs contain two functional blocks: the SCF and the SDF. The SCF incorporates the SLPs for 
the supported services. It models the complete SCF-side processing of service sessions, through 
SLP instantiation, handling o f communication with other IN entities and SLP instance 
termination. It also incorporates functionality associated with the load control strategies studied. 
The SDF functional block models the reading and updating of database entries; we assume that 
delays associated with these actions are incorporated into the processing delay o f the arriving 
message that triggered them.
5.3.2 Analytic  M odel
The analytic model was developed with the aim of modelling as closely as possible the 
behaviour of the IN simulation model, described above. Its main purpose is to provide a degree 
o f validation of the efficacy o f the results generated using the simulation model. In this section 
we specify the analytic model, note those aspects in which it differs from the simulation model 
and discuss the impact of these differences.
Considering the central processors of the SSPs and SCP as queues with arbitrary arrival/service 
rate distributions and number o f servers results in the queuing network illustrated inFigure 5.3;
Brendan Jennings Page 134 31/05/01
Chapter 5: A Token-based Strategy for IN SCP Load Control
this mirrors the simulation model network topology illustrated in Figure 5.2. Throttles, 
operating on the input streams Ak, are in place at the output of each SSP queue.
Figure 5.3: IN Q ueuing N etw ork, 1 SCP and  K  SSPs.
In the simulation model SSP central processors are in effect treated as infinite service rate 
queues, hence in the analytic model SSP queues (but not throttles) can be ignored. We are then 
left with a single queue that models the SCP central processor. M odelling in strict accordance 
with the simulation model would necessitate use of a multi-server queue, with one server for 
each type o f message that arrives at the SCP and a service rate corresponding to the number of 
instructions required for processing o f that message type. Our first simplification is to assume 
that all messages associated with a particular service involve the same number o f instructions 
(the mean value for that service), consequently we need model only a ./-server queue. For ease 
o f analysis we additionally assume that that actual service times for arriving messages are 
exponentially distributed.
In the simulation model the SCP central processor has a single queue with a finite capacity of 
500 messages. For the analytic model we model a queue with infinite capacity, hence no 
message discarding occurs. We do not model the dropping of messages that have been 
excessively delayed in the queue. These differences may lead to some discrepancies between the 
results obtained using the simulation and analytic models.
Delays representing user interactions are omitted from the analytic model since, in steady state, 
they have no impact on the performance o f the system. The main impact o f this simplification is 
that measurements obtained from the analytic model will be seen to settle almost immediately 
after a change in input traffic; this will not be the case for the simulation model. We do not 
model end-user reattempt behaviour in the analytic model, but overcome this limitation by 
comparing results with results from simulation runs where end-user reattempts are also omitted.
The final simplification relates to the models of the load throttles. We model all throttles types 
by means of PT coefficients. OPT provides these coefficients directly, but the outputs o f ACG
Brendan Jennings Page 135 31/05/01
Chapter 5: A Token-based Strategy for IN SCP Load Control
and TOKEN (gap interval lengths and token allocations respectively) must be converted into 
equivalent PT coefficients; formulae for these conversions are provided below. This conversion 
will lead to minor discrepancies in load throttling behaviour between the simulation and analytic 
models. We note that this simplification means that in effect we do not model any wastage of 
tokens that may arise from the token spending algorithm.
5.3.2.1 Specification of Analytic Model
Given the simplifications and assumptions described above we proceed to specify the analytic 
model. The model outputs the mean SCP load and mean SCP queue size for a interval, given the 
arrival rates o f requests for all J  services at all K  SSPs and PT coefficients for the same 
interval. Let T  denote the interval duration, which we set equal to the control interval of the 
load control strategies we study. Let Ak (t) denote the mean arrival rate o f requests for service
type j  at SSP k  at time t . Let p ak j {t) denote the PT coefficient for service j  at SSP k  as set 
at time t ; these values are in effect the probabilities of acceptance of service requests during the 
interval \t,t + T]. The mean arrival rate o f sessions relating to service type j  at SSP k  at 
time t , denoted AscpkJ(t) ,  is then given by:
The SCP queue has J  servers; let n SCPj denote the service rate of server j . Let yscpj(t)  denote 
the arrival rate o f messages o f  service type j  at the SCP at time t . Let eSCPJ denote the number 
of messages relating to a session o f service type j  that arrive at the SCP for processing. Finally, 
let p SCP(t) denote the load o f the SCP at time t .
Estimation o f SCP arrival rates and SCP load
The arrival rates o f service type j  messages at the SCP can be estimated by:
Estimation of SCP mean queue size and mean queuing delay
We employ the decomposition approximation method, described in §3.1.1.3, to estimate SCP 
mean queue size. The following expression for the square o f the variation coefficient (svc) o f
S^CP,k,j(t) —
K K
Y SCP i (0 ~ e ,SCP i ^SC J'.k , ; (0 e sCP. I Ÿ! Pk M  T)Ak j ( t )
These values can be used to estimate the load of the SCP, as follows:
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the interarrival times of messages at the SCP at time t , denoted by kaSCP (t) , was generated by 
substituting into the general form of the decomposition equations given in §3.1.1.3.
K J
SCP \LJ J  K
X eSCPJ X PkJ (t ~ T ) \ j  (0
j=  1 k=\
The mean SCP queue size at time t , denoted LSCP(t), can now be estimated using Kingman’s 
formula. Note that since the service times associated with the J  servers are all exponentially 
distributed we set the svc o f the service time of messages at the SCP, Ksscp(t) equal to 1, 
giving:
j I P scp (0 \.k a scr (0 + 1]
2[1 — Pscpi 0 ]
Ascp (0 Pscp (0
The mean queuing delay at the SCP queue at time t , denoted Tscp(t), can then be estimated by 
applying Little’s Law:
TSCp (0  — ■ S^CP (0j
y ,  y  scp, j (0
7=1
Calculation of Equivalent PT Coefficients for ACG Strategy
Let gkJ(t) be the gap interval duration set by the SCP for service type j  at SSP k  at time t . In 
the case where gk j ( t ) >T  we can simply set the equivalent PT coefficient, p k j (t),  equal to 
zero:
p !j (0 = o if SkjiO-T
Where g kJ(f) < T  we make use of the fact that all requests arriving while the gap timer is active 
are accepted, whilst all those arriving when it is inactive are rejected. Therefore, assuming that 
the gap timer is inactive at the start and end of the control interval, the value o f p kJ(t) can be 
calculated as the fraction o f the control interval for which the gap timer is inactive. I f  we denote 
the aggregate time for which the gap timer is inactive by rinacl!ve, we have:
=  ^  if gkJ(0<T
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Now, the number o f service j- requests that will be accepted by SSP k  during the control 
interval is given by ASCP kJ(t + T ).T , so the aggregate length o f time for which the gap timer will 
be active, denoted racljve is given by:
= ¿scpjj (t + T).T.gkJ (t) = p°kJ (t)AkJ (t + T).T.gkj (0
Given the above we can calculate rinaclive as:
= T ~ ^ active = T ~  p akJ 00 \ j  i f  + T ) I . g kj (0
Substituting for Thiacliw in the expression for p k j (t) and solving yields:
Pk-j ( 0 =  l + Ak j (t + T).gk j (t) i f  g^ t )< T  
In summary:
i f  g*.,( t ) < T
1 + K  j (t + T).gkJ{t)
0 i f  g k X t ) > T
Calculation of Equivalent PT Coefficients for TOKEN Strategy
If the number of service request arrivals during an interval is equal to or greater than the number 
o f allocated tokens then the required PT coefficient is 1. Otherwise, the PT coefficient is 
calculated by dividing the number of allocated tokens by the number of arrivals during the 
interval. This leads to the following conversion formula:
P l j ( 0  =
1 i f  Ak j {t + T).T <nkJ(t)
i f  K j ( t + T ) T > n kj{t)n k , j  (0
5.3.3 S u p p o r t e d  S e r v i c e s
The SS.7/IN models used in Chapter 4 supported two basic IN services (Freephone and 
Televoting), as well as a single non-IN service (ISUP Telephony). Here and in chapter 6 we 
wish to focus on services that are more complex (in terms of number o f signalling messages 
exchanged per session) and therefore more representative o f the type o f service currently being 
deployed on IN platforms. We model three ‘new’ service types: Virtual Private Network, 
Ringback and Restricted Access Call Forwarding. The models o f these services are loosely 
based on the prototype implementation descriptions in [Karagiannis et al., 1998], One of the 
primary reasons for using these three services is that these descriptions are sufficiently detailed
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to allow reasonably accurate estimation o f processing requirements o f individual signalling 
messages arriving at the SCP, thus the accuracy o f our models is improved.
5.3.3.1 Service A: Virtual Private Network
Virtual Private Network (VPN) services create a logical sub-network, spanning single or 
multiple IN network domains, which appears to a specific group o f end-users as a private 
network, providing a range o f features normally associated with private telephony exchanges. 
All calls are controlled by an SCP, which provides facilities such as number translation and call 
monitoring. Figure 5.4 illustrates the sequence o f information flows involved in a successful 
session of the service; the labels in brackets will be used to identify the signalling messages 
corresponding to the IFs. The profit associated with a successful session o f the VPN service is 5 
profit units.
SSP
SRF
User
Delay-*
A1
User 
Delay- 
A2
SSF
I r
_SS.7_
Analysed 
Information (sA1)
SCP
■~i r"
Connect (sA4)
Request Report 
BCSM (sA5)
Event Report 
BCSM (sA6)
Request Report 
BCSM (sA7)
Event Report 
BCSM (sA8)
Release Call (sA9)
SCF SDF
I
Search (sA2)
Search 
Result (sA3)
-j I_
Figure 5.4: Info rm ation  Flow sequence for V irtua l P rivate  N etw ork service session.
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The processing requirements, in terms of executed instructions, for messages arriving at the 
SCP are shown in Table 5.1. These values were used directly in the simulation model, whilst for 
the analytic model the mean message execution time was used for the calculation o f the SCP 
service rate for Service A.62
Table 5.1: Service A SCP processing requirements.
Arriving Signalling Message Departing Signalling Message(s) SCP Instructions
sAl sA4, sA5 170,000
sA6 sA7 35,000
sA8 sA9 35,000
240,000
In the simulation model the duration o f the end-user delay phases o f the service are drawn at 
random from a negative exponential distribution on a session-by-session basis. The mean o f the 
distribution is 5 seconds for user delay A1 (telephone ringing) and 100 seconds for user delay 
A2 (conversation). In the analytic model these end-user delays are not modelled.
5.3.3.2 Service B: Ringback
Ringback services allow a calling party, upon receipt of an engaged tone for a called party, to 
request that a call be automatically initiated to that callee once his/her current call has 
terminated. To realise this service the SCP signals the SSP to report when the callee’s current 
call terminates, after which it signals the SSP to initiate a call between the caller and callee. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the sequence of information flows involved in a successful session o f the 
service, A successful session is assumed to generate 10 profit units.
The processing requirements, in terms of executed instructions, for messages arriving at the 
SCP are shown in Table 5.2. These values were used directly in the simulation model, whilst for 
the analytic model the mean message execution time was used for the calculation o f the SCP 
service rate for Service B.63
In the simulation model the duration o f the end-user delay phases are chosen at random using 
the distributions described in Table 5.3. In the analytic model these end-user delays are not 
modelled.
62 Mean number of instructions = 240,000 / 3 = 80,000. /jW we., = 28,000,000 / 80,000 = 350.
63 Mean number of instructions = 300,000 / 6 = 50,000. /JscrsERncr, = 28,000,000 / 50,000 = 560.
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Table 5.2: Service B SCP processing requirements.
*
Arriving Signalling Message Departing Signalling Message(s) SCP Instructions
sBl sB2 90,000
sB3 sB4 35,000
sB5 sB6 35,000
sB7 sB8, sB9 45,000
sBlO s B l l ,  sB12 45,000
sB13 sB14, sB15 50,000
300,000
SSP! !
SRF SSF
SS.7 SCP
" 1  r ~
Analysed 
Information (sB1)
Connect to 
Resource (sB2)
Status Report (sB3)
Play
Announcement (sB4)
Specialized Resource 
Report (sB5)
Request Status 
Report (sB6)
Status Report (sB7)
Connect (sB8)
Request Report 
BCSM (sB9)
Event Report 
BCSM (sB10)
Connect (sB11)
Request Report 
BCSM (sB12)
Event Report 
BCSM (sB13)
Continue (sB14)
Continue (sB15)
SCF SDF
I
Figure 5.5: Information Flow sequence for Ringback service session.
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Table 5.3: Service B end-user delay phase du ra tion  distributions.
End-User Delay Description Distribution
B1 Announcement None (constant duration o f 5s)
B2 Time to end o f conversation Negative exponential, mean 50s
B3 Callee telephone ringing Negative exponential, mean 5 s
B4 Caller telephone ringing Negative exponential, mean 5 s
5.3.3.3 Service C: Restricted Access Call Forwarding
Basic call forwarding allows an end-user to redirect incoming calls to a different number in a 
manner transparent to the calling party. A variation o f this, in which the calling party m ust enter 
a specified PIN number before the call is forwarded to the other number, is modelled here. 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the sequence o f information flows involved in a successful session o f the 
service. A successful session is assumed to generate 1 profit unit.
SSP
User 
Delay h 
C1
SRF SSF
I r -
Prompt and collect userj 
Information (sC4)
SS.7_
Analysed 
Information (sC1)
I r ~
Connect to 
Resource (sC2)
Status Report (sC3)
Collected User 
Information (sC5)
Connect (sC8)
SCP
SCF SDF
Search (sC6)
Search 
Result (sC7)
Figure 5.6: Inform ation Flow sequence fo r R estricted  Access Call F orw ard ing  service session.
The processing requirements, in terms o f executed instructions, for messages arriving at the 
SCP are shown in Table 5.4. These values were used directly in the simulation model, whilst for 
the analytic model the mean message execution time was used for the calculation o f the SCP 
service rate for Service C.64
64 Mean number o f instructions = 160,000 / 3 = 53,333. /fc.fmtKK.£C = 28,000,000 / 53,333 = 525.
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Table 5.4: Service C SCP processing requirem ents.
Arriving Signalling Message Departing Signalling Message(s) SCP Instructions
sCl sC2 70,000
sC3 sC4 25,000
sC5 sC8 65,000
160,000
In the simulation model the duration o f the end-user delay phase of the service, which relates to 
digit collection, is drawn at random from a negative exponential distribution with a mean of 5s. 
In the analytic model this end-user delay is not modelled.
5.4 ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF STRATEGY 
PERFORMANCE
This section presents and discusses the results o f a comparative study o f the ACG, OPT and 
TOKEN strategies, performed using analytic and simulation models. The primary aims o f the 
study were to confirm that TOKEN is likely to perform significantly better than static strategies 
(such as ACG) and to explore its merits and disadvantages as compared to similar adaptive, 
revenue-maximising strategies (such as OPT). The analysis focuses solely on the effectiveness 
o f TOKEN in controlling the load o f a single SCP; strategy enhancements for realisation o f a 
more network-oriented control scheme are dealt with in chapter 6.
The experiments carried out for the study were designed to allow investigation o f both 
strategies’ basic load control behaviour and their robustness to varying network/load conditions. 
The central goal of an IN SCP load control strategy is to maximise the service session 
completion rate during an overload situation whilst ensuring that the utilisation on the SCP stays 
close to but does not exceed a target level. In addition, SCP throughput should be maximised, 
that is the SCP should ideally not have to devote any processing time to the dropping of 
excessively delayed messages. It must also be robust to the volume o f overload traffic, the 
sources of overload traffic, the number o f traffic sources in the network and the supported 
service mix.
We employ five performance metrics in our analyses, namely: SCP utilisation, SCP throughput, 
SCP input queue size, service session completion rates and generated profit. Since all three 
strategies are founded on the principle o f keeping SCP utilisation within defined limits and 
maximising throughput, the use o f utilisation and throughput as performance metrics is natural. 
SCP input queue size gives an indication of the degree of overload and the response delays 
experiences by service end-users. Utilisation, throughput and queue size are equipment 
manufacturer-centric performance metrics; the remaining two metrics, completion rates and 
profit, give a more network operator-centric viewpoint. Session completion rates give an
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indirect measure o f the number o f users receiving adequate quality-of-service from the network 
during overload, whilst generated profit gives a measure of strategy performance regarding use 
of SCP resources in an optimal manner.
This section is structured as follows: §5.4.1 addresses basic strategy behaviour; §5.4.2 addresses 
selective throttling o f service types based on profit; §5.4.3, §5.4.4 and §5.4.5 address robustness 
with regard to volume of overload traffic, source of overload traffic and the number o f traffic 
sources respectively; finally, §5.4.6 address the operation o f the TOKEN enhancement for 
control of legacy SSPs.
5.4.1 B a s i c  L o a d  C o n t r o l  B e h a v i o u r
In order to facilitate a direct comparison o f basic load control behaviour the results presented 
here relate to the scenario where the arrival rates for service B and service C are set to zero; in 
effect only service A is supported by the network. This choice avoids issues relating to 
profit-based service differentiation and fairness, which are dealt with separately below. The 
arrival rates for service A are set so that during normal load conditions the SCP offered load is 
0.35 Erlangs, whilst during overload the SCP first-offered load is 1.4 Erlangs. The volume of 
service requests is increased in one step at t = 600s and decreased in one step at t = 1200a- . In 
both normal and overload conditions service requests arrive at all SSPs in volumes proportional 
to SSP size and with exponentially distributed interarrival times. The control interval islO i for 
all three strategies. End-user reattempt behaviour is not modelled initially. For ACG the target 
SCP utilisation range is set to (0.8,0.9) Erlangs, whilst for OPT and TOKEN the target SCP 
utilisation is c = 0.9 Erlangs.
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 show the offered load and SCP throughput55 for ACG, OPT and 
TOKEN, as obtained using the analytic and simulation models respectively. We see that ACG 
performs very poorly: throughput exceeds and falls short o f the target value in an oscillatory 
fashion. As discussed in §4.4.1 this occurs because, when using the standard gap intervals, ACG 
initially greatly over-controls the load offered to the SCP. Sources then reduce traffic by too 
large an amount, and once SCPs have serviced the backlog o f messages in their buffer the 
processor becomes starved, utilisation falls below the lower threshold, SSPs remove gapping, 
the SCP becomes overloaded and the cycle repeats.
OPT and TOKEN perform significantly better than ACG in controlling utilisation/throughput, 
since they dynamically compute load throttle parameters based on arrival rate estimations and 
these parameters will almost always be more accurate than those chosen from the small set of 
static gap intervals used by ACG. Both OPT and TOKEN keep the mean utilisation/throughput
65 In this scenario no messages were dropped by the SCP for any of the three scenarios, hence for the 
simulation results SCP throughput is equivalent to SCP utilisation. For the analytic model message 
dropping is not modelled, hence throughput is always equivalent to utilisation,
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very close to the target o f  0.9 Erlangs during overload, however we see that with OPT there is 
oscillation around this value. TOKEN, on the other hand, controls the utilisation without ever 
exceeding the target o f 0.9 Erlangs. This would be a significant advantage of TOKEN in the 
case where the target utilisation of the SCP must not be exceeded if  system integrity is to be 
guaranteed. The drawback of TOKEN in this regard is that the utilisation falls a little short of 
the target, due to the operation of the percentage thinning based token spending process. The 
main reason for this difference in behaviour is that OPT employs relative load throttle 
parameters (PT coefficients), whereas TOKEN employs absolute parameters (token allocations). 
The difference in time taken for throughput to approach the target in the analytic and simulation 
models is due to the modelling of end-user delays in the simulation model.
j — — Offered Load | j  4CP T>rquqHpm — Offered Load]
Figure 5.7: A nalytic model. SCP offered load and utilisation. Left: ACG. C entre: OPT. 
R ight: TO K EN .
r — Offered Lead — SCP Throoghput | — OlfcfedLoad — SCP 'nroughpd j j . — Offered Load  SC P I
Figure 5.8: Sim ulation model. SCP offered load and utilisation. Left: ACG. C entre: OPT.
Right: TO K EN .
The impact o f processor utilisation oscillation on SCP input queue sizes can be seen in 
Figure 5.966 and Figure 5.10. The closer utilisation is to 1.0 the larger the mean queue size, 
which increases both the dropping probability for arriving messages and the mean queuing 
delay for messages not dropped. Clearly, message dropping and large delays degrade the quality 
of service received by service end-users. We see that with ACG the queue size oscillates in
66 The decomposition method cannot be used to estimate queue size when a queue is saturated (utilisation
equals one). With ACG the SCP is often fully utilised, hence we can not show queue size for ACG.
*
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tandem with the oscillations o f SCP utilisation. In this scenario the queue size does not grow to 
the stage where messages are dropped, however (as will be shown later) message dropping will 
occur when offered load is higher.
At the start o f  the overload OPT has not yet reacted to the increase in the volume o f arriving 
requests, all o f which are accepted. This means that the SCP utilisation quickly goes to and stays 
at 1 for the duration o f the first control interval after overload onset. Therefore the analytic 
model is unable to calculate a mean queue size for this interval. In Figure 5.9 we have set the 
queue size for this interval to zero, this accounts for the obvious difference between the two 
OPT queue size graphs. As shown by the simulation model graph the queue size does not, in 
this scenario, grow to the stage where messages are dropped, however in more severe overload 
conditions this is a likely occurrence. For TOKEN we see that the queue size is well controlled, 
even at the start o f the overload.
— Mean SCP Q « u e  Size 1  Mean SC P Queue Size
t  sa> «H IW)
Tim* (i)
o- XO 600 900 120Û
Tima (a)
Figure 5.9: A nalytic model. M ean SCP Queue Size. Centre: OPT. R ight: TOKEN.
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Figure 5.10: Sim ulation model. M ean SCP Queue Size. Left: ACG. C entre: O PT. R ight: TOKEN.
Moving averages (window 60s) o f mean service session completion rates for each o f the three 
SSP types, as obtained using the simulation model, are shown in Figure 5.11. It is clear that both 
OPT and TOKEN demonstrate a significant improvement in completion rates over ACG. There 
are only small differences between the total completion rate performance o f OPT and TOKEN, 
reflecting their similar performance with regard to controlling SCP throughput.
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Figure 5.11: Sim ulation model. P er SSP size completion rates. Left: ACG. C entre: OPT.
Right: TOKEN.
Regarding fairness between the treatment of SSP sizes it is evident from Figure 5.11 that ACG 
treats sources more equitably than either OPT or TOKEN. Table 5.5 shows the ratios of 
completion rates for small/medium/large sized SSPs during the overload. For complete fairness, 
in terms of throttling SSPs o f  different sizes in proportion to their contributions to overload 
traffic, these ratios should equal those of the SSP size ratio (7 : 3 : 7). For OPT we see almost 
all o f the accepted requests originate at large SSPs, a result o f the lack o f an explicit constraint 
relating to fairness in the formulation o f the optimisation problem. TOKEN also tends to favour 
larger SSPs, because there is a greater probability that tokens allocated to these will be used?7 
We note that a bias towards larger SSPs may be desirable from the network operator’s 
viewpoint, since large SSPs tend to be associated with urban areas where there is a larger 
concentration of business customers; who are often regarded as being o f higher importance than 
residential customers.
Table 5.5: Ratios of com pletion rates for sm all/m edium /Iarger SSPs.
Strategy Ratio (small : medium : large)
ACG 1 : 2.40 : 4.63
OPT 1 : 4.45 : 113.03
TOKEN 1 : 5.00 : 14.12
Our final performance metric is the rate at which profit is generated; Figure 5.12 shows these 
rates for the three strategies. As expected OPT and TOKEN perform very similarly, both 
generating a larger amount o f profit than ACG.
67 If  fairness between SSPs sizes is a priority, it would be possible to modify SSP service profit values 
associated with requests arriving from different SSPs so that smaller SSPs receive more equitable 
treatment.
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Figure 5.12: S im ulation model. P ro fit generated per second. Left: ACG. C entre: OPT.
R ight: TO K EN .
For the results presented thus far end-user reattempt behaviour was omitted from the models. To 
show the impact o f reattempts on the operation of the control strategies, reattempt behaviour 
was included in the simulation model in the manner described in §5.3.1.1. Reattempts cause the 
volume of load offered to the SCP to persist at a high level for some time after the abatement of 
first-offered overload traffic. Figure 5.13 shows that the volume of reattempt traffic is greater 
for ACG than OPT or TOKEN, the explanation being that ACG throttles a greater number of 
requests (it over-controls during an overload). The higher volume of traffic offered to the SCP, 
combined with ACG’s oscillatory nature, means that a significant number of messages are 
dropped, leading to the decrease in SCP throughput seen in Figure 5.13. This in turn causes a 
decrease in the rate o f completions for ACG, as evident from Figure 5.14. OPT and TOKEN 
continue to control SCP utilisation and queue size in a manner that maximises throughput and 
therefore both completion rates and generated profit.
j—— Offered Load  SCP Throughput | — -Offered Load  SC P Throughput I
1200 »500 1000
Figure 5.13: Sim ulation model, reattem pts included. SCP offered load and  throughpu t. 
Left: ACG. C en tre: OPT. Right: TOKEN.
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F igure 5.14: Sim ulation model, rea ttem pts included. Overall completion rates. Left: ACG. C entre: 
O PT. R ight: TOKEN.
5.4.2 Profit  M a xim isatio n
An ideal IN load control strategy will prevent SCP overload regardless of the number of 
supported services, by selectively throttling service requests at SSPs in a manner that maximises 
some global measure of network performance. We choose to maximise profit generated by 
successful service sessions, hence during overload requests for lower profit service types should 
be throttled in favour o f requests for higher profit service types.
To analyse the performance o f the three strategies in providing SCP protection in a 
heterogeneous service environment and simultaneously differentiating between service types for 
profit maximisation, we investigate a scenario in which the arrival rates for all three services are 
non-zero. In normal conditions service request arrival rates for all service types are set equal to 
each other and to values such that the mean SCP load is 0.35 Erlangs. Overload is caused by an 
increase in the number o f arrivals o f service A requests and results in a total mean SCP 
first-offered load o f 1.4 Erlangs. In this situation the load control should accept as many 
service A sessions as possible, in preference to lower profit services (service C), but not in 
preference to higher profit services (service B), whose acceptance rate should remain 
unaffected.
Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 show the per service type SCP utilisation for ACG, OPT and 
TOKEN, as obtained using the analytic and simulation models respectively.68 Note that with the 
simulation model end-user reattempt behaviour has been modelled. ACG applies the same gap 
intervals to all service types during an overload, with all service types being throttled regardless 
o f their profit ratings. On the other hand both OPT and TOKEN exhibit the desired behaviour: 
service B acceptance rates remain unchanged during the overload whereas all service C requests 
are throttled.
68 In these graphs each colour represents the contribution to SCP utilisation relating to processing o f 
message types o f the corresponding service. The contributions o f the three services are represented as 
being ‘on top o f each other,’ so the upper boundary of the shaded area is the actual SCP utilisation.
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Figure 5.15: A nalytic model. P e r service type SCP utilisation. Left: ACG. C entre: OPT. 
Right: TOKEN.
Figure 5.16: Sim ulation model. P e r service type SCP utilisation. Left: ACG. C entre: OPT.
Right: TOKEN.
Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 show the total completion rates and generated profit rates for the 
three strategies, as obtained using the simulation model. The completion graphs for OPT and 
TOKEN show a spike in the number of completions before the abatement of overload; this is 
due to reattempts for service C related to previous requests that were made just before the 
abatement of service A overload. The impact of service differentiation in control behaviour on 
generated profit is clearly illustrated by Figure 5.18, which shows that OPT and TOKEN are 
considerably better than ACG at maximising profit for the network operator.
Figure 5.17: Sim ulation model. Total completion rates. Left: ACG. C entre: OPT. R ight: TOKEN.
600 903 1201 1SC0 1S00
T lfm fs)
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Figure 5.18: Sim ulation model. P ro fit generated per second. Left: ACG. C entre: OPT.
R ight: TOKEN.
5.4.3 V olum e  of O verload  Traffic
Ideally an IN load control should protect the SCP from overload regardless o f the volume of 
offered load. To investigate the robustness of ACG, OPT and TOKEN to the level o f offered 
load fourteen scenarios, over which offered load during overload range from 0.35 to 4.0 
Erlangs, are analysed. As with the preceding section the arrival rates are set equal for all three 
services during normal load and the overload is caused by a step increase in the volume of 
service A requests arriving at all SSPs. Reattempt behaviour is not included.Figure 5.19 shows 
the mean SCP throughput during overload for each strategy plotted against mean offered load, 
for the fourteen scenarios. The figure also shows the ideal characteristic: if offered load is less 
than the target utilisation, mean SCP throughput should equal the offered load; if it is greater 
mean SCP throughput should equal the target utilisation. The values used to generate these plots 
are listed in Table 5.6, page 153.69
F igure 5.19: C om parison w ith ideal load control. Left: Analytic model. R ight: Sim ulation model.
69 These values are the mean of five corresponding values resulting from five simulation runs using 
different random number generator seeds.
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Figure 5.19 shows that ACG is very sensitive to the volume o f offered load, with the mean SCP 
throughput only approaching the target for a limited range o f offered loads.70 This is due to the 
use o f a small number o f  static control parameters, which are unableto provide adequate control 
over a wide range o f operating conditions. The difference in mean throughput for ACG between 
the analytic and simulation models is in part due to the simulation model including message 
dropping, which, as discussed in §5.4.1, causes a reduction in SCP throughput. The figure 
shows that OPT gives the best overall performance, with mean throughput closely tracking the 
ideal characteristic for all the offered load values (though, as noted previously, this is achieved 
at the expense o f oscillation about the mean value).
TOKEN performs well at offered loads that are either much lower or much higher than the 
target utilisation. For offered loads less than approximately 0.7 Erlangs mean SCP utilisation 
matches offered load, whilst for offered loads greater than approximately 1.1 Erlangs mean SCP 
utilisation settles at a value that is a small percentage less than the target. For the latter the 
shortfall is related to token wastage related to the percentage thinning based token spending 
process and inaccuracies inherent in the arrival rate estimates. With respect to the latter we note 
that during overload SSPs receive slightly more tokens for service B than they bid for, however 
the number actually required may exceed or fall short of this number. Some SSPs will have a 
small surplus o f service B tokens at the same time as others have an excess demand for them. 
Therefore a number o f tokens are ‘wasted,’ leading to the mean SCP utilisation falling short o f 
the target value. This drawback may not be very significant given that TOKEN does protect the 
SCP and, doing so without permitting the target SCP utilisation to be exceeded.
A more obvious drawback o f TOKEN is its behaviour when the offered load is close to the 
target load. We see that in the region where offered load approaches 0.9 Erlangs SCP utilisation 
falls significantly below the offered load. Clearly it is undesirable for a load control strategy to 
throttle traffic when the SCP is not overloaded. The explanation for this behaviour is that where 
offered load is close to the target load larger bids, for higher profit services, receive more tokens 
than requested, at the expense o f bids relating to lower profit services and/or smaller SSPs. 
Therefore, even though there are excess tokens in the network, a significant number of them are 
wasted and service requests are unnecessarily throttled elsewhere. However network operators 
are unlikely to dimension SCPs to operate this close to maximum utilisation during normal load 
conditions and so poor performance in this region may not be a critical drawback o f the 
strategy.
70 The strategies are also sensitive to other factors such as the number of traffic sources (cf. §5.4.5), so the 
plots shown here is valid only for the particular network and service mix studied.
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T able 5.6: D ata fo r ideal load com parison graphs.
Analytic M odel Sim ulation Model
Offered AC G OPT TOKEN Offered AC G OPT TO K EN
0.3823 0.3823 0.3823 0.3823 0.3479 0.3479 0.3479 0.3456
0.7309 0.7309 0.7309 0.7309 0.6903 0.6903 0.6902 0.6694
0.8329 0.8329 0.8329 0.7104 0.7960 0.7960 0.7957 0.7386
0.8829 0.8024 0.8778 0.7569 0.8497 0.8418 0.8458 0.7647
0.9325 0.7653 0.8970 0.7963 0.8973 0.7379 0.8863 0.7713
0.9842 0.7823 0.8993 0.8303 0.9388 0.6940 0.8959 0.7973
1.0343 0.7984 0.9002 0.8555 0.9966 0.7192 0.8979 0.8220
1.1320 0.8116 0.9006 0.8765 1.0961 0.7816 0.9018 0.8488
1.2844 0.8316 0.8988 0.8810 1.2508 0.8641 0.8997 0.8657
1.4355 0.8439 0.8971 0.8897 1.3889 0.7059 0.9034 0.8704
1.6335 0.8630 0.8970 0.8833 1.5899 0.6852 0.9000 0.8702
1.9166 0.8841 0.9088 0.8853 1.9976 0.6950 0.8896 0.8710
3.0341 0.8763 0.9060 0.8868 3.0008 0.6982 0.8921 0.8692
4.035 0.7345 0.9013 0.8842 4.0014 0.6938 0.8953 0.8702
Figure 5.20 shows the moving average (window 100s) o f mean completion rates for the three 
strategies for three scenarios in which the mean first-offered SCP load is 1.1, 1.4 and 2.5 
Erlangs respectively. The results were obtained using the simulation model with reattempt 
behaviour included. These graphs again demonstrate the insensitivity of ACG to the volume of 
offered load. For OPT and TOKEN the differences in completion rate abatement times result 
from the higher volumes of reattempts that occur at higher first-offered load levels.
Time (a) T lm a(i)  T lrm (s)
Figure 5.20: Sim ulation model. O verall completion rates for th ree offered load volumes.
Left: ACG. C entre: OPT. Right: TOKEN.
5.4.4 S o u r c e  o f  O v e r l o a d  T r a f f i c
In the simulation scenarios discussed above the overload of service A traffic occurred at all 
SSPs in the network. As well as handling thesz global overloads an ideal IN load control should
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be able to handle overloads resulting from increases in arrival rates at a subset of the SSPs; 
termed a focussed overload. In such circumstances it seems reasonable that only those SSPs at 
which the overload occurs are forced to throttle requests for the overloading service. Note that 
the more important goal of maximising profit means that lower profit, non-overloading services 
should be throttled at all SSPs and no higher profit services should be throttled anywhere. To 
investigate strategy performance during a focussed overload we employ the same load profile as 
the last section with one main difference: service A overloading traffic originates from only half 
the SSPs (specifically half of the number of each of the three groups of differently sized SSP).
Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22 show the SCP offered load and utilisation, as obtained using the 
analytic and simulation models respectively. As expected ACG is seen to perform as poorly in 
terms o f controlling SCP utilisation as it did in the global overload case. OPT and TOKEN 
perform well, keeping SCP throughput at roughly the same levels as they did for the global 
overload case. Figure 5.23 compares the overall completion rates for the three strategies for the 
focussed and global overload scenarios; we see that the strategies achieve approximately the 
same performance in both cases.
□ Ser/tceA BSetvice B □ServtcsCJ □ ServiœA ■ S e rica  B O Service C l
0 303 200 «co uoo
Figure 5.21: Analytic model. SCP offered load and utilisation. Left: ACG. Centre: OPT. 
R ight: TOKEN.
o mo at»
Figure 5.22: Sim ulation model, reattem pts included. SCP offered load and utilisation. 
Left: ACG. C entre: OPT. Right: TOKEN.
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-A C G   OPT  TOKEN I
Time (s)
Figure 5.23: Sim ulation model. Overall com pletion rates. Left: G lobal overload.
R ight: Focussed overload.
To compare the fairness of the strategies in terms of throttling only requests originating at 
‘culpable’ SSPs, Figure 5.24 shows the moving average (window 200s) of service A completion 
rates for a small, a medium and a large SSP which do not contribute to the overload. For these 
SSPs the rate o f acceptance of service A requests should not be affected during the overload (at 
least with this definition of fairness). We see that ACG and TOKEN go further towards 
attaining this goal than does OPT. For OPT the reduction in completion rates is very significant 
and is a result o f  the linear programming problem not explicitly incorporating any fairness 
related constraints. W ith ACG the reduction results from the same gaps being put in place at all 
SSPs regardless o f their contribution to the overload. Finally, for TOKEN the degradation is 
less pronounced and, as discussed previously, is a result o f the token generation algorithm’s 
tendency to allocate tokens to bids with higher arrival rate estimates.
1
Figure 5.24: Sim ulation model. Focussed overload. Com pletion rates for non-overloading SSPs. 
Left: Sm all SSP. C entre: M edium  SSP. R ight: L arge SSP.
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5.4.5 N u m b e r  o f  T r a f f i c  S o u r c e s
We now address the operation of ACG, OPT and TOKEN in networks consisting of a larger 
number of SSPs. In scenarios investigated above the network contained 12 SSPs, which meant 
that the load control strategy had to control 36 sources o f service requests. Intuitively, we can 
expect that OPT and TOKEN will have greater difficulty in computing optimal values for 
control parameters in a network containing a larger number o f sources. To investigate this, we 
analyse strategy operation in networks containing 24 and 96 SSPs, both with equal numbers of 
small, medium and large SSPs. A global overload of service A is analysed, with arrival rates 
being set to give an SCP first-offered load o f 0.35 Erlangs in normal conditions and 1.4 Erlangs 
during high load conditions.
Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26 show the SCP offered load and utilisation for a network with 24 
SSPs, whilst Figure 5.27 and Figure 5.28 show the same for a network with 96 SSPs We see 
that for the network with 24 SSPs ACG actually performs better than in previous scenarios, 
specifically throughput is kept closer to the target and the frequency o f oscillation is reduced. 
However, in the network with 96 SSPs we see worse behaviour than in the 12 SSP scenario: 
although there are few oscillations load is, for the most part, kept well below the target.
j ~ 0 f r « 6 d  Load — SCP TtvoughpU I 1— Offered Load — SCP ThroughpU | — Offered Load — SCP Throughput 1
 „  ,          _-jr-Tr7vt i*,T-( w
-  ■ —  -
12CO 15CO
Figure 5.25: A nalytic model. N etw ork with K  = 24 SSPs. SCP offered load and throughput. 
Left: ACG. C entre: OPT. R ight: TOKEN.
| —  Offered Load — SCP T hrou tpu t | -SCP Tlroughput j j —  Offered Load  SCP Throughput |
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Figure 5.26: Sim ulation model. N etw ork with K  = 24 SSPs. SCP offered load and th roughput. 
Left: ACG. C entre: OPT. R ight: TOKEN.
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Figure 5.27: Analytic model. N etw ork with K = 96 SSPs. SCP offered load and th roughpu t. 
Left: ACG. C entre: O PT. R ight: TOKEN.
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Figure 5.28: Sim ulation model. N etw ork w ith K= 96 SSPs. SCP offered load and  th roughpu t.
Left: ACG. C entre: O PT. R ight: TOKEN.
Both OPT and TOKEN show some degradation in throughput during overload as compared to 
the 12 SSP scenario. The degree o f degradation is quantified by Table 5.7, which shows the 
mean SCP throughputs during overload. However both strategies do still provide effective 
protection against SCP overload. O f greater concern is the fact that, for the 96 SSP case, the 
simulation results show SCP throughput falls below offered load in normal load conditions, 
which indicates that requests are being rejected unnecessarily. This is due to the smaller 
absolute numbers of service requests arriving at the small/medium SSPs in the 96 SSP case as 
compared to the 12 SSP case; often during overload no requests for one or more service types 
arrive at many of the SSPs during a control interval. This means that many o f  the arrival 
estimates inputted into OPT/TOKEN are zero, which hampers the algorithms ability to calculate 
optimal solutions. This limitation should be taken into account when applying either strategy.
Table 5.7: M ean SCP th roughpu t d u rin g  overload for varying netw ork sizes.
Number of SSPs Analytic Model Simulation Model
AC G O PT TOKEN AC G O PT TO K EN
12 0.8439 0.8971 0.8842 0.7418 0.8826 0.8561
24 0.8470 0.8990 0.8716 0.8253 0.8774 0.8445
96 0.8347 0.8864 0.8565 0.8550 0.8146 0.8119
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5.4.6 O p e r a t i o n  o f  T o k e n - b a s e d  S t r a t e g y  E n h a n c e m e n t  f o r  
C o n t r o l  o f  L e g a c y  SSPs
We now analyse the performance o f the TOKEN strategy enhancement described in §5.1.3, 
which allows conversion of token allocations into gap intervals that can be used for load 
throttling by legacy SSPs. We simulate a network containing a single SCP and 12 legacy SSPs, 
where, as before, the offered SCP load is 0.35 Erlangs in normal conditions and 1.4 Erlangs 
during overload. Figure 5.29 shows the SCP offered load, throughput, mean queue size and 
overall completion rates. We see that, for the most part, TOKEN succeeds in providing 
near-ideal load control. The exception is at the onset of the overload where the SCP utilisation 
goes to 1.0 because no gapping is active at the SSPs. As expected these results are very similar 
to the results acquired for OPT for the same load conditions (see §5.4.2).
FOffered Load — SCP Throghpmj
— SCP Mean Queue Size
Time (s)
Time (s)
-To ta l Completions
Time (s)
Figure 5.29: Simulation model, 12 legacy SSPs. Top left: SCP offered load and th roughpu t.
Top right: P er service type SCP utilisation. Bottom left: M ean SCP queue size. 
Bottom right: O verall Com pletion rates.
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5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have presented an IN SCP load control strategy in which access o f IN service 
requests to the SCP is controlled by means of tokens. When an arriving request is accepted it 
consumes a single token (of the appropriate type), granting it use of all the SCP resources 
required over the duration o f the service session. Through matching the number o f tokens 
generated to the number of service sessions that can be handled by the SCP, the strategy ensures 
that SCP overload does not occur. Furthermore, the strategy controls the manner in which 
tokens are allocated between different service types and traffic sources so as to maximise the 
profit generated during overload.
The likely performance of the TOKEN strategy was analysed by comparing it with both ACG 
and Lodge's optimisation strategy, by means o f analytic/simulation models. Performance o f the 
three strategies was compared in terms of basic load control behaviour, profit maximisation and 
robustness to factors such as volume o f overload traffic and number of traffic sources. The 
results o f this comparison are summarised in Table 5.9 (page 160).
There are two main conclusions to be drawn from the comparative analysis o f the three 
strategies. Firstly, ACG has major failings as an IN load control: it is very prone to oscillations 
and not robust to changes in operating conditions due to its reliance on the use of a relatively 
small number of standard gap intervals. More optimal sets o f gap intervals could be applied for 
a particular IN, however calculation o f suitable gap intervals is non-trivial and would have to be 
repeated every time there is a change in SCP resources or supported service mix. Secondly, 
OPT and TOKEN operate significantly better than ACG and deliver very similar performance 
under all the scenarios studied. This is due mainly to the fact that both strategies dynamically 
compute control parameters with the goal o f maximising profit whilst protecting the SCP from 
overload.
The conclusion that OPT and TOKEN give similar performance is not unexpected, since the 
market-based token generation algorithm is in effect a form of optimisation process.71 The 
relatively minor differences in their performance stems from the fact that OPT employs relative 
control parameters (PT coefficients) whilst TOKEN employs absolute control parameters (token 
allocations). From the load control performance viewpoint the main advantage o f  TOKEN over 
OPT is that it ensures SCP utilisation never exceeds the target utilisation, whereas with OPT 
there will be oscillation around the target value. The main advantage o f OPT over TOKEN is 
that it keeps mean utilisation closer to target utilisation for all offered loads, especially where
71 [Ygge, 1998] proves that a very general class of optimisation problems can be transformed into 
analogous market-based control problems, the general equilibrium solutions to which are the solutions to 
the corresponding optimisation problems.
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offered load is close to the target, a region where TOKEN performs badly. We note that it 
would be straightforward to convert the PT coefficients generated by OPT into equivalent token 
allocations and vice versa. Therefore we believe that there are no firm arguments (from the load 
control viewpoint) for recommending the use o f one of these strategies over the other.
Table 5.8: Sum m ary of results o f com parative analysis of ACG, OPT and TO K EN .
Attribute ACG OPT TOKEN
Staying close to but under 
SCP processor target 
utilisation during
overload.
Maximisation o f SCP 
Throughput
Profit-maximisation.
Maximisation o f service 
session completion rates.
Minimisation o f SCP 
queue size and connection 
delays.
Immediate reaction to 
overload onset.
Robustness to offered 
load level.
Scalability to number of 
traffic sources in the 
network.
Fairness in relation to 
traffic source sizes.
Selective source throttling 
during focussed 
overloads.
NO
Utilisation oscillates due 
to use o f standard gap 
intervals.
NO
Oscillations may cause 
message dropping due to 
queue size build-up.
NO
No concept o f profit- 
based service type 
differentiation.
NO
SCP under-utilisation 
means completion rates 
not maximised.
NO
SCP queue size oscillates 
leading to large delays for 
some end-users.
NO
Up to one control interval 
before gapping put in 
place.
NO
Standard gap intervals 
unsuited to a range of 
offered load.
NO
Standards gap intervals 
unsuited to a range of  
network sizes.
NO
Same gap intervals put in 
place at all SSPs.
NO
Same gap intervals put in 
place at all SSPs.
Compatibility with legacy —
systems.
Simple control 
implementation.
YES
ACG is a table-driven 
control.
PARTIAL
Some oscillation around 
target utilisation due to 
use o f PT as load throttle.
YES
Message dropping or 
discarding due to queue 
size build-up unlikely.
YES
Objective function seeks 
to maximise profit.
YES
Within bounds set by 
profit maximisation 
constraint.
PARTIAL
SCP queue size may grow 
at the start o f a severe 
overload.
NO
Up to one control interval 
before PT throttle in 
place.
YES
Mean SCP utilisation 
close to target regardless 
o f offered load.
PARTIAL
Poor performance in large 
networks where arrival 
rates low for some SSPs.
NO
Large SSPs strongly 
favoured.
NO
Non-overloading SSPs 
experience severe 
throttling.
YES
Only requires support for 
PT load throttle
NO
Requires solution of 
linear programming 
problems.
YES
Utilisation slightly below  
target. Use o f  tokens 
ensures target not 
exceeded.
YES
Message dropping or 
discarding due to queue 
size build-up unlikely.
YES
Tokens generated so as to 
maximise profit.
YES
Within bounds set by 
profit maximisation 
constraint.
YES
Significant oscillation in 
SCP queue size unlikely.
YES
Volume o f  accepted 
requests limited by token 
allocation size.
PARTIAL
Utilisation close to target 
except where offered load 
is close to target value.
PARTIAL
Poor performance in large 
networks where arrival 
rates low for some SSPs.
NO
Token generation process 
favours larger SSPs.
PARTIAL
Non-overloading SSPs 
experience some 
throttling.
YES
Token allocations can be 
converted to gap intervals.
NO
Requires relatively 
complex token generation 
algorithm and throttle.
Brendan Jennings Page 160 31/05/01
Chapter 5: A Token-based Strategy for IN SCP Load Control
It may be argued that the use o f tokens for load control is a more intuitively understandable 
approach than the use o f ‘abstract’ mathematical optimisation. Hence there may be non­
technical reasons to adopt TOKEN over OPT. For example, use of tokens would provide a more 
direct linkage between load control and service level agreements (SLAs) agreed between the 
network operator and a customer. In such agreements the operator may guarantee, at the risk o f 
sever financial penalties, that a minimum number of offered service requests will be accepted 
per unit time regardless o f overall traffic levels in the network. This information could be 
inputted into a modified token generation process, which would impose minimum allocations 
for that service type, regardless of demands for other services.
This chapter has focussed solely on strategies for the control o f load offered to a single SCP, the 
OPT and TOKEN strategies having been shown to provide excellent load control performance 
in this context. However, the overriding focus of this thesis is to explore the area o f  network- 
oriented, rather than node-oriented, IN load control. In the next chapter we attempt to realise 
this aim, by enhancing the TOKEN strategy to provide profit-maximising load control in 
networks containing multiple, possibly heterogeneous resource types.
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CHAPTER 6 
E x t e n s io n  o f  T o k e n -b a s e d  St r a t e g y  t o  
A c h ie v e  N e t w o r k -o r ie n t e d  SS.7/IN 
L o a d  C o n t r o l
At the start of this thesis we argued that the increasingly dynamic nature o f IN networks means 
that over-dimensioning, static routing and traditional, node-based load control can no longer 
provide adequate performance management in today’s INs. In this chapter we enhance the 
token-based load control strategy, introduced in chapter 5, to provide network-oriented dynamic 
routing and load control. The enhanced strategy allows for the dynamic routing o f service 
requests to multiple SCPs whilst ensuring that neither SCPs, other IN resources, nor the SS.7 
network overload. Its dynamic nature facilitates automatic adaptation to changes in traffic 
patterns, changes in the supported service mix, the introduction/withdrawal o f network 
resources and network failures.
The chapter is structured in three parts. §6.1 shows how the token-based strategy can be 
enhanced to provide dynamic routing and load control in a multiple-SCP IN. §6.2 shows how 
the token-based strategy can be extended to provide load control for multiple resource types, 
using as an example the situation where the network contains multiple SDPs that must be 
protected from overload. Finally, §6.3 addresses how the token-based strategy can be enhanced 
to provide protection against SS.7 resource overloads: strategy enhancements that encourage 
SSPs to use those SCPs in closest proximity and which use delay measurements to detect SS.7 
network overload are proposed and analysed.
6.1 TOKEN-BASED LOAD CONTROL OF A MULTIPLE-
SCP IN
Original deployments o f IN systems provided a relatively small number o f services, whose 
execution and management had previously been directly supported by network switches. 
Because these services were small in number and had well-understood traffic and resource 
usage characteristics, it was possible for network operators to realise them using a small number
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of SCPs and configure each SSP to statically route all its initial service session messages to a 
single SCP thus resulting in a logical partitioning o f the IN. This approach has the advantage 
that focussed overloads (within a single ‘partition’) are contained -  they do not lead to overload 
o f other SCPs. However, static partitioning also meant that SCPs could overload in 
circumstances where there was sufficient residual processing capacity available in other SCPs.
Logical partitioning o f IN networks through static routing of initial service session messages 
remains standard practice for many network operators. However, rapid introduction o f a wider 
range o f complex services is necessitating deployment o f ever-Iarger numbers o f SCPs, which 
often only support a subset o f the network’s IN service portfolio. In this type of environment 
dynamic routing, combined with effective load control, can offer a means o f ensuring that 
resources are utilised optimally. In this section we show how the token-based load control 
strategy can be extended to facilitate dynamic routing of initial service sessions messages 
between multiple SCPs in a manner providing protection against overload.
§6.1.1 presents simulation results72 demonstrating how static routing can lead to sub-optimal 
resource usage in certain overload conditions. Subsequently, §6.1.2 specifies how the token- 
based strategy can be extended to provide centralised control of multiple SCP resources and 
§6.1.3 shows how a similar degree o f control can be provided in a more distributed fashion. 
Finally, §6.1.4 presents a hierarchical distributed version of the strategy, suitable for application 
in large-scale INs.
6 .1 .1  D e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  S t a t i c  R o u t i n g
The network scenario illustrated in Figure 6.1 was used to investigate the impact o f SSPs 
statically routing IN initial service session messages to a single SCP. The network contains two 
identical SCPs, each serving six SSPs. We simulate a focussed overload in which the arrival rate 
o f service A requests increases only at SSPs 1-6, which initiate sessions with SCP 1. During 
overload the first-offered load to SCP 1 is 1.4 Erlangs; end-user reattempt behaviour is 
modelled. Load control is achieved using the token-based load control strategy, as described in 
chapter 5.
The per service type SCP throughputs for SCP 1 and SCP 2 are shown in Figure 6.2. During the 
overload SSPs 1-6 are forced to reject service requests even though SCP 2 is running at normal 
load and has available processing capacity. Unnecessary throttling o f service requests clearly 
reduces the amount of profit generated, so there is a strong case for the introduction o f  a more 
dynamic routing scheme. O f course SCPs must still be protected from overload, so we argue 
that a dynamic routing scheme should only be realised as an integrated component o f  a load 
control strategy.
72 All simulation results presented in §6.1 were obtained using a simulation model employing the same 
node and service models used for chapter 5.
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Overload Traffic
SCP 2
SSP 12
Figure 6.1: D ual-SCP netw ork  w ith static routing, focussed overload.
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Figure 6.2: D ual SCP netw ork  with static routing. P er service type SCP th roughpu t. Left: SCP 1.
R ight: SCP 2.
6.1.2 C e n t r a l i s e d  C o n t r o l  o f  M u l t i p l e  SCPs
The token generation algorithm described in chapter 5 operates by allocating tokens on a 
one-by-one basis until the supply o f SCP processing capacity exhausts. Because o f this iterative 
nature it is straightforward to enhance this algorithm to allocate resources for more than one 
SCP. Tokens are still allocated on the basis of maximum marginal utility per marginal cost and 
secondary criteria, but potential allocations are now examined on a per-SCP, as well as on a 
per-SSP, per-service basis. The algorithm terminates when the supplies o f processing capacity 
o f all SCPs are exhausted. Application of this algorithm clearly requires that information 
regarding the capacity and per-service processing costs of each SCP be made available at the 
network node where the algorithm executes, hence we have ‘centralised’ control o f the SCP 
resources.
Upon completion of the token generation process per-service, per-SCP token allocations are 
sent to SSPs, which use them for accepting service requests over the coming interval. New 
service requests are accepted if  any tokens (for any SCP) remain and on the basis of a
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percentage thinning based token-spending algorithm. A number o f strategies to decide which 
SCP an accepted request should be routed towards can be envisaged; the one we investigate is to 
select the SCP for which the remaining supply of tokens (for the service in question) is largest. 
Employing token allocations as inputs to the routing decision effectively integrates dynamic 
routing with the token-based load control strategy. In §6.1.2.1 we specify a first version o f the 
enhanced algorithm, whilst in §6.1.2.2 the enhanced token spending process is specified. The 
performance o f the enhanced strategy is analysed and improvements to the token generation 
algorithm described in §6.1.2.3.
6.1.2.1 Specification of Enhanced Token Generation Algorithm
To specify the enhanced token generation algorithm we employ much o f the notation used in 
§5.1, where the original, single-SCP token-based strategy was specified. Before providing the 
algorithm specification we introduce the complete notation:
Assuming the network consists o f I  SCPs, K  SSPs and J  service types, let i , k  and j  
denote an arbitrary SCP, SSP and service type respectively. Let rk ( j ) denote the profit 
generated by a successful session o f service type j  originating at SSP k  . Let the total available 
capacity bid by the SCP i be denoted by c, and let the total processing costs associated with a 
type j  service session at SCP i be denoted by p ,(J) ■ Let qk(J)  denote the bid o f SSP k  for 
tokens o f service type j  and let nik( j )  denote the number of SCP i tokens allocated in 
response to this bid.
All SSPs maintain I J  pools o f tokens, one for each SCP and service type pairing. When the 
SSP admits a type j  service request one token is removed from token pool i j . Token pools are 
refilled as a result o f  the token generation process, which is executed at the start of control 
intervals o f length T  time units. During the token generation process records are kept, for each 
SCP, o f the total remaining processing capacity and the price per allocation o f tokens associated 
with the transactions; these records are denoted by s, and ci k (j ) respectively.
Let uk( j )  denote the marginal utility associated with allocating a type j  token to SSP k , and 
nk( j ) denote the total number o f type j  tokens allocated to SSP k  as a result o f  previous 
algorithm iterations. By interpreting the expected number o f service requests qk( j ) as the 
average o f a Poisson distribution, we obtain uk (j ) as
w=ntU )+1 W '
The marginal cost o f an additional token can be simply interpreted as the total processing cost 
incurred by the SCP arising directly from consumption o f that token. Let v,.(y) denote the
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marginal cost associated with issuing a type j  token at SCP i . We have: 
v,-0 ) = P i U )
Let a ( i , j , k )  -allocation refer to assigning a type j  token from SCP i to SSP k  . The marginal 
utility per marginal cost, denoted by Sik( j )  of such an action is:
$i,k O’) = uk O') ! v; 0)
We can now specify the algorithm formally. As in the single SCP version of the strategy the 
variables ick( j )  an(  ^ ( j )  are used to denote the probability o f respectively exactly nk( j )  and 
more than nk ( j )  arrivals o f service requests of type j  at SSP k during the coming control 
interval.
Step 1: Initialisation.
For all SCPs i = do:
For all SSPs k = \ do:
For all service types j  = do:
Set token allocations nik ( j )  = 0 and costs cik ( j )  -  0 .
For all SSPs k  = 1,..., K  do:
For all service types j  = do:
Set n k( j )  = e~9kU- .
Set n k( j )  = l - x k ( j ) -
Set marginal utilities uk (j ) = rk ( j )TTjt ( j ) .
For all SCPs i = do:
For all service types j  = 1 J  do:
Set marginal costs v, ( j )  = p :( j ) •
For all SCPs / = 1,...,7 do:
Set remaining SCP processing capacity si = c , .
Step 2: Identify optimal allocations.
For all SCPs z = l , S S P s  k  = \,...,K  and service types j  = do:
List all candidate allocations that maximise 8jk ( j ) .
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Step 3: Arbitrate between optimal allocations.73
For all SCPs i - 1 , SSPs k -  and service types j  = l,...,J  do:
I f  allocation (i , j , k ) is in the candidate list then:
Criterion A: Supplies™
I f  si < »wher e 5,-.max = m a x ( i„ .. , i ; ) ,  then:
Eliminate candidate allocation (i , j , k ) .
Criterion B: Step size.
I f  P,U )< P ,,maxU ) ,  where p lmax( j )  = m ax(pl(l) ,...,p l(J ) ,...,p l (\),...,p I(J ) ) ,  then: 
Eliminate candidate allocation (i , j , k ) .
Criterion C: Provider concentration.
K
I f  Y nJ j ) > ni,mmU) > where n, min ( j )  is the minimum number o f tokens allocation
*=i
for any of the service types j  = and SCPs /'= 1 , then:
Eliminate candidate allocation (i, j ,  k ) .
Criterion D: Fairness.
If  nk(J)/<IkU) > mkU)> where mk( j ) is the minimum of the proportions of 
demands satisfied for any o f the SSPs k = l,...,K  and service types j  = ,
then:
Eliminate candidate allocation ( i , j , k ) .
Criterion E: Supplier Concentration,75
I f  «aO ') . where nlm,nk( j )  = mm(nlk(f), . . . ,nl k ( j j ) , then:
Eliminate candidate allocation (i , j , k ) .
Selection.
Randomly select allocation (i ' , j ' , k ') from those remaining in the candidate list.
73 Two new criteria, relating specifically to the multiple-SCP case, are included along with those used for 
the single-SCP case. Other criteria may also be employed.
74 To encourage load balancing between SCPs, those SCPs with a larger amount o f unallocated capacity 
are preferred over other SCPs.
75 To encourage stability against sudden load changes with respect to specific services/SSPs, those SCPs 
which have allocated a smaller number o f tokens for service type j  to SSP k are preferred over other 
SCPs.
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Step 4: Perforin optimal allocations.
Set « ,* .( /)  = % . ( / )  + ! ■
Set ci,k,(j ' ) = crk,(j ' )  + uk, ( f ) .
Set sl. = s l, - p , , ( f ) .
Step 5: Update internal variables.
Set 7tk, ( f )  = 7Tk, ( /  )qk, ( f  ) / n k. ( / )  .
s e tn i.( /)= n i,( / ) - ^ ,( /) .
Set Mt.(/) = ^ ,( / )n A,(/).
Step 6: Loop statement.
I f  there exists at least one SCP i for which s,. > 0 then:
GOTO Step 2.
Else:
STOP.
6.1.2.2 Specification of Enhanced Token Spending Process
The enhanced token spending process involves two steps: firstly a percentage thinning throttle is 
applied to ascertain whether an arriving service request should be accepted; secondly an SCP, to 
which the initial service session message will be routed, is selected. The PT coefficients for 
each service are updated at sub-intervals of the control interval using the algorithm described in 
§5.1.2, page 128.76 The two-step process for service request acceptance/throttling is specified as 
follows:
Step 1: Apply PT throttle.
Select a random number X  uniformly distributed in the range (0.0,1.0).
If  X < P a( j )  then:
Service request is accepted.
Else:
Service request is throttled.
STOP.
76 Here the updating algorithm is initialised with the total number of available tokens for the service type.
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Step 2: Select SCP.
For all SCPs i = 1 do:
List all SCPs which maximise n\ ( j ) , where n\ ( j )  is the number o f tokens remaining in 
token pool i j .
Randomly select SCP i' from the list.
6.1.2.3 Performance Analysis of Centralised Control Approach
The network scenario illustrated in Figure 6.3 was used to analyse the performance o f the 
centralised token-based load control strategy described above. The network contains four 
identical SCPs, all o f which can serve all of the twelve SSPs. We simulate a global overload in 
which the arrival rate o f service A requests increases, at each SSP, to a level corresponding to 
an first-offered load of 1.4 Erlangs to each SCP. End-user reattempt behaviour is modelled.
F igure 6.3: N etw ork w ith /  = 4 identical SCPs, K =  12 SSPs, global overload.
Figure 6.4 shows the offered load per SCP and the mean of the SCP throughputs for this 
scenario. The token-based strategy is seen to control the throughput o f the four SCPs as a whole, 
with the mean SCP throughput closely approaching the target value during overload. However, 
to ascertain the actual success o f the strategy in protecting against overload, it is necessary to 
examine the throughput o f individual SCPs.77 Figure 6.5 shows the individual throughputs o f the 
four SCPs and the percentage spread in throughputs between the SCPs with the smallest and 
largest values. We see that throughputs of all the SCPs approach but do not exceed the target 
value and are well balanced, deviating by only a small percentage in all conditions.
77 For all the simulation runs presented in this chapter SCP throughput values are the same as SCP 
utilisation values, since the token strategy ensures that SCP input queue sizes do not grow to the degree 
where messages are dropped or discarded. Therefore we show plots of throughput values only.
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Figure 6.4: Identical SCPs, centralised control. O ffered load and M ean SC P th roughput.
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Figure 6.5: Identical SCPs, centralised control. Left: SCP throughputs. R ight: P ercentage sp read  
of SCP throughputs.
Figure 6.6 shows the per service type SCP throughputs for two of the SCPs: SCP 1 and SCP 3. 
We see that the strategy succeeds in selectively throttling service requests to maximise profit. 
During the overload requests for service A are accepted in preference to those for lower profit 
service C, but not in preference to higher profit service B. Figure 6.7 shows the total completion 
rates and profit generated per second. The spike in completion rates as the overload abates is 
caused by reattempts resulting from service C requests throttled just before overload abatement; 
because of the low profit generated by successful service C sessions this spike is not mirrored in 
the profit plot.
Figure 6.8 shows the per SSP size completion rates for service A; we see that the strategy treats 
SSPs fairly: the completion rate ratio appears to change little between normal and overload 
conditions. Specifically, the completion rate ratio during overload is 1 : 3 . 1 7 :  7.43, which 
closely approximates the actual SSP size ratio of 1 : 3 : 7.
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Figure 6.6: Identical SCPs, centralised control. Per service type SCP throughput. Left: SCP 1. 
Right: SCP 3.
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Figure 6.7: Identical SCPs, centralised control. Left: Total completion rates. Right: Profit 
generated per second.
Tim « (*)
Figure 6.8: Identical SCPs, centralised control. Per SSP size completion rates.
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The results presented above show that the strategy provides near-optimal load controf when all 
SCPs have identical performance characteristics. The network scenario depicted in Figure 6.9 
was used to analyse its performance in networks containing heterogeneous SCPs, that is, SCPs 
have differing resource requirements to process sessions of the same service type(s). In this 
scenario SCP 1 and SCP 2 are 25% faster at processing service A sessions;78 all SCPs process 
service B and service C sessions at the same speed. Note that SCPs 1 and 2 will continue to 
allocate service B tokens in preference to service A tokens at the start o f the token generation 
process, since rk(B) l  p i(B)> rk( A ) / p t(A) ,79 However, to maximise overall profit during a 
service A overload, it would be preferable for SCPs I and 2 to process only service A sessions 
and have SCPs 3 and 4 process all service B sessions.
Service A Required
Instructions Ratio: 0.75 : 0.75 : 1.0 : 1.0
t t t t t t t t t t t t
Overload Traffic
Figure 6.9: N etw ork with 1=  4 heterogeneous SCPs, K =  12 SSPs, global overload.
Figure 6.10 shows the throughputs o f the four SCPs and the percentage spread in throughputs 
between those SCPs with the smallest and largest values. During normal load conditions we see 
that the throughputs of SCPs 3/4 is approximately 0.15 Erlangs greater than those o f SCPs 1/2. 
As discussed below this is related to the manner in which the capacity o f SCPs is allocated 
between the service types. The figure also shows a dip in the mean SCP load at the abatement o f 
the first-offered overload, at which point the actual load offered to the SCPs is less then their 
target utilisation.80 The just-completed token generation process will have allocated large token 
allocations to larger SSPs, however the arrival rates at these SSPs reduces, leading to a 
significant degree of token wastage and the dip in mean throughput. However, the next token
78 We model this by reducing by 25% the required number of SCP processor instructions associated with 
each service A session message.
79 Assuming there are reasonably large bids from each SSP, at the start o f the token generation process the 
probability o f  token use is very close to 1.0.
80 The increased SCP 1/2 processing rate for service A sessions means that the SCPs can handle this level 
o f  offered load; in the previous scenario, where all SCPs had the same characteristics, this was not the 
case.
Brendan Jennings Page 172 31/05/01
Chapter 6: Extension o f Token-based Strategy to Achieve Network-oriented SS.7/IN Load Control
generation process adapts to the changed -SSP arrival rates and token wastage becomes 
negligible.
—  SCP1 Throughput SCP2 Tiiroygnpul —  SCP3 Tiirou0hp«t
—  SCF4 Tlwavghpui — Mean Throoghpij _ __ I — SCP Load Spread
Time (a) Time (s)
Figure 6.10: H eterogeneous SCPs, centralised control. Left: SCP throughputs. R ight: P ercentage 
Spread  of SCP throughputs.
Figure 6.11 shows the per service type SCP throughputs for two of the SCPs: SCP 1 and SCP 3. 
During normal conditions tokens are initially allocated for service B from all four SCPs. It then 
becomes more optimal to allocate service A tokens, all o f  which are allocated from SCPs 1/2 
since these SCPs provide faster processing rates for this service. Further service B tokens are 
allocated at the same time as the service A tokens, with most o f these being allocated from SCPs 
3/4, since SCPs 1/2 capacity has been mostly used for service A. This accounts for SCPs 3/4 
having a larger service B throughput then SCPs 1/2. Once all service A/B tokens have been 
allocated the service C tokens are allocated from SCPs 3/4 (SCPs 1/2 capacity has been all but 
exhausted).
From Figure 6.11 we see that during overload all four SCPs have a broadly similar service B 
throughput. However, as discussed above, the SCP 1/2 processing capacity used on service B 
sessions would have been more profitably spent on service A, since the service B sessions could 
have been handled by SCPs 3/4. This points towards a flaw in the token generation algorithm: it 
does not properly ascertain the most profitable means, from the network-wide viewpoint, of 
utilising SCP processing capacity.
The flaw in the token generation algorithm is related to the expression used to calculate 
marginal cost: v. ( j )  = p i( j ) . Use o f the absolute value o f session processing requirements to 
express marginal cost means that, when allocating a token, the algorithm finds the most 
profitable service to which blocks o f processing capacity can be allocated from the viewpoint o f 
the SCP in question. The algorithm does not take into account that a by-product o f allocating the 
capacity to one service type is the denial o f the capacity to the other service types, which from 
the global perspective may be better served by this SCP. Therefore, to ensure optimal allocation,
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it is necessary to employ a relative measure o f cost that makes it possible to ascertain the most 
profitable means (from a global perspective) o f allocating a block of processing capacity.
□  Service A ■  Service B □  Service C
Q 300 600 90Q 1200 15D0 1800
Time (s)
□  Service A ■ Service B □  Service C
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1600
Time (s)
Figure 6.11: H eterogeneous SCPs, centralised control. P er service type SCP throughput.
Left: SCP 1. Right: SCP 3.
To provide a relative measurement o f the marginal cost of allocating processing capacity we can 
express it in terms of the alternative marginal gains that could have resulted from other 
allocations o f the same amount o f capacity, as follows:
r-1**1 P i ( f )
In this expression the summations cover all possible allocations of a processing capacity block, 
division by Pi(j ' )  normalises session processing requirements relative to those for service type 
j  at SCP i , and uk,(j ' )  is the potential marginal gain from a (k ' , f ) allocation.81
To illustrate how the updated expression for v, ( j )  ensures the optimality o f the token allocation 
consider the example o f SCP 1 (or SCP 2) allocating tokens during overload conditions. The 
summations used to calculate the v,.(j) values implicitly take into account two factors: firstly 
that service B sessions can be processed at the same absolute cost at other SCPs as they can at 
SCP 1 and secondly, that less processing capacity is required to process service A sessions at 
SCP 1 then is required at SCPs 3/4. Therefore, the summation for service B for SCP 1 will yield
81 Because v ,0 ) is now dependant on the uk(j)  values it must be updated at each iteration of the token 
generation algorithm. To do so a recursion approach can again be employed. If we set: 
j  K  ,
y y « t O ) ,
where w, gives a measure of the price per unit processing capacity at SCP i , then v, (j)  = pi(j)wl and in 
Step 5 of the token generation algorithm (Update internal variables) the following lines can be added to 
update v, ( j ) :
For all SCPs i = l,...,I do: Set wt = w,-- r k.(j')7rk. ( j ' ) / /> ,( /) .
For all SCPs i = 1 and all service types j  = 1 J  do: Set v,(y) = Pi(j)Wj.
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a higher value then the summation for service A at SCP 1 and tokens for SCP 1 will be awarded 
to service A in preference to service B (or indeed service C).
We now analyse the performance o f the token-based strategy in the presence o f heterogeneous 
SCPs when the updated expression for the marginal cost of token allocations is employed. 
Figure 6.12 shows the throughputs o f the four SCPs and the percentage spread in throughputs 
between the SCPs with the smallest and largest values. During normal load conditions we again 
observe a significant percentage spread between the throughputs of SCPs 3/4 and SCPs 1/2. We 
also observe a discernible spread between throughputs during the overload, with SCPs 1/2 
throughputs approaching the target value more closely then those of SCPs 3/4.
j  SCP Load Spread
Time (s)
—  SCP1 Throuahpüt — SCP2 Throwflhpiijt — ’SCP3 Thraugiipirt I
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Figure 6.12: Heterogeneous SCPs, enhanced centralised control. Left: SCP throughpu ts.
Right: Percentage Spread  o f SCP throughputs.
Figure 6.13 shows the per service type SCP throughputs for two of the SCPs: SCP 1 and SCP 3. 
During normal conditions we see that there is a smaller throughput for service B at SCPs 1/2 
then in the previous case. This is because SCPs 1/2 now have a strong bias towards service A 
tokens; they only have service B allocated for them at the end of the token generation process, 
when the number of service A allocated tokens is so large that the expected marginal utility per 
marginal cost for service A reduces significantly.
During overload, we see that SCPs 1/2 no longer have service B tokens allocated from them, 
they only process service A  sessions. All service B sessions are now processed by SCPs 3/4. 
This allocation results in the imbalance between throughputs during overload noted above. The 
high arrival rate of service A requests means that no service A tokens remain unused and the 
throughputs of SCPs 1/2 approach the target value very closely. This is not the case for 
service B: bids are implicitly inaccurate, so a small number of tokens will remain unused, with 
the result that the throughputs o f SCPs 3/4 fall somewhat short o f the target.
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□  Service A  ■  Service B □  Service C
Time (s)
Figure 6.13: H eterogeneous SCPs, enhanced centralised control. P er service type SCP th roughpu t. 
Left: SCP 1. Right: SCP 3.
Figure 6.14 compares the total completion rates and profit generated per second achieved when 
employing the original and updated versions of the marginal cost expression respectively. We 
see that, during overload, for the updated version a larger number o f (service A) sessions 
complete successfully and that this is reflected in an increase in the level o f generated profit.82 
In this scenario the increase in profit is marginal, however in scenarios where the differences in 
profit per unit o f  processing capacity for different SCPs is more pronounced the increase would 
become more significant.
—  Original Version  Enhanced Version —  Original Version -Enhanced Version 1
Figure 6.14: C om parison between original and updated versions. Left: Total com pletion rates. 
R ight: P ro fit generated per second.
82 We have verified that the differences between the completion rate and profit plots observed here relate 
to the different token allocations and not to statistical variations between simulation runs.
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6.1.3 Distributed  Control  of M ultiple SCPs
In the preceding section we investigated a centralised version o f the token-based strategy that 
allocates SCP processing capacity by means o f a single token generation process executing at a 
single network node. In a large-scale network it may be neither practical nor desirable to 
execute a central token-generation process requiring information from all SSPs and SCPs in the 
network. In this section we present a distributed version o f the strategy, where each SCP 
executes its own token generation process and SSPs split their arrival rate bids between a 
number of SCPs.83
Assuming that an SSP splits its bids into / ’ sub-bids (where / '< / ) ,  then the total bid from 
SSP k  for service type j  can be written in terms of the sub-bids as follows:
qk (j ) = Z  q,jt 0 )  = X  %  O')?* 0 )  >with Z  aa  O ) = 1 -°
¡=1 /= !  i=I
In the above expression the a, k ( j )  values are weights determining how much o f the expected 
demand at SSP k  for service type j  sessions is bid to the token generation process at SCP i . 
Note that since we assume that streams of service requests behave as Poisson processes it is 
possible to split bids in this manner without affecting the accuracy o f the cumulative bids 
received by the SCPs.
The most obvious approach an SSP can take in calculating values for a, k( j ) is to split bids 
evenly between all the SCPs it communicates with. In §6.1.3.1 we specify and analyse the 
performance o f this approach and show that it leads to sub-optimal resource allocations in 
networks containing heterogeneous SCPs. In §6.1.3.2 we specify and analyse a more complex 
approach in which closing prices from the token generation process are used to calculate 
optimal bid splits.
6.1.3.1 Even Bid-Splitting Approach: Specification and Performance Analysis
For even bid splitting SSPs simply divide their total bid for a service type by the number of 
SCPs to which they will bid, as follows:
?/.* 0 )  = a>.k ti)qk O') = O)
83 In the distributed version the token generation processes allocate tokens for a single SCP only, so the 
original token generation algorithm, as described in chapter 5, can be employed and there is no necessity 
to adopt the updated expression for marginal cost specified in §6.1.2.
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To investigate the even bid splitting approach we first use the network scenario depicted in 
Figure 6.3 (consisting o f four identical SCPs and 12 SSPs). We assume that all SSPs split their 
bids between all SCPs. Overload is again caused by an increase in the arrival rate o f service A 
requests at all SSPs, corresponding to a first-offered per-SCP load o f 1.4 Erlangs. Figure 6.15 
shows the per-SCP offered load and the mean of the SCP throughputs for this scenario and 
Figure 6.16 shows the individual SCP throughputs and the percentage spread. These figures 
show the performance o f the distributed strategy in protecting SCPs from overload is very 
similar to that o f the centralised strategy in the same scenario; this confirms that splitting o f bids 
does not affect ability o f the strategy to protect against overload.
Figure 6.17 shows the per service throughputs of SCP 1 and SCP3, whilstFigure 6.18 shows the 
total completion rates and profit generated per second. These graphs confirm that, when all 
SCPs are identical, the distributed strategy exhibits similar profit maximising characteristics as 
the centralised strategy. However, Figure 6.19 shows that there is some difference between the 
two versions: the ratio o f completion rates between differently sized SSPs during overload is not 
as fair for the distributed version (1 : 6.42 : 16.94) as it was for the centralised version 
(1 : 3.17 : 7.34). This is due to the bids inputted into the individual token generation processes 
being smaller in absolute terms in the distributed version: the smaller the absolute values o f the 
bids the more the token generation algorithm is biased in favour o f those SSPs with larger bids.
 O ffe red  Load  Mean Throughput
Figure 6.15: H om ogeneous SCPs, d istribu ted  control with even bid splitting. O ffered load and 
M ean SCP th roughput.
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Figure 6.16: H om ogeneous SCPs, d istribu ted  control with even bid splitting. Left: SCP 
throughpu ts. Right: Percentage Spread of SCP throughputs.
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Figure 6.17: H om ogeneous SCPs, d istribu ted  control with even bid splitting. P e r service type SCP 
th roughpu t. Left: SCP 1. R ight: SCP 3.
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Figure 6.18: Hom ogeneous SCPs, d istribu ted  control with even bid splitting. Left: Total 
com pletion rates. R ight: P er SSP size completion rates.
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Time (s)
Figure 6.19: Hom ogeneous SCPs, d istribu ted  control with even bid splitting. P ro fit generated  per 
second.
We now analyse the performance of the even bid splitting approach in the presence of 
heterogeneous SCPs, again employing the network scenario depicted in Figure 6.9. Figure 6.20 
shows the throughputs of the four SCPs and the percentage spread in throughputs between those 
SCPs with the smallest and largest values. We see that in normal conditions there is an 
appreciable spread between the throughputs of SCPs 1/2 and those of SCPs 3/4, due to SCPs 1/2 
allocating a greater number o f tokens. However this spread is not as severe as in the centralised 
case, because SCP 1/2 service A tokens can only be allocated in response to bids sent to 
SCPs 1/2, whereas in the centralised case they could be allocated to the totality o f SCP 
service A bids. This means that in normal conditions service A sessions will be processed by all 
SCPs, not just SCPs 1/2 (as evident from Figure 6.21).
—  SCP1 Throughput
—  S C P 4T
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Figure 6.20: H eterogeneous SCPs, d istribu ted  control with even bid splitting. Left: SCP 
throughputs. Right: Percentage Spread of SCP throughputs.
Figure 6.21 shows the per service type throughputs for SCP 1 and SCP 3, whilst Figure 6.22 
shows the total completion rates and profit generated per second. We see that during overload 
SCP 1 processes service B sessions, due to the token generation algorithm basing its marginal 
cost expression on an absolute measurement of profit per processing capacity unit at the SCP in
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question. As discussed in §6.1.2.3 this is sub-optimal behaviour, ideally SCP 1/2 should not 
process service B sessions during overload. To overcome this drawback, it is possible to employ 
a more advanced bid splitting approach, based on use o f closing prices from token generation 
processes. This approach is investigated in the next section.
□  Service A »Service 0 □  Service C
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Figure 6.21: H eterogeneous SCPs, d istributed control w ith even bid splitting. P e r service type SCP 
th roughpu t. Left: SCP 1. Right: SCP 3.
j  Tolal Complétions
600 -----
550 --------------------------------- --------
0 300 600 500 1200 1500 1800
Time (s}
900
Time (s)
Figure 6.22: H eterogeneous SCPs, distributed  control w ith even bid splitting. Left: Total 
com pletion rates. Right: P rofit generated per second.
6.1.3.2 Price-based Bid Splitting Approach: Specification and Performance Analysis
For the price-based bid splitting approach prices per service type per token at each SCP, denoted 
c . ( j ) , are computed at the end of the token generation process. These prices are calculated by 
dividing the sum o f the per SSP token allocation prices for that service by the sum of the token 
allocations for the service type, as follows:
U^) = 'Lc,,kU)/'ZniAJ)
k = 1 /  *= 1
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These prices are indicated to the SSPs along with the new token allocations from that SCP. 
They are used by the SSP during the formulation o f the bids sent to the token generation process 
at the start o f  the next control interval.
and prices: if its bids increase/decrease from those of the previous interval the prices are 
assumed to increase/decrease proportionally. This implicitly assumes that all other SSPs will 
make bids that are identical to those they made in the previous interval. O f course this will not 
be the case since other SSPs will be adopting the same approach and changing their bids, 
thereby affecting closing prices. However, as the bids sent to SCPs with currently lower prices 
increase the prices will increase and vice versa, so prices will tend to stabilise (as long as 
offered load is stable) after a number of control intervals.
The details o f the calculation are as follows: assume that the previous bid by SSP k  to SCP i 
for service type j  resulted in an allocation o f nik( j )  tokens at a price c,.(y). The forthcoming 
bid, for qk( j ) tokens should then be split into bids qn,(j) , -- ,qrk( j ) M such that the resulting 
total cost:
manner. First we separate qrk( j )  from the summation in the total cost expression, giving:
In formulating its bids an SSP aims to minimise the total cost o f the tokens it will be allocated. 
In its calculation o f the optimal bid splits qt k (j ) it assumes a linear relationship between bids
is minimised under the constraint
/■
I X *  0 :) = ?*(/>
The above is a non-linear optimisation problem, however it can be solved in a straightforward
Then, we use the constraint to substitute for qrk( j ) :
2
84 For simplicity we will again assume in our analysis that SSPs always split bids between all SCPs, that
is, / '=  I .
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Differentiating with respect to qik ( j )  for all i and setting the resulting expressions equal to 
zero yields / ' - l  linear equations in qyk{j ) ,—, q i ^ k{ j ) ,  which can be solved simultaneously.
Finally, qrk(j)  can be found through use of the constraint.
To analyse this approach we again simulate the network scenario depicted in Figure 6.9. Figure 
6.23 shows the throughputs of the four SCPs and the percentage spread in throughputs between 
those SCPs with the smallest and largest values. This figure is similar to that for the even bid 
splitting approach (Figure 6.20), but with a slightly larger spread in the throughputs between 
SCPs 1/2 and SCPs 3/4 during overload, indicating that they are processing different service 
types. This is confirmed by Figure 6.24, which shows the per service type throughputs for SCP 
1 and SCP 3. We see that after a settling period at the start o f the overload SCPs 1/2 process 
service A requests only, which is the desired behaviour. A proportion of the throughput at the 
start of the overload relates to service B; this is due to both the residual processing requirements 
of service B sessions that were ongoing at overload onset and the fact that it takes a number of 
iterations for closing prices to adjust to the changed arrival rate bids.
Figure 6.25 compares the total completion rates and profit generated per second achieved when 
employing the even bid splitting and price-based bid splitting approaches. We see that, during 
overload, the price-based approach leads to a larger number of (service A) completions and a 
corresponding increase in generated profit. As with the centralised control strategy the increase 
is marginal in this scenario, but would increase in scenarios where differences in profit per unit 
of processing capacity for different SCPs are more pronounced.
— -SCP1 Tfirouohpiil SCP2 Throughpul
—  SCP4 Th/oop ftput — Offered L o a d  __
— SCP3 Throughput — SCP Load Spread j
Time (s)
Figure 6.23: H eterogeneous SCPs, d istribu ted  control with price-based bid splitting. Left: SCP 
th roughputs. Right: Percentage Spread  of SCP throughputs.
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□  Service A  ■  Service B □  S ervice C
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□  Service A ■  Service B  □  Service C
Time (s)
Figure 6.24: H eterogeneous SCPs, d istribu ted  control with price-based bid splitting. P e r service 
type SCP throughput. Left: SCP 1. Right: SCP 3.
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Figure 6.25: H eterogeneous SCPs, d istribu ted  control with price-based bid splitting.
Left: Total completion rates. Right: P rofit generated per second.
6.1.4 H i e r a r c h i c a l ,  D i s t r i b u t e d  C o n t r o l  o f  M u l t i p l e  SCPs
The distributed strategy presented above involved all SSPs sending bids to potentially all SCPs 
in the network. A disadvantage of this scheme is that, in a network with a large number o f 
SSPs/SCPs, the amount o f bid-related traffic generated every control interval may be 
unacceptably large. A solution is to adopt a scheme in which certain SSPs bid on behalf o f other 
SSPs (or other groups of SSPs), receive the subsequent token allocations and redistribute them 
to these SSPs. In effect this creates a ‘bidding hierarchy,’ which can be structured to mirror 
actual network topology. In this section we follow this approach, specifying a hierarchical, 
distributed version of the token-based strategy and analysing its likely performance.
Assume that in the bidding hierarchy all K  SSPs are arranged into Y  (possibly overlapping) 
SSP groups. Let y  denote an arbitrary grouping and let X y denote the number o f SSPs in
group y .  O f these, one ‘principal’ SSP will collate bids received from the other X  - 1
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‘secondary’ SSPs with its own, forward the collated bid(s) to SCPs and/or other SSPs and 
redistribute resulting allocations between itself and the secondary SSPs. Let x e{ l,...,A r } 
identify an arbitrary SSP from group y . Furthermore, let every x  map to , where
each k  uniquely identifies an SSP in the entire network. Finally, let k  denote the unique 
identifier o f the principal SSP of group y .
The principal SSP collates its own bid and those of the secondary SSPs on a per service basis, as 
follows:
=  O')x=l
This bid may then be forwarded as-is to a centralised token generation process, or split (using 
either the even or price-based approaches) with sub-bids being forwarded to a number o f remote 
token generation processes. In response to these bids the principal SSP will receive (cumulative) 
per-service token allocations, nk ( j ) . These allocations must then be split into sub-allocations 
for each SSP in the principal’s group (including itself).
A simple approach to calculating sub-allocations is to, on a per-service basis, split the overall 
allocations in a weighted fashion, where the weight for service type j  for SSP x  is given by 
qx(] ) j qk 0 ) -  However, this approach will not guarantee that the resulting sub-allocations are
profit-optimal.85 A better option is to reallocate tokens by running a SSP token distribution 
process that is analogous to the token generation process, but with SCP processing capacity 
supplies being replaced as inputs by overall allocations received by the principal SSP. In 
addition, since one token of service type j  is equivalent to Pi( j ) /Pi ( j ' )  tokens o f service 
type j ' , the distribution algorithm can be designed to allow ‘token conversion’ for the purpose 
o f profit maximisation. We now proceed to specify such an algorithm?6
85 Profit-optimal token allocation requires that the probability of token use be taken into account. A key 
input into the calculation of this probability is the absolute value of the estimate of arrivals in the 
forthcoming control interval, with higher estimates increasing the probability of token use. In the weight- 
based approach relative estimate sizes rather than token use probabilities based on absolute estimate 
values are used, hence the resulting allocations will be sub-optimal (from the profit viewpoint).
86 The algorithm is based on the centralised token generation algorithm, but with SCP capacity supply 
replaced by per-SCP supplies of tokens for the lowest cost service at that SCP; service processing costs 
replaced by ratios of service processing costs to those of the lowest cost service at that SCP; and the 
number of SSPs in the network replaced by the number of SSPs in the principal’s group. Unless explicitly 
specified all terminology used here has the same meaning as defined in §6.1.2.
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Step 1: Initialisation.
Forali SCPs 2 = 1,...,/ do:
Set m ,0 ),min) = X ~  ?  • '7 ;  %  O ’)
j' Pi\Ji,min/
where y( min identifies the service type with the lowest value o f processing costs at SCP i 
and WjOjmin) is the pool o f available / f[nin tokens for SCP i that may be converted and 
distributed by the algorithm.
Forali SCPs i = do:
Forali SSPs x  = l,...,X JI do:
Fora li service types j do:
Set token allocations nix( j )  = 0 .
Forali SSPs x  = l,...,X y do:
For all service types j  = 1,...,J do:
Set n X(J) = e~qAJ).
Set n xU ) = i - ^ U ) -
Set marginal utilities ux( j )  -  rx(J)Hx( J ) .
Forali SCPs i = l,...,I do:
O * - V 1 V 1 Pi O'/.min ) , .NSet w , = J ^  uxO ) .
j = l  X = l  P i \ J )
Forali SCPs i = do:
For all service types j  = 1 do:
Set marginal costs v:( j )  - —EAU — w.
Pi O'/,min )
Step 2: Identify optimal allocations.
For all SCPs / = 1 , SSPs x  = \,. . . ,X  and service types j  do:
List all candidate allocations that maximise 5,,(/) = .J '>■/ s /  *\v,0)
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Step 3: Arbitrate between optimal allocations.
Apply secondary criteria87 to eliminate less optimal token allocations, select an allocation at 
random from the remaining candidates.
Step 4: Perform optimal allocations.
Set nr y ( f )  = nry( f )  + \ .
Set mv ) = m,  (¿, min) — Pf J \  •
P i' \Ji\m\n )
Step 5: Update internal variables.
Set Kx,(j ' ) = n x.(j ' )qx( j ' ) l n x, ( j ' ) .
Set n x( f )  = I l x. { f ) -7vx, ( f ) .
Set uxXj ' )  = rx, ( j ' )Ux,(j ' ) ■
For all SCPs 2 = 1,...,/ do:
Set w, = w, ) ■
P i ( j )
For all SCPs 2=1,...,/ do:
For all service types j do:
f •\
Set marginal costs v, ( j )  =    w ,.
P i  O '/.m in  )
Step 6: Loop statement.
I f  there exists at least one SCP i for which m, ) > 0 then:
GOTO Step 2.
Else:
STOP.
To analyse the performance o f the hierarchical, distributed token-based load control strategy we 
simulate the network scenario depicted in Figure 6.26. This scenario consists o f three SSP 
groups, with SSP 1, SSP 2 and SSP 3 acting as principals and each receiving bids from three 
secondary SSPs. The principal SSPs forward bids to token generation processes held at each o f 
the four SCPs and employ price-based bid splitting.
87 These criteria will be similar in nature to those defined for the token generation algorithms o f the 
centralised and distributed strategies.
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Figure 6.26: N etw ork with 1 = 4  heterogeneous SCPs, K =  12 SSPs, hierarchical, d is trib u ted  control 
with 3 SSP groups.
Figure 6.27 shows the throughputs o f the four SCPs and the percentage spread in throughputs 
between those SCPs with the smallest and largest values. We see that the strategy provides good 
protection from overload and note that the spread in overall throughput between SCPs 1/2 and 
SCPs 3/4 indicates that these SCP pairs are processing different service types. This is confirmed 
by Figure 6.28, which shows the per service type throughputs for SCP 1 and SCP 3. The 
throughputs of these two SCPs is more similar to those observed for the centralised version of 
the token-based strategy (see Figure 6.13, page 176) then to those observed for the distributed 
version (see Figure 6.24, page 184). The explanation for this is that the principal SSPs are 
provided with information regarding the service type processing requirements at all SCPs and 
use this information in their token distribution. Specifically, the use of the relative marginal cost 
expression results in all service A tokens being allocated from SCPs 1/2, as was the case for the 
centralised strategy, but not for the distributed strategy. The total completion rates and profit 
generated per second are shown in Figure 6.29, we see that the strategy performs as well as the 
centralised and distributed versions in maximising completion rates and profit.
- -S C P 1  Throughput —  SCP2 TTiroughput — SCP3 Throughput 
—  SCP4 Throughput —  Mea n Th roughput_______________________
■— SCP Load Spread ,
Time (s)
Figure 6.27: Heterogeneous SCPs, h ierarch ica l distributed control with price-based bid splitting. 
Left: SCP th roughputs. R ight: Percentage Spread of SCP th roughpu ts.
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Figure 6.28: H eterogeneous SCPs, h ierarch ical d istributed control with price-based bid splitting. 
P er service type SCP th roughput. Left: SCP 1. R ight: SCP 3.
j  — Total Completions
Tim« (a) Time (s)
Figure 6.29: Heterogeneous SCPs, h ierarchical d istributed  control with price-based bid splitting. 
Left: Total com pletion rates. R ight: P rofit generated per second.
6.2 TOKEN-BASED CONTROL OF SDP RESOURCES
Heretofore we have focussed solely on the development of a token-based strategy providing 
effective control of SCP processor resources. Although SCPs are in many ways the critical IN 
resource it is also possible that in some traffic conditions other resources, for example network 
databases or automated announcement facilities, become equally or more susceptible to 
overload. Depending on the characteristics o f the overloading service(s) one of these resource 
types may become a network bottleneck: overloading at the same time as, or instead of, the 
SCPs. Resultant queue size build-up and message discarding/dropping will greatly affect end- 
user quality of service, despite the fact that the SCPs have controls in place to protect 
themselves from overload. Given the above, it is clear that a truly network-oriented load control 
strategy should protect multiple resource types from overload regardless o f the offered traffic 
characteristics.
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In this section we enhance the token-based strategy to incorporate profit-optimal allocation of 
both SCP and SDP processing resources. In the enhanced strategy SSPs are allocated two sets of 
tokens: one for SCPs, the other for SDPs. To accept a request for a service session requiring use 
o f an SDP an SSP must have available one SCP token and one SDP token.88 Allocation o f SCP 
and SDP tokens is co-ordinated, with SCP and SDP tokens being allocated as a pair for the 
relevant service types. As previously, tokens are allocated on the basis o f protecting resources 
from overload and maximisation of generated profit. The enhanced strategy is introduced and 
outlined in §6.2.1 and its likely performance is analysed in §6.2.2.
6 .2 .1  S p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  T o k e n - b a s e d  S t r a t e g y  f o r  S C P / S D P  
C o n t r o l
A number of approaches to the generation o f tokens for SDPs can be envisaged. The simplest is 
to allocate SDP tokens independently from SCP tokens: SSPs send bids to SDP token 
generation processes, which allocate tokens based on available SDP capacity and profit 
maximisation. These token generation processes may be centralised, distributed, or distributed 
hierarchical in the same manner as previously outlined for SCP token generation. This approach 
ensures that neither SCPs nor SDPs overload, however allocations may not be profit-optimal. 
For example, an SSP may receive more SCP tokens than SDP tokens for an overloading service, 
so when all SDP tokens are consumed the remaining SCP tokens cannot be used. In this case it 
would be more optimal to allocate the excess SCP tokens to a service type that did not require 
access to an SDP. Therefore, it is desirable to co-ordinate allocation o f SCP and SDP tokens to 
ensure that, for the relevant service types, tokens are always allocated as a pair.
One approach to co-ordinated allocation o f SCP and SDP tokens would be to employ a 
centralised token generation process that is supplied with information regarding expected arrival 
rates, profits, available SCP/SDP capacities and service-specific costs for both SCPs/SDPs. The 
token generation algorithm would be an extension of that specified in §6.1.2, with service 
related costs at SDPs being taken into account when identifying optimal allocations. As 
discussed previously a centralised approach is not ideal for large INs, so we instead focus on a 
distributed approach.
In our distributed approach SCPs each run their own token generation process and acquire SDP 
tokens by bidding to independent SDP token generation processes. The sequence o f events is as 
follows: SSPs send bids to SCP token generation processes as outlined previously;89 SCPs 
receive SSP bids and collate them on a per-service basis; these collated bids are submitted to the
88 An SDP token grants access to the SDP for the duration of the service session, regardless of how many 
times the SDP is queried. We assume that the number of SDP queries per session is fixed for all sessions 
of a particular service type.
89 SSPs may or may not be arranged in a hierarchy for bidding purposes and may use either even- or 
price-based splitting when bidding to SCPs.
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SDP token generation process(es); SCPs receive SDP token allocations and use them as inputs 
into their own token generation process; SCPs generate SCP/SDP token allocations which they 
then send to the SSPs. SDP token generation processes can be arranged in a centralised or 
distributed manner; we specify and investigate a centralised scheme here.
SCPs will receive SDP tokens on a per service, but not on a per SSP basis, since collated bids 
were submitted to the SDP token generation process(es). The SCP can simply distribute the 
SDP tokens between SSPs or employ token conversion (of SDP tokens between different 
service types) to achieve a more profit-optimal allocation. We adopt the latter approach but note 
that it has the potential disadvantage that SCPs are required to have knowledge o f the 
processing requirement ratios o f the various service types at the various SDPs. During the SCP 
token generation process candidate allocations are identified by examining the marginal utility 
per marginal cost o f all possible SSP/service type allocations. Where the service type requires 
access to an SDP candidate allocations additionally specify an SDP, with the choice between 
SDPs being based on minimising marginal cost (which is expressed using a relative 
measurement similar to that used for SCPs in §6.1.2.3).
We now proceed to specify the enhanced token-based strategy. §6.2.1.1 describes the 
centralised SDP token generation algorithm; §6.2.1.2 specifies the distributed SCP token 
generation / SDP token redistribution algorithm and §6.2.1.3 specifies the SCP/SDP token 
spending algorithm.
6.2.1.1 Centralised SDP Token Generation Algorithm
The centralised SDP token generation algorithm is analogous to the centralised SCP token 
generation algorithm specified in §6.1.2.1 (except that the marginal cost expression introduced 
in §6.1.2.3 is used), but with SCPs taking the place of SSPs and SDPs replacing SCPs. The 
notation changes as follows:
I  -»  L , where L denotes the number o f SDPs in the network.
/ —> / ,  where I denotes an arbitrary SDP.
K - + I ,  i - > k .
J  -> J SDP, where J SDP denotes the number of service types requiring access to the SDP. 
j  -> j  e  {JSDP} , where {JSDP} denotes the set o f service types requiring access to the SDP. 
rk{j)  -> r ( j ) 90, where r ( j )  denotes the profit generated by a successful session o f type j . 
c,. —» c, , where c, denotes the total processing capacity available at SDP / .
90 For the SDP token generation algorithm we assume that profit values for each service type are the same 
at all SSPs in the network.
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s; -»  s , , where s, denotes the capacity sold on behalf of SDP I .
Pi(j )  —> P i ( j ) , where p , ( j )  denotes the processing costs o f service type j  at SDP / .
qk( j )  -> where q, ( j )  denotes the bid o f SCP i for tokens of service type j .
n,k( j )  —>• nn ( j ) , where n, ,{j )  denotes the number of service type j  allocated to SCP i on 
behalf o f SDP / .
nk( j )  —» nt( j ) , where n, ( j )  denotes the total number o f service type j  tokens allocated to 
SCP i .
ci k (J ) ci i (J ) > where c, f ( j )  denotes the price of an (/, j )  allocation.
“  q ( i Yuk( j ) ut( j )  = r ( j )  ■e~q,u), where u;( j )  denotes the marginal utility associated with
1- 1,0 ) w!
allocating a type j  token to SCP i .
v,.( j )  -»  v,(J) -  '¿ '^ j  ur( j ' ) ,  where v, ( j )  denotes the marginal cost o f allocating a type
7 - 1  Pi O')
j  token on behalf o f SDP I .
$ik(J) , 0 ) = M, 0 ) / v/ 0 )  j where <5, ,.(y) denotes the marginal utility per marginal costs o f a 
( / , / , / )  allocation.
6.2.1.2 Distributed SCP Token Generation / SDP Token Redistribution Algorithm
We now specify the SCP token generation algorithm, using the notation defined previously and 
additional notation defined as the algorithm specification proceeds. The variable i is used to 
denote the SCP at which the algorithm executes. We assume that SCPs send bids to a 
centralised SDP token generation process (these bids need not be split).
Step 1: SDP bid dispatch.
For all service types j  e  {JSDp} do:
Set ? ,0 )  = Z ? * 0 ) -
*=i
Submit bids <7,0) to SDP token generation process.
Receive token allocations n, , ( j )  from SDP token generation process.
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Step 2: Initialisation.
For all service types j  = 1 do:
For all SSPs k  = \,...,K  do:
Set SCP token allocations n.k( j )  = 0 and costs cik( j )  = 0 .
Set 7rk( j )  = e~g>U).
Set n*O') = 1-^*0')■
Set marginal utilities uk (j ) = rk ( j ) H k (j ) .
For all service types j  = 1 do:
Set SCP marginal costs vi( j )  = ( j )  ,91
Set remaining SCP processing capacity si = ci .
For all SSPs do:
For all service types j  e  {JSDP} do:
For all SDPs I = 1 do:
Set nlk ( j )  = 0 , where nlk ( j )  denote the number o f type j  tokens allocated on behalf 
o f SDP I toS S P  k  .
For all service types j  e  {JSDP} do:
For all SDPs do:
Set m, ^  P i nt¡(J) > where j , min identifies the service type with the lowest
1=1 Pi (J/,min )
value o f processing costs at SDP / and m, (j,  min) is the pool o f available j ,  mln tokens for
SDP I that may be converted and distributed by the algorithm.
For all SDPs I = 1 do:
For all service types j  e  {JSDP} do:
J SDP K  ,
s e t w , = y y ; ^ .
For all SDPs 1 = \,. . . ,L  do:
91 As noted previously in the situation where tokens for a single resource are being allocated there is no 
necessity to employ a relative measure for marginal costs.
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For all service types j  e  {JSDP} do:
Set v/ ( j )  = p i ( j ) w / .
Set a -  0 , where a  is the maximum value of Sik( j )  over all ( j , k )  allocations previously 
examined.
Step 3: Identify optimal allocations.
For all SSPs k  = l,...,K  and service types j  = do:
I f  j  £ U sdp) then:
I f  ôik( j ) >c t  then:
Set a  = Sik( j ) .
Else:
I f  there exists at least one SDP I for which m, ( j , min ) > 0 do:
If  Sik( j ) > a  then:
Set a  = Stk ( j ) .
Set ¡ 5 -  oo, where f i  is the minimum value o f v,( j )  over all I allocations 
previously examined.
For all SDPs do:
I f  m,Ui.mm)>0 then:
If  v , ( j ) < P  then:
Set f t  = V[{j) .
For all SSPs k  = and service types j do:
If  j  £ {JSDp} then:
I f  Sik( j )  = a  then:
List ( j , k )  as a candidate allocation.
Else:
I f  there exists at least one SDP I for which w,(7/ min) > 0 do:
I f  Sik( j )  = a  then:
For all SDPs l = \,...,L  do:
I f  w/O',,mi„ )> 0  then:
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If v,(J) = P then:
List ( j , k , l ) as a candidate allocation.
Step 4: Arbitrate between optimal allocations.
ForSSPs k  = , service types j  = and SDPs l = \,...,L  do:
If  allocation ( j , k ) / ( j , k , l ) is in the candidate list then:
Apply secondary criteria to eliminate less optimal candidates?2
Randomly select allocation ( j ' , k ' ) / ( f  , k ' , / ')  from those remaining in the candidate 
list.
Step 5: Perform optimal allocations.
Set « ,.* .( /)  =  »,■,*.(/) + 1.
Set clkXj ' )  = cik,(j ' )  + ui , ( f ) .
Set s, = s , - p i( f ) .
I f  j ^ { J sDp) then:
Set nrk,(j ' )  = nrjt, ( f )  + 1.
Set m, ( j lmin ) = m, ( j lmm ) — Prf 9 ' \
P rU /',min )
Step 6: Update internal variables.
Set x k( f )  = x k, ( f ) q k, ( f ) l n k, ( f  ) .
Set =
Set uk, ( j ' )  = rk, ( j ' ) U k, ( f ) .
I f  f e  { J sdp} then:
For all SDPs I = 1 do:
For all SDPs / =  1 do:
For all service types j  g {Jsdp} do:
92 Criteria such as those specified in §6.1.2.1 can be applied, as well as similar criteria governing the 
optimal manner in which to allocated SDP tokens.
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Set vl ( j )  = p l (j)yv,.
Step 7: Loop statement.
I f  there exists at least one SCP z for which s: > 0 then:
GOTO Step 3.
Else:
STOP.
6.2.1.3 SCP/SDP Token Spending Process
The SCP/SDP token spending process is analogous to that specified in §6.1.2.2, except that, 
when a request is accepted, an SDP as well as an SCP must be chosen. SDPs for which more 
tokens are currently available are again chosen in preference to other SDPs.
Step 1: Apply PT throttle.
Select a random number X  uniformly distributed in the range (0.0,1.0).
If  X < p a( j ) then:
Service request is accepted.
Else:
Service request is throttled.
STOP.
Step 2: Select SCP.
For all SCPs i = do:
List all SCPs which maximise n\  (j ) ,  where n\  ( j )  is the number o f tokens remaining in 
token pool i j .
Randomly select SCP i' from the list.
Step 3: Select SDP.
For all SDPs do:
List all SDPs which maximise ri, (j ) ,  where n\  (j ) is the number o f tokens remaining in 
token pool I j .
Randomly select SCP /' from the list.
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6.2.2 P e r f o r m a n c e  A n a l y s i s  o f  E n h a n c e d  S t r a t e g y
The network scenario illustrated in Figure 6.30 was used to analyse the performance o f the 
enhanced token-based strategy described in the previous section. The network consists o f four 
identical SCPs and two SDPs having different processing requirements for service A (but not 
for service C). All SCPs and all SDPs can be used by all of the twelve SSPs in the network. We 
simulate two global overloads, in which the arrival rates of service A and service C respectively 
increase to a level corresponding to a first-offered load of 1.4 Erlangs to each SCP; end-user 
reattempt behaviour is modelled.
Service A Required
Instructions Ratio: 0.5  : 1.0
Figure 6.30: N etw ork w ith / =  4 identical SCPs, L  = 2 heterogeneous SDPs, K  = 12 SSPs, global 
overload.
In the simulation model used previously the functionality associated with the SDF was 
incorporated into the SCP model (although SDF communication/processing was assumed not to 
require any SCP central processor instructions). Here we employ a separate SDP model that is 
similar in nature to the SCP one. It contains a single central processor that has the capacity to 
execute c = 6,200,000 instructions per second. Signalling messages arriving at the SDP require 
the execution o f a different number o f instructions, depending on their type; details o f these 
requirements are provided in Table 6.1. The SDP has a single input queue that can hold a 
maximum of 500 messages (we assume that all messages are of the same size). I f  the queue is 
full then all arriving messages are discarded, with no associated processing cost. I f  messages 
have been waiting in the queue for longer than t -  2s by the time they commence processing 
they are dropped, a process that involves expending 24,000 instructions. The SDP contains a 
single functional block: the SDF, which models the reading and updating of database entries. 
The SCP model is the same as that used previously except that messages requiring SDF
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processing are forwarded to the SDP model; this process is assumed not to have any effect on 
SCP processing requirements, which have the same values as those used previously.
Table 6.1: SDP processing requirem ents.
Arr. Signalling Message Dep. Signalling Message SDP 1 Instns. SDP 2 Instns.
sA2 sA3 30,000 50,000
sC6 sC7 60,000 50,000
We first investigate the operation o f the enhanced strategy in the presence o f a service A 
overload. The relative capacities o f the four SCPs and two SDPs are such that the SCPs are 
capable o f processing more service A sessions per unit time then are the SDPs. Therefore, if the 
SDP utilisation is to be maintained below the target o f 0.9 Erlangs during a service A overload 
the SCPs will have to have their utilisation maintained at a value significantly below their target. 
In effect the SDPs become the network bottleneck: it is their maximum capacity which dictates 
the maximum completion rate that can be achieved.
Figure 6.31 shows the offered SCP load, mean SCP throughput and mean SDP throughput for 
the duration o f the simulation run.93 We see that the enhanced token-based strategy succeeds in 
ensuring that the throughput o f the SDPs is kept close to the target value o f 0.9 Erlangs. 
Moreover, this is achieved by keeping the throughput o f the SCPs at approximately 0.75 
Erlangs. SCP throughputs are limited because the SCP token generation / SDP token 
redistribution process can only allocate as many service A token pairs as correspond to the 
token allocations received from the SDP token generation process. When SDP token allocations 
are exhausted the SCPs allocated their remaining capacity to services not requiring SDP access, 
in this case service B.
—  Offered Load  Mean SCP Throughput “ Wean SDP Throughput |
Figure 6.31: Identical SCPs, heterogeneous SDPs. Service A overload. Offered SCP load, m ean 
SCP throughput and m ean SDP throughput.
93 As with previous cases the token-based strategy ensures that resource queues do not grow to the level 
where message dropping/discarding occurs, hence SCP/SDP throughput is equivalent to SCP/SDP carried 
load.
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Figure 6.32 shows the per-service throughputs Tor SCP 1 and SCP 3. We see that the throughput 
o f the SCPs is as expected: all service requests are accepted in normal conditions and SCP 
throughputs are well balanced, whereas during overload all service C sessions are throttled, all 
service B requests are accepted and the number o f service A requests accepted is limited to the 
number that can be handled by the SDPs.
Figure 6.33 shows the per-service throughput for SDP 1 and SDP 2. In normal conditions we 
see that SDP throughputs are unbalanced, due to their differing processing requirements for 
service A. This means that more o f the service A tokens generated are for SDP 1 and the 
majority of the service C tokens generated are for SDP 2. The token spending process is such 
that the SDP for which an SSP has the most tokens is used in preference to the other SDP. 
Hence we see that the service A throughput of SDP 1 is greater than that for SDP 2 and vice 
versa for service C. During overload we see that both SDPs allocate tokens for service A in 
preference to the lower profit service C and that end-user reattempt behaviour has the effect of 
prolonging the overload beyond the time of abatement of first-offered overload traffic.
□  Service A  ■  Service B □  Service C
0 300 #00 WO 1200 1500 1*00
Time (s)
Ô » 0  eoo 900 1200 1500 IflOO
Time (s)
□  Service A ■  Service B □  Service C
Figure 6.32: Identical SCPs, heterogeneous SDPs. Service A overload. Per service type SCP 
throughput. Left: SCP 1. R ight: SCP 3.
□  Service A  ■  Service B □  Service C !
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Figure 6.33: Identical SCPs, heterogeneous SDPs. Service A overload. P er service type SDP 
throughput. Left: SDP 1. Right: SDP 2.
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We now investigate the operation o f the strategy in the presence o f a service C overload. As 
before, the relative capacities o f the SCPs and SDPs mean that SCPs are capable o f processing 
more service C sessions per unit time than the SDPs. Figure 6.34 shows the offered SCP load, 
mean SCP throughput and mean SDP throughput for the duration o f the simulation run. Once 
again the SDP throughput is kept below the target value (a little further below than was that case 
for service A overload) while the SCP throughputs are kept at the corresponding level 
(approximately 0.53 Erlangs).
— Offered Load  Mean SCP Throughput — Mean SDP Throughput
Figure 6.34: Identical SCPs, heterogeneous SDPs. Service C overload. O ffered SC P load, mean 
SCP th roughpu t and m ean SDP throughput.
Figure 6.35 shows the per-service throughputs for SCP 1 and SCP 3. As expected all service A 
and service B requests are accepted during overload, while the number o f accepted service C 
requests is limited in accordance with the available SDP capacity. Figure 6.36 shows the per- 
service throughput for SDP 1 and SDP 2. In normal conditions we again observe an imbalance 
in SDP throughput caused by unequal token allocations resulting from differing service A 
processing capacities. During overload we see that all service A tokens are generated for SDP 1, 
which has the better service A performance. Most of the remaining SDP 1 capacity and all of 
the SDP 2 capacity is used for service C sessions. The shortfall below the target o f SDP 1 
throughput is due to a larger number o f tokens for service A being generated than originally bid 
for by the SSPs (the large difference between service A and service C profit means that the 
token generation algorithm deems it more profit-optimal to allocate capacity to service A rather 
than service C.)
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Figure 6.35: Identical SCPs, heterogeneous SDPs. Service C overload. Per service type SCP 
throughput. Left: SCP 1. Right: SCP 3.
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Figure 6.36: Identical SCPs, heterogeneous SDPs. Service C overload. P e r service type SDP 
throughput. Left: SDP 1. R ight: SDP 2.
6.3 TOKEN-BASED CONTROL OF SS.7 RESOURCES
In the analyses of the token-based strategy presented thus far we have focussed on overload of 
IN resources only and ignored the potential for SS.7 resource overload. As shown in chapter 4, 
overload of SS.7 links (or indeed STPs) can have a severely detrimental impact on network 
performance. The current token-based strategy does not incorporate any means for detecting or 
alleviating SS.7 overload, hence it can not prevent the unacceptable response delays and 
premature session terminations resulting from message discarding at overloaded links. To 
achieve fully network-oriented load control it is therefore necessary to enhance the token-based 
strategy to help prevent and/or respond to SS.7 overloads.
In theory it would be possible to use an approach similar to that outlined in §6.2 to enhance the 
token-based strategy to allocate tokens for individual links and STPs. Unfortunately, this would 
be highly impractical, since the SS.7 static routing scheme and capabilities for re-routing during 
failure conditions would necessitate very complex token generation algorithms and bidding
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hierarchies for even moderately sized networks. For this reason we must develop a simpler 
approach that does not require detailed knowledge of the SS.7 network topology or routing 
scheme.
One of the conclusions o f chapter 4 was that use of message delay measurements appears to be 
the most practical means for SSPs to detect overload in the SS.7 network. In the strategy 
enhancement presented here round-trip delay measurements are employed to select ‘favourable’ 
SCPs from individual SSP’s viewpoint and to detect if the routes through the SS.7 network 
towards an SCP (or the SCP itself) are overloaded. This information is used in enhanced bid 
splitting, load throttling and token spending processes; collectively these help maximise 
network performance in situations where the potential for SS.7 overloads is high.
§6.3.1 describes how round-trip delays experienced by special ant messages are used to select 
favourable SCPs; and how this information can be used in the bid splitting and token spending 
processes. §6.3.2 describes an enhanced load throttling processes that reduces traffic to 
destination SCPs where response delays exceed pre-specified thresholds. Finally, §6.3.3 
presents an analysis o f the performance o f the enhanced strategy based on results obtained using 
a modified simulation model.
6.3.1 Ph ero m o ne-based  SCP Selection
In a multiple-SCP network SSPs will ideally use those SCPs which, because o f their physical 
proximity or prevailing network load conditions, provide better quality o f service then other 
SCPs. For example, in normal load conditions an SSP should use those SCPs to which it is 
connected by the smallest number o f signalling links; this both minimises response delays for 
end-users and reduces the probability o f message loss. Similarly, if one or more signalling links 
are overloaded, SSPs should use those SCPs the routes towards which avoid these links.
SSP measurements o f the delay between the time at which an IN query message is sent to an 
SCP and the time at which the corresponding response message is received, provide relative 
estimates o f how ‘favourable’ it is for that SSP to use particular SCPs for future service 
sessions. During normal conditions the delay measured for SCPs that are in close proximity 
and/or process messages more promptly will be less then those measured for other SCPs. 
During overload (of signalling links, STPs, or of SCPs themselves) messages towards affected 
SCPs will encounter saturated queues and be delayed significantly. The approach we use to 
exploit the information provided by delay measurements employs an approach based on Ant 
Colony Optimisation (for a description o f this resource allocation paradigm cf. §3.2.3.)
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6.3.1.1 S p ecifica tion  o f  P h erom on e-b ased  SC P Selection P rocess
We use the concept o f pheromone tables to select favourable SCPs based on SSP delay 
measurements. The formulae used for updating pheromone probabilities are based on those 
outlined in [Schoonderwoerd et al., 1997]. The details of the approach are as follows:
• At intervals o f length Tml, for every service type j  an ant message is generated at every
one of the SSPs in the network and sent to a selected SCP;
• At each SSP k  a pheromone table for each service type j  is maintained. The pheromone 
tables contain entries for all the SCPs in the network; the entries are the probabilities PkJ, of 
SSP k  choosing SCP i as the destination for a service type j  ant message;
• The destination SCP of an ant message is selected using the information in the pheromone
table, following one o f two schemes: either the ‘normal scheme’ or the ‘exploration 
scheme.’ The scheme used is selected at random, but with the probability o f using the
exploration scheme, P lore, being much less than that for the normal scheme, Pmrma, ;
• In the normal scheme the SCP is selected randomly, the probability of picking SCP i being 
the probability Pkj indicated in the pheromone table; this is analogous to the trail selection 
behaviour o f real ants;
• In the exploration scheme the SCP is also selected randomly, however the probabilities of 
selecting all the SCPs are equal. The purpose of the exploration scheme is to introduce an 
element o f noise into the system so that more performant SCPs can be found as network 
conditions change; this is analogous to a small number of real ants which do not follow the 
‘recommended’ trail, but which, as a result, may find even better trails;
• Each ant message is routed to the designated SCP, which returns it directly to the 
originating SSP. The round-trip delay, as measured by the SSP, is used to update the 
pheromone table entries for the relevant service type. The calculations are as follows:
P.„ + APp  _  "J_____
* 1 + AP
Pi n = — ^ -  V / '£ [ ! , / ] , iV i  
hj l + AP
where i indicates the visited SCP and
AP = —  + —^ — + C  
tan, C,U)
where A , B  and C are constants; twll is the measured round trip delay for the newly 
returned ant message; and c,{j') is the closing price per service type j  token at SCP i as
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indicated to the SSP in the last received token allocation.94
• For each service type at each SSP, the SCP selected as being most favourable is the one for 
which the pheromone table entry is the largest.
We note that a pheromone probability can only be reduced following an increase in another 
pheromone probability and that, since this reduction is achieved by multiplying by a non-zero 
factor o f value less than one the value will never reach zero. In addition, when a pheromone 
probability is increased the absolute and relative increase will be larger the smaller the initial 
probability value. This means that information relating to SCPs which are not currently 
favoured is amplified, so that the process of finding more favourable routes when network 
conditions changes is achieved quickly.
6.3.1.2 Use of Pherom one Probabilities for Token Spending and Bid Splitting
Pheromone probabilities can be used to control the order in which SSPs use the tokens allocated 
to them. It is desirable to use those tokens associated with SCPs with larger pheromone values 
first. These SCPs are the ones currently most favoured for that service type, because of their 
performance, proximity to the SSP, or the state of the routes that messages traverse to reach 
them. This approach is particularly beneficial in periods of normal traffic loading (when the 
majority o f allocated tokens will not be used) as it ensures that favoured SCPs are given 
priority. §6.3.2 provides a specification o f an enhanced token spending process incorporating 
pheromone-based SCP selection.
In a distributed token-based strategy pheromone probabilities can be used directly as the weight 
values a,k( j )  that dictate the amount o f expected demand is divided between bids destined for 
different SCP token generation processes. Basing bid splitting on pheromone probabilities 
means that the SSP is more likely to receive tokens for those SCPs it currently favours most. 
The approach also has the advantage that bid splitting will automatically adjust to changes in 
network conditions, for example if  an SCP becomes isolated due to SS.7 resource failure or 
overloaded links/STPs it will not receive significant bids until conditions improve.
6.3.2 D e l a y - b a s e d  L o a d  T h r o t t l i n g
The SCP selection approach described above provides SSPs with information allowing them to 
avoid sending messages through overloaded regions of the network. However, it does not 
explicitly incorporate throttling o f service requests destined for overloaded or unavailable
94 When pheromone probabilities are being used to split bids (cf  §6.3.1.2) the use of closing prices in the 
pheromone updating calculation encourages the SSPs, to send approximately even bids to all SCPs in the 
network. Were this not used, SCPs would receive uneven bids, resulting in sub-optimal token allocations. 
For example, in our scenario SCPs 2/3 would receive smaller bids for all service types then would SCPs 
1/4 and as a result during overload would allocate tokens to lower profit services whilst SCPs 1/4 would 
not be able to satisfy demand for higher profit tokens.
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destinations. In severe failure or overload conditions messages may not be able to reach one or 
more destination SCPs, so these SCPs should not be sent any further requests until the overload 
abates.
To achieve explicit throttling of requests during network overloads, SSPs can monitor the 
response delays for departed (IN and ant) messages. Once response delays for a pre-specified 
number o f departed messages, M , dispatched to SCP i , exceed a pre-specified threshold value 
no further requests are accepted for that SCP. The threshold del a / 5 for detection o f overload, 
denoted Tonsel, can be chosen on the basis of the customer expectations of response delays for IN 
services; example values are outlined in [MacDonald and Archambault, 1994], Alternatively, a 
purely load control oriented approach can be taken: by measuring mean response delays when 
the network is running at target capacity and setting the thresholds somewhat higher than the 
highest o f these mean values.
The pheromone-based SCP selection process continues to send ant messages to all SCPs, 
including those for which no requests are currently being accepted (these SCPs will have very 
small pheromone probabilities but will have ant messages sent to them through the exploration 
scheme). These ant messages provide a means of detecting abatement o f overload for affected 
SCPs: when an ant message returns within a pre-specified threshold delay,96 denoted Tahme, 
service requests can again be accepted for the visited SCP.
To incorporate delay-based load throttling into the token-based strategy we can adopt a 
three-step load throttle. The first step involves the delay-based throttle described above being 
used to create a list o f SCPs for which requests can currently be accepted for the service type in 
question. I f  there are no such SCPs the request is throttled. In the second step a PT throttle is 
applied as previously in order to regulate token usage. In the final step, the token pools for the 
created list o f  SCPs are examined and the request is accepted if  tokens are available. The SCP 
having the highest pheromone probability o f those SCPs for which tokens remain is selected. 
This approach leads to the following modified token spending process:
Step 1: Identify list o f potential SCPs.
Create a list {Iaccepl J} o f all SCPs for which requests o f type j  can be accepted.
If  {Lccep'J is empty then:
95 Clearly different service types involve different processing demands for message pairs, so ideally the 
delay threshold would be service and message specific. We assume that the threshold value will be 
significantly larger than the typical response delay for all message pair types, hence it is not necessary to 
support the additional complexity of maintaining a large number of threshold values.
96 This threshold can be set at a lower level than the detection threshold in order to introduce hysteresis to 
prevent rapid oscillation in the rejection/acceptance of requests.
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Service request is throttled.
STOP.
Step 2: Apply PT throttle.
Select a random number X  uniformly distributed in the range (0.0,1.0).
I f  X  > p a( j )  then:97
Service request is throttled.
STOP.
Step 3: Exam ine Token Pools.
Set u = 0 , where u  is the maximum pheromone probability over those previously examined. 
For all SCPs i e { I acctplJ} do:
If n', ( j )  > 0 , where n\ ( j )  is the number o f  tokens remaining in token pool i j , then:
If  Pklj > u  then:
Set u  = PkiJ.
For all SCPs i e { I omplJ} do:
I f  o 'i ( 7 ) > 0 then:
If  PklJ = u  then:
Service request is accepted and routed towards SCP i ,
Set n\  ( j )  = n\  ( j )  - 1.
STOP.
If v  = 0 then:
Request is throttled.
STOP.
97 When p„(j) *s updated the calculation should not take into account tokens for SCPs not currently 
members of the {Iaccep,j}  list.
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6.3.3 P e r f o r m a n c e  A n a l y s i s  o f  E n h a n c e d  S t r a t e g y
In this section we present the results o f a simulation study o f the performance of the token-based 
strategy, enhanced to incorporate delay-based throttling, pheromone-based bid splitting and 
pheromone-based token spending. The study necessitated updating the simulation model used 
previously to incorporate SS.7 signalling link and STP models. We analyse the performance of 
the strategy both during overload and in the presence of link/STP failures.
6.3.3.1 D escription o f U pdated IN  Sim ulation M odel
To enable analysis of the performance o f the enhanced strategy, SS.7-specific components o f 
the simulation model used in chapter 4 were added to the simulation model described in §5.3. 
The resulting model incorporates SSPs, SCPs, STPs and signalling links, which can be arranged 
into arbitrary network topologies. The particular topology used for this study is shown in 
Figure 6.37.
Figure 6.37: N etw ork used for updated sim ulation model.
As can be seen from Figure 6.37 in the updated model there is, for simplicity, only a single 
signalling link connecting each SSP/SCP to an STP (as noted in chapter 4 SSPs/SCPs are 
usually connected to at least two STPs to provide redundancy). All messages between two 
signalling points follow the same route and no alternative routes are in place in case o f link/STP 
failure. All functionality associated with the SS.7 load controls is omitted from the updated 
model. STPs are arranged in a mesh topology, with each STP being connected to its four nearest
Brendan Jennings Page 207 31/05/01
Chapter 6: Extension o f  Token-based Strategy to Achieve Network-oriented SS.7/IN Load Control
neighbour STPs. STP routing tables are configured to provide the shortest possible routes 
between SSPs and SCPs. In addition, the routing plan ensures that the load on signalling links is 
approximately balanced across the network in conditions where the same volume o f traffic 
arrives at each o f the four SSP groups.
The proximity o f SSPs to SCPs in terms of the number of links that must be traversed by 
messages travelling in either direction is listed in Table 6.2. From this table we can conclude 
that, in conditions where no signalling links or STPs are overloaded, SSPs 1-3 should (if 
possible) use either SCP 1 or SCP 2, SSPs 4-6 should use SCP 1, SSPs 7-9 should used SCP 4 
and SSPs 10-12 should use SCP 3 or SCP 4.
Table 6.2: Proxim ity, in num bers of links to be traversed , of SCPs to SSPs.
SSP Group S C P 1 SCP 2 SCP 3 SCP 4
SSPs 1-3 3 3 4 4
SSPs 4-6 3 4 4 4
SSPs 7-9 4 4 4 3
SSPs 10-12 4 4 3 3
For the simulation runs described here ant messages are generated at intervals o f Taill = 0.25s 
and the values o f the constants used for pheromone probability updating are 
A = 0.00025, B = 0.00025 and C = 0.0 . At the start of the runs the pheromone values are set 
equal for all SCPs (PhJ =0.25 V k , i , j ) .  The exploration probability was set to Pexp!ore =0.05 . 
For delay-based throttling the number of messages that must be delayed beyond the threshold 
delay for an SCP to be deemed overloaded was set to M  = 3 . The onset and abatement 
threshold delays were set to Tomet = 2s, Tahale = 1.? respectively. The network was dimensioned so 
that signalling links do not overload (for convenience we simulate STP/link failures as opposed 
to overloads). We assume that all IN signalling messages are o f length 100 Bytes and that ant 
messages are of length 25 Bytes.
6.3.3.2 Operation During Overload Conditions
To compare performance o f the original and enhanced versions o f the strategy during normal 
and overload conditions we simulate a global overload of service A to a level corresponding to a 
first-offered load of 1.4 Erlangs to each SCP. End-user reattempt behaviour is modelled and all 
SCPs have the same performance characteristics for all service types.
Figure 6.38 shows the mean and individual throughputs o f the four SCPs for the original and 
enhanced strategy. For the original strategy we see that the throughputs o f all four SCPs are well 
balanced during both normal and overload conditions. This is not the case for the enhanced 
strategy. In normal conditions the throughputs o f the SCPs are not balanced, however they
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reflect the proximity o f the SCPs to the various SSP groups. SSPs 1 and 4 are both three links
away from two separate SSP groups, whereas SSPs 2 and 3 are both three links away from only
one SSP group. For this reason the operation o f the pheromone-based SCP selection process 
means that more SSPs favour SCPs 1 and 4 over SSPs 2 and 3, resulting in the former pair 
having higher throughputs during normal load. During overload the throughputs o f the SCPs are 
much more evenly balanced, because SSPs are forced to use tokens for less favoured SCPs once 
all tokens for their favoured SCP are consumed. The sharp dip in throughputs at the end o f the 
first-offered overload is due to sudden drop in the number o f offered requests, which causes 
under-bidding to some SCPs at the same time as over-bidding to others.
— SCP1 Throughput — SCP2 Throughput — - SCP3 Throughput I — ^SCP ¡Throughput — SCP2 Throughput — SCPS Throughput
SCP4 Throughput —  Mean Throughput________________________ | SCP4 Throughput — Mean Throughput_____________________
Figure 6.38: SCP m ean and individual th roughputs. Left: O riginal strategy. R ight: E nhanced  
strategy.
Figure 6.39 and Figure 6.40 demonstrate which SCPs are favoured by the various SSP groups; 
they show the per source SSP group throughputs of the SCPs for the original and enhanced 
versions o f the strategy respectively. For the original version we see that SCPs receive 
approximately equal numbers o f service requests from the four SSP groups during both normal 
and overload conditions.
For the enhanced strategy we see the preferred SCPs of the various SSP groups. SSPs 4-6 and 
SSPs 7-9 send the majority o f their requests to SCP 1 and SCP 4 respectively as these are the 
only SCPs that are three links away. In normal conditions SSPs 1-3 and SSPs 10-12 spread their 
requests between SCPs 1/2 and SCPs 3/4 respectively; the spread is somewhat uneven since the 
pheromone selection process arbitrarily selects only one o f the two favoured SCPs for each 
service type at each SSP. In overload conditions we see that SSPs 1-3 and SSPs 10-12 for the 
most part use SCP 2 and SCP 3 respectively, because SCP 1 and SCP 4 are strongly favoured by 
SSPs 4-6 and SSPs 7-9. In all conditions we see that SSP groups occasionally use less 
favourable SCPs. This is an artefact o f ant messages generated using the exploration scheme, 
which may briefly increase the pheromone probability of one o f the SCPs that are four links 
away.
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Figure 6.39: O riginal strategy. P e r source SSP group SCP throughputs. Top left: SCP 1.
Top right: SCP 2. Bottom  left: SCP 3. Bottom left: SCP 4.
From the discussion above we see the major outcome of employing the enhanced strategy is 
that, all other factors being equal, SSP predominantly use those SCPs in closest proximity. As 
all SSPs use nearby SCPs, the total traffic carried by the SS.7 network will be minimised 
(within the constraints set by the SS.7 routing plan). Figure 6.41 quantifies this effect for the 
current scenario by comparing the total volume of signalling messages in Bytes transmitted by 
SS.7 links for the original and enhanced strategies.98 We see that use of the enhanced strategy 
results in approximately 10% less overall traffic during normal conditions and 15% less during 
overload, though of course the size o f this reduction is highly dependent on factors such as 
network size, routing plan, service session characteristics and the parameters of the 
pheromone-based SCP selection process.
0 300 BOO SCO 1200 1500 1800
Time (s)
98 For the enhanced strategy both IN and ant messages are included in the total.
Brendan Jennings Page 210 31/05/01
Chapter 6: Extension of Token-based Strategy to Achieve Network-oriented SS.7/IN Load Control
Tim e{s) Time (s)
■ SSPs 1 -3 □  SSPs 4-6 DSSPs 7-9 BSSPs 10-12 I
Time (s) Time (s)
Figure 6.40: Enhanced strategy. P er source SSP group SCP throughputs. Top left: SC P 1. 
Top right: SCP 2. Bottom left: SCP 3. Bottom left: SCP 4.
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Figure 6.41: N um ber of SS.7 link packet transm issions for original/enhanced strategies.
6.3.3.3 Operation During Failure Conditions
We now address the operation o f the enhanced strategy during two network failure conditions. 
Firstly we simulate a failure o f the signalling link connecting SCP 1 to STP 8, which isolates 
SCP 1 from all the SSPs in the network. The link in question fails at t = 600s and is brought
Brendan Jennings Page 211 31/05/01
Chapter 6: Extension o f Token-based Strategy to Achieve Network-oriented SS.7/IN Load Control
back into service at t -  1200s, with the volume of traffic offered to the network remaining at 
normal levels throughout. The ideal behaviour in this case is for the SSPs to forward service 
requests which would previously have been sent to SCP 1 to the other SCPs, in effect their spare 
capacity is used to compensate for the unavailability of SCP 1."
Figure 6.42 shows the mean and individual throughputs of the four SCPs. Soon after the link 
failure we see that the mean SCP throughput returns to normal, with all service requests now 
being routed to the three non-isolated SCPs for the failure duration. The explanation for this 
behaviour is as follows: in normal circumstances SSPs favouring SCP 1 send it a large number 
o f ant messages and a much smaller number to the other SCPs. Once SCP 1 is made unavailable 
ant messages do not reach it and hence are not returned to their originating SSP. This is not the 
case for ant messages sent to other SCPs, so pheromone probabilities are quickly increased for 
these SCPs and reduced to almost zero for SCP 1. Ant messages sent in the exploration scheme 
are still sent to SCP 1, so once the link is brought back into service, these messages are returned 
to the SSPs, where they quickly cause the pheromone probabilities for SCP 1 to return to their 
previous levels.
— 3CP1 Tiirou-ghpmt —  SCP2 Throuohpul —  3CP3 Thrcniflhp-ul 
-  SCP4 T h io ijf  ftp tii — Mean Thu omgtiput____________ __________
Figure 6.42: SCP 1 failure. SCP m ean and individual throughputs.
Figure 6.43 shows the per source SSP group throughputs of the SCPs. We see that SCP 1 
normally predominantly services requests originated by SSPs 1-3 and SSPs 4-6. Upon failure 
onset the requests originating from SSPs 1-3 are transferred to SCP 2 (the only remaining SCP 
that is three links away), whilst the requests originating from SSPs 4-6 are transferred to the 
three remaining SCPs (all o f which are four links away from SSPs 4-6). We see that the requests 
are transferred to the other SCPs in an optimal manner, minimising the load carried by the SS.7 
network.
99 We assume here that bids and token allocations are not transferred to SCPs over the SS.7 network, 
rather over some network management infrastructure. If the former were the case SSPs would not receive 
token allocations from SCP 1 and would therefore use the other SCPs by default. However, it may take 
the SSPs as much as one token generation interval to realise that the SCP is unavailable, which will be 
unacceptable in situations where a relatively long token generation interval is in place.
Brendan Jennings Page 212 31/05/01
Chapter 6: Extension of Token-based Strategy to Achieve Network-oriented SS.7/IN Load Control
■ SSPs 1-3 D SSPs*-6 DSSPs 7-9 B SSPs 10-12 f - S S P . «  n S S P s «  O SSPs 7-9 B SS P s 10-12
■ S S P s U  aS S P s4 -6  OSEPS7-9 B SSPs 10-12I « S S P s 1-3 a  SSPs *-6 □  SSPs 7-9 « S S P s  10-12
Q X 0  039 900 1300 -SCO ] H )
Tan* (s)
’r
Figure 6.43: SCP 1 failure. P er source SSP group SCP throughputs. Top left: SC P 1. 
Top right: SCP 2, Bottom left: SCP 3. Bottom left: SCP 4.
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We now simulate a failure of STP 6. which results in the failure of all links connecting it to 
other nodes in the network. The major effect o f this is that SSPs 4-6 become isolated from the 
rest o f the network. Additionally SCP 1 becomes unavailable to SSPs 7-12 (STP 6 is on the 
route from SCP 1 to these SSPs). Since SSPs 4-6 can no longer communicate with any o f the 
SCPs it is clear that they must throttle all arriving IN service requests. As these SSPs cannot 
receive ant messages the only means they have of detecting that network conditions have 
changed is through the delay-based load throttle.
Figure 6.44 shows the mean and individual throughputs of the four SCPs. Once STP 6 fails we 
see that the mean SCP load drops by approximately 25%, reflecting the fact that SSPs 4-6 have 
been isolated. Figure 6.45 shows the per source SSP group throughputs o f the SCPs. After the 
failure we see a severe drop in the throughput of SCP 1, a large portion o f which had previously 
related to SSPs 4-6, as well as a smaller drop in SCP 4 throughput. When STP 6 is brought back 
into service ant messages start to reach their destinations and return to SSPs 4-6 within the 
abatement threshold delay, causing the SSPs to re-commence the acceptance o f service requests. 
A spike in mean SCP load can be observed immediately following failure rectification, this is 
caused by end-user reattempts for requests previously rejected at SSPs 4-6.
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Figure 6.44: STP 1 failure. SCP mean and individual throughputs.
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Figure 6.45: STP 1 failure. Per source SSP group SCP throughputs. Top left: SCP 1. 
Top right: SCP 2. Bottom left: SCP 3. Bottom left: SCP 4.
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6.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 5 introduced an SCP load control strategy based on profit-optimal resource allocation 
by means of tokens that are used to grant an IN service session access to the SCP over its full 
duration. In this chapter we have specified a number of enhancements to the original 
token-based strategy, which:
• Allocate tokens for the different types of resource required by a session. Depending upon
network conditions and offered load, different resource types become susceptible to
overload. By generating tokens for the different types of IN resource required by a service 
session the strategy can protect against overload o f multiple resource types;
• Provide co-ordinated allocation o f tokens for multiple resource instances to maximise
overall network profit. In an IN individual resource instances (in particular SCPs) may 
provide differing performance for the various supported services. To maximise overall 
profit the strategy takes into account the service-specific relative performance o f the 
available resources when allocating tokens;
• Introduce dynamic routing o f IN service requests. The number o f generated tokens is
limited to protect against resource overloads, so it is possible to safely employ dynamic
routing algorithms that select those resources currently providing the best performance for a 
particular service type and that adapt to failures and overloads in the SS.7 network.
These enhancements collectively transform the token-based strategy into a fully network- 
oriented IN load control, where all resources are protected from overload and where the 
allocation of resources to service requests is done in a co-ordinated manner and with the aim of 
maximising overall network profit.
The first part o f this chapter enhanced the original token-based strategy to allocate the resources 
of multiple SCPs in a co-ordinated manner. The enhanced strategy incorporates dynamic routing 
o f IN service requests by SSPs to all network SCPs (or a subset thereof). The strategy was 
shown to maximise the throughputs o f all SCPs during overload and maximise profit through 
selective throttling of service requests. In addition, for networks containing SCPs exhibiting 
varying performance for different service types, the strategy was shown to match service types 
with SCPs in a profit maximising manner.
Three forms o f the enhanced strategy were specified: a centralised version, in which tokens for 
all SCPs are generated by a single process; a distributed version, where tokens are separately 
generated at multiple SCP-specific processes; and a hierarchical distributed version, suitable for 
application in large-scale INs. The hierarchical distributed version involves designated, 
principal SSPs bidding on behalf of a group of local SSPs, receiving bundled token allocations 
and re-distributing these token allocations between themselves and their local SSPs.
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We note that it would be straightforward to extend the SSP token re-distribution algorithm to 
provide protection against SSP overloads. The extended algorithm would take into account the 
demands placed on the SSP by both IN and non-IN services and their profit ratings. In an 
overload triggered by non-IN services, SSP tokens allocated to non-IN services would be 
limited to protect the SSP, whilst higher-profit IN services would remain unaffected. Similarly, 
in an IN overload, the tokens allocated to IN services would be limited in order to ensure 
protection o f both the SSP and the SCP from overload. If  an algorithm of this form were in 
place at SSPs then the token-based strategy would bear close resemblance to the two-stage 
optimisation strategy outlined by [Lodge et a!., 1999; Lodge, 2000].
The second part o f this chapter outlined how the token-based strategy can be enhanced to 
provide control over multiple types of resource. A strategy enhancement that allocates tokens 
for both SCPs and SDPs in a co-ordinated manner was specified. SCPs receive bids from SSPs 
and, for the relevant service types, collate these bids, forward them to SDP token generation 
process(es), receive SDP token allocations, and use these as inputs into their own token 
generation process. SCP and SDP tokens are allocated as pairs, thereby ensuring that SSPs do 
not waste tokens o f one type due to the absence of tokens of the other type.
It would be relatively straightforward to enhance the token-strategy to provide control over 
resource types other than SCP and SDP processing capacity. These resource types could be 
internal or external to the SCPs/SDPs, for example internal TCAP dialogue handlers, or external 
IP-based voice circuits used for end-user interaction. As noted by [Kihl and Rumsewicz, 1996] 
the latter often become the bottleneck in media-stimulated mass call-in focussed overloads, so 
access to them should be strictly controlled. To incorporate allocation o f IP circuits into the 
token-based strategy we can take a similar approach to that used for SDPs: dedicated token 
generation processes to which SCPs send bids. One important difference is that the holding 
times o f these circuits is likely to be of the same order as the token generation interval duration, 
therefore the token generation process must estimate the likelihood of each currently occupied 
circuit being released during the coming interval before allocating tokens for it.
The final part o f the chapter showed how the strategy can be enhanced to provide protection 
against SS.7 overloads, which can seriously degrade the quality-of-service experienced by IN 
service end-users. The approach taken is based on the use of periodically-generated ant 
messages which travel from SSPs to selected SCPs and, upon their return, trigger the updating 
of a table of pheromone probabilities. Pheromone probabilities reflect the relative performance 
o f SCPs from the point o f view o f SSPs. SSPs can use them as inputs into their token spending 
and/or bid splitting processes. Pheromone-based SCP selection is augmented by a delay-based 
load throttle that uses message round-trip delay measurements to detect SS.7/SCP overloads and 
explicitly prevents further requests being sent to the SCP in question whilst overload persists.
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Analysis of the operation of the token-based strategy enhanced with pheromone-based token 
spending / bid splitting and delay-based load throttling showed how SSPs can be encouraged to 
use those SCPs in closest proximity, thereby minimising the load carried by the SS.7 network. 
In addition the strategy can rapidly respond to failure conditions (and indeed link/STP 
overloads) in the SS.7 network, by automatically adapting the routing of service requests (if 
possible) to minimise message loss and unnecessary throttling.
The strategy enhancements outlined in this chapter can, for the most part, be employed together 
to provide an effective load control system, tailored to a particular IN. For example in a large 
network a mix o f centralised, distributed and distributed hierarchical SCP token generation 
processes, mirroring network topology, can be present, together with centralised and distributed 
processes for SDP and IP token generation. SSPs can also employ token re-distribution 
algorithms to protect themselves against overload, use pheromone-based token spending to 
identify and use close SCPs and detect SS.7 overloads/failures by means o f delay-based load 
throttling.
One potential area of difficulty relates to the presence of heterogeneous SCPs in a large 
network: should SSPs use SCPs in close proximity or those giving the best performance for a 
particular service type? Either price- or pheromone-based bid splitting can be employed 
depending on the network operator's answer to this question. We note that one possible solution 
would be to deploy pheromone-based token-spending with price-based splitting: SSPs would 
receive tokens primarily from those SCPs giving the best performance, but would prioritise 
between these on the basis of their proximity.
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CHAPTER 7
C l o s in g  R e m a r k s  a n d  T o p ic s  f o r  F u r t h e r  
R e s e a r c h
Rapid advances in technology, together with market deregulation, is fuelling demand for 
communications, entertainment and financial services delivered over the telecommunications 
infrastructure. The consequent trend towards increased network complexity suggests that 
approaches to performance management o f systems, services and networks will soon need to be 
more responsive, adaptive, proactive, and less centralised than those in use today. This is 
especially true in the context of INs, which will continue to act as the primary 
telecommunications service delivery platforms for years to come, but in which relatively simple, 
node-oriented load control strategies are currently employed.
In this thesis we have argued that node-oriented load control strategies are incapable o f 
managing SS.7/IN traffic load in a manner that provides optimal usage of network resources. 
This viewpoint is supported by chapter 2, where the results of a detailed analysis o f standard 
node-oriented strategies for SS.7 and IN were presented and discussed. These results 
demonstrate that, as well as being inherently flawed, these controls can interact poorly in the 
presence of simultaneous SS.7 and IN resource overloads.
As an alternative to node-oriented strategies we advocate the adoption of network-oriented 
approaches. An example network-oriented strategy, employing a token-based paradigm, was 
proposed and studied. Chapter 5 showed that, in the context of controlling the load o f a single 
SCP, the token-based strategy compares favourably with two SCP control strategies o f 
contrasting sophistication. More significantly, chapter 6 showed how the strategy can be 
extended to provide a fully network-oriented IN load control solution. The enhanced strategy 
was seen to have numerous advantages over traditional approaches; including:
• Dynamic control: the strategy dynamically calculates control parameters, hence it performs 
well in the face o f variations in the volume of offered load, the service mix and resource 
availability levels. Its dynamic nature also means it is inherently scalable to networks of 
arbitrary size;
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• Preventative control: the strategy is predicated on explicit allocation o f critical network 
resources, hence it prevents overloads rather then simply reacting to them;
• Profit-optimal control: the strategy maximises generated profit by allocating resources to 
more valuable services during overload;
• Control o f  multiple heterogeneous resources: the strategy provides control over multiple 
instances of heterogeneous resource types. During an overload it protects those resources 
that are currently the system bottleneck from overload;
• Dynamic routing o f  service requests: the strategy provides a means o f introducing 
co-ordinated dynamic routing of service requests by SSPs to multiple SCPs;
• Minimisation o f  SS.7 network load: the strategy can be enhanced to provide automatic 
selection of those IN resources in close proximity to an SSP, thus minimising the load 
carried by the SS.7 network;
• Integration with legacy systems: token allocations can be straightforwardly converted into 
control parameters such as gap intervals or PT coefficients, so legacy SSPs (employing 
traditional load throttles) can be integrated into the overall network-oriented control 
framework;
• Understandable paradigm: allocation of tokens is an easily understood concept, hence the 
strategy provides a useful paradigm for explanation of the operation of the IN performance 
management system to a non-technical audience.
In light o f these advantages we believe that there would be significant benefits for the IN 
network operator in implementing the token-based load control strategy. These benefits arise 
from the strategy’s direct focus on the load control needs of the operators in the context o f a 
more open, dynamic IN environment. This focus contrasts sharply with that o f traditional 
node-oriented approaches, where equipment vendors design controls to maximise throughput of 
individual switches without regard to overall network performance.
In the remainder of this chapter we outline and discuss ways in which the token-based strategy 
could be further enhanced. §7.1 discusses potential enhancements that could provide improved 
load control performance and facilitate increased implementation flexibility. §7.2 outlines two 
alternative application areas in which the token-based strategy could provide a solution to 
performance management problems. Finally, §7.3 discusses some broader research topics 
relating to the full integration of network-oriented load control strategies into a fuller network 
management solution incorporating long-term planning o f network resource deployment.
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7.1 FURTHER ENHANCEMENT OF THE TOKEN-BASED 
STRATEGY
The token-based strategy specified in chapters 5 and 6 was shown to provide near-optimal load 
control performance in a wide range of operating conditions. Nevertheless, we envisage a 
number o f further enhancements to the strategy that may provide more optimal control and 
greater implementation flexibility in the context o f a real IN environment.
Alternative Token Spending Algorithms
Simulation results for the token-based strategy have shown that the use of percentage thinning 
in the token spending process leads to wastage o f tokens during high load, resulting in 
somewhat sub-optimal resource usage. Other means of controlling the rate at which tokens are 
spent can be employed; for example, chapter 5 shows that token allocations can be converted 
into CG gap intervals. It should be possible to convert token allocations into leaky bucket or 
Window parameters. The relative merits of these alternative approaches on the degree of token 
wastage should be explored.
The other component of the token spending process is the algorithm used to select between one 
of a number of resources for which tokens remain. The approach taken in chapter 6 was simply 
to select that resource for which the largest number currently remain. However, this was seen to 
lead to unbalanced loads when the network contains heterogeneous resources. Approaches such 
as selecting resources proportionally to the number of tokens remaining for them, should be 
investigated.
Control of SSP, IP and Other Resources Types
As outlined in chapter 6, it appears relatively straightforward to enhance the token-based 
strategy to provide explicit allocation of capacity of resource types other then SCPs and SDPs. 
For load control o f SSPs we envisage enhancement o f the SSP token redistribution algorithm to 
take into account the local processing demands of both IN and non-IN services. For control o f 
IPs the approach would be similar to that used for SDPs, but would take into account that the 
critical resource is likely to be voice circuits, not processing capacity.
Integrated control of multiple IN resource types appears very attractive, however it should be 
noted that in many overload cases the critical resource is actually the limited pool o f human 
agents available to answer end-user calls. Therefore, it may be very beneficial to allow manual 
configuration of the token generation processes with the number of operators available to 
answer calls to a specific number (or set of numbers), so that tokens are allocated accordingly. 
This would minimise the number of end-users receiving engaged tones and free up network 
resources for other, profitable sessions.
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Co-ordinated allocation of tokens for more then a small number of different resource types is 
likely to result in very complex token generation processes. It is an open issue as to whether this 
complexity is justifiable, or whether alternative, simpler solutions would suffice. One such 
solution would be to run completely independent token generation processes for the various 
types of resource required to process service sessions, although this runs the risk of more 
significant levels o f token wastage.
Enhanced Resource Capacity Estimation
The token generation algorithms make two significant simplifying approximations regarding the 
characteristics o f  resources for which they generate tokens. In real systems these 
approximations may be unacceptable and lead to sub-optimal control. The first approximation is 
that the processing capacity required at each resource for a service session is constant for all 
sessions of the same service. In reality the amount of capacity required to process individual 
messages may increase the higher the resource’s current level o f utilisation. Therefore, an 
appropriate non-linear relationship between processing capacity requirements and the amount of 
capacity already allocated should be used during token generation.
The second simplifying assumption is that once a service request is accepted all processing 
capacity required by that session is consumed within the current control interval. Clearly service 
sessions may involve lengthy delays relating to end-user interactions. Hence, at the time of a 
given token generation process invocation, resources will have associated ‘residual’ demands 
that may be ‘exercised’ during the coming control interval. The presence o f these demands 
effectively reduces available capacity and should be taken into account if the target utilisation is 
not to be exceeded.100 To do so, it would be necessary to maintain approximate estimates of the 
mean delays for the various end-user interaction phases of a session. These values could be used 
to calculate probabilities that sessions currently in a interaction phase will require processing 
capacity in the coming control interval; these probabilities could then be used to calculate the 
actual amount of capacity that can be safely allocated.
Other factors relating to resource characteristics may also be of relevance to the accuracy o f the 
token generation process. For example, many SCPs employ multi-processor hardware 
architectures, so processing overheads relating to inter-processor communication and 
management tasks can increase significantly during periods of high utilisation. All such factors 
would need to be taken into account during the design of an optimal token generation algorithm. 
Clearly it would be in the interests of equipment vendor to design customised token generation
100 In our studies the impact of residual demands was minimal, due both to the wastage of a number of 
tokens during overload and the fact that, for the services modelled, processing requirements were 
approximately balanced over the session duration. The latter means that the impact of sessions claiming 
residual demands is in effect offset by new sessions that do not use all the allocated capacity immediately.
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algorithms that ensure that the resource in question meets performance targets agreed with the 
network operator.
Enhanced SSP Bidding
The bidding mechanism used by SSPs in the versions of token-based strategy specified in this 
thesis is very simple: it doesn’t take into account long term trends in offered traffic. We can 
envisage a more advanced approach, in which SSPs would have access to a database containing 
records relating to previous demands for services and the results of previous bids (token prices, 
percentage of received tokens actually used etc.). This database could facilitate SSPs 
automatically detecting daily traffic patterns and changing bids accordingly. Also, by comparing 
current arrival rates with normal patterns, it should be possible to detect higher-than-average 
loads indicating onset o f overload conditions.
Adaptive Invocation of Token Generation Process
One of the fundamental limitations of the token-based strategy is that token generation takes 
place at set intervals. Tokens are only valid for the duration of the control interval for which 
they are generated, therefore the strategy is vulnerable to delays and errors in the transmission
of SSP bids and token allocations. In addition, frequent invocation of the token generation 
process may represent a significant drain on SCP resources and add significantly to the load 
carried by the SS.7 network.101
Problems associated with limited token lifetime can be solved by translating token allocations 
into parameters of load throttles such as Call Gapping or Window, as alluded to previously. 
Once put in place the throttles can use these parameters until the arrival, at an arbitrary time in 
the future, o f the next token allocation. This also suggests an alternative to periodic invocation 
of the token generation process(es): SSPs could send updated bids at arbitrary times, for 
example when they detect abnormal increases in the level of demand for one or more services!02 
The receiver o f updated bids could then invoke the token generation process, using both the new 
bids and old bids (the last submitted bids for those SSPs that have not submitted updated bids).
To further extend the alternative approach the resources themselves can be allowed to invoke 
the token generation process when they detect a change in available capacity. With this 
enhancement the token-based strategy could be used as an tool for automatically re-configuring 
the network when new resources are added, resource capacity changes, or the services supported 
by the resources change.
101 The latter is relevant for the scenario where bids and token allocations are transferred over the SS.7 
network.
102 This approach could work particularly well if, as described above, SSPs maintain databases that can be 
used to detect longer-term traffic patterns. Then SSPs could, for example, submit updated bids in 
response to expected hourly and daily changes in arrival rates.
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Clearly the design of algorithms to achieve the ‘intelligent’ bidding behaviour described above 
_is a non-trivial task and it is difficult to quantity the resultant benefits. However, this represents 
an interesting topic for further research, since it deals with the application o f longer-term 
measurements in load control. I f  a success such an approach would be a significant 
advancement over current approaches, which invariably use only short term measurements to 
enable reaction to overload onset.
7.2 APPLICATION OF THE TOKEN-BASED STRATEGY TO 
OTHER CONTROL PROBLEMS
The token-based load control strategy is generic in nature: it does not depend on particular 
characteristics o f IN resource or services in order to provide load control. There is no reason 
why the strategy can not be applied to control problems other then the protection o f IN 
resources. In this section we outline how the strategy could be applied in two alternative 
application areas where load control and performance management is becoming a major issue. 
The first area is Global System fo r  Mobile communication (GSM) networks enabled with 
Customised Access fo r  Mobile network Enhanced Logic ('CAMEL) capabilities, which bear close 
resemblance to the IN architecture. The second is large-scale Voice-over-IP (VoIP) networks, 
which also adopt distributed architectures for the delivery o f telecommunications services.
7.2.1 L o a d  C o n t r o l  f o r  GSM CAMEL
International roaming in GSM networks has been a reality for a number of years, however in 
general the roaming end-user does not have the ability to seamlessly access the services 
available in his/her home network. For example, when accessing voicemail the roaming 
end-user has to prefix his/her abbreviated dialling number with a full international code. The 
CAMEL initiative was set up in order to develop standards that will facilitate network operators 
offering end-users all the services to which they subscribe in a manner familiar to them. 
Existing CAMEL standards also allow for roaming of Prepaid customers between networks, a 
factor that is expected to greatly accelerate introduction of CAMEL capabilities between 
network operators. CAMEL standards specify the interface between the GSM  Service Control 
Function (GSMSCF) and the Mobile Switching Centre (MSC), thereby allowing the MSC 
remotely invoke service sessions when requested. An example scenario is illustrated in 
Figure 7.1 below.
When an end-user roams to a new network the local MSC/VLR detect that they do not have a 
profile for that user and contact the user’s HLR, which forwards the required data, updates its 
own records and removes the users profile from the VLR with which the end-user was last 
associated. Based on the data received from the HLR the visited VLR will update the trigger 
table in the visited MSC so that when the end-user requests a service (for example by entering
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the abbreviated code for voicemail access) the MSC can detect the request and forward it, over 
the CAMEL interface, to the home SCP. For the duration of the service session the home SCP 
directs the GSMSSF in the visited MSC and, upon session completion, updates billing records 
as appropriate. For roaming Prepaid users there will be frequent communication between the 
visited MSC and the home SCP in order to track the customer’s remaining credit. This will lead 
to a significant amount of signalling traffic crossing the network boundary.
HOME NETWORK VISITED NETWORK
I G S M S C F
ISmSST
Voicemail
System
International Roaming
Authentication
System
CAMEL Phase 2
HLR: Home Location Register MSC: Mobile Switching Centre
VLR: Visited Location Register BSC Base Station Controller
GSMSCF: GSM Service Control Function MAP: Mobile Application Part
GSMSSF: GSM Service Switching Function
Figure 7.1: International Roaming with CAMEL.
Signalling traffic crossing the network boundary represents a potential source of overload o f the 
SCP(s) in the home network. O f course the situation is further complicated by the sources o f the 
overload traffic being outside the control o f the home network operator. Clearly it is necessary 
to implement some form of load control at the network boundary. The ability o f the token-based 
strategy to protect high-revenue services whilst enforcing whatever SLAs may be in place 
between the two operators make it an attractive solution to this problem.
7.2.2 L oad C ontrol for  L arg e-Scale V oice-over-IP Netw o rk s
A technology currently growing in importance is Internet Telephony, which involves the 
delivery o f a full range of telephony services using the Internet Protocol (IP) and is therefore 
often referred to as Voice-over-IP. Currently there is explosive growth in the number o f 
standards related to IP-telephony convergence. Here we briefly discuss two o f  the main
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approaches. The first, and most mature, is based on the H.323 series of standards from the ITU 
[ITU, 1996] and complimentary work from the ETSI TIPHON project [ETSI, 1999], while the 
second is being developed by the IETF and is based on their Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
and Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) specifications.
7.2.2.1 TIPH O N  H.323-based Voice-over-IP
The Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonisations Over Networks (TIPHON) 
specifications are aimed at facilitating a scaleable, carrier-class H.323-based architecture. 
Central to the H.323 standard is the Gatekeeper functional entity, which is broadly analogous to 
a switch in a traditional telephony network. The H.323 Gatekeeper has been generalised into a 
‘cloud’ of Gatekeepers by ETSI TIPHON and is likely to be further decomposed into smaller 
functional blocks such as Name Servers (performing address mapping) and Authentication 
Servers (maintaining authentication and authorisation information) by equipment vendors. 
These decomposed functional blocks will no longer be replicated in every Gatekeeper node, 
instead Gatekeepers will access them through an INAP-like protocol.
Large-scale H.323 implementations will contain multiple instances of the various resource types 
accessed by multiple Gatekeepers to provide end-user services. An example network scenario is 
depicted in Figure 7.2. It shows multiple Gatekeepers, which compete not only for Name Server 
and Authentication Server resources but also for:
• Gateways: required by Gatekeepers for calls that are routed to the destination network(s) 
accessible through a particular gateway;
• Multi-point Control Units: required by Gatekeepers to support centralised multi-party calls;
• Service Control Points: required by Gatekeepers to support advanced IN-based services.
Figure 7.2: TIPH O N  N etw ork Scenario.
The token-based load control strategy could easily be applied in the scenario described above, 
with tokens being allocated to the Gatekeepers for the various resource types. As previously the
Brendan Jennings Page 225 31/05/01
Chapter 7: Closing Remarks and Topics for Further Research
strategy would facilitate effective load control, dynamic routing and profit-optimal selective 
throttling of service requests during overload. There may also be' potential to enhance the 
strategy to provide control over bandwidth allocated in the IP network. We note that such an 
approach is likely to require integration with traffic control strategies (such as Multi-Protocol 
Label Switching (MPLS) or Diffserv) operating at the IP layer.
1.2.2.2 SIP/SC TP-based Voice-over-IP
An alternative framework for the development of Voice-over-IP networks is being developed 
within the IETF and, is to a large degree, centred around the SIP and SCTP specifications. SIP 
is a generic protocol enabling the set-up of communication sessions between end systems and 
proxy servers. It incorporates mechanisms for terminal capability negotiation, caller and callee 
authentication, personal mobility, and simple telephony-related features like call forwarding and 
call transfer. SCTP enables the reliable exchange of (SS.7) signalling messages over and IP- 
based network infrastructure, thus providing a means of transparently supporting existing 
telephony-related services in an IP-based environment.
The use o f SCTP means that it will be possible to introduce network elements like SCPs with 
SCCP entities that communicate directly with other IP-based entities through use o f the SCTP 
message transfer service; thus SCTP replaces the MTP in this context. SCTP contains window- 
based flow control procedures, however research work on the analyses of their performance has 
commenced only recently. For example, it is not yet clear how these controls would operate in 
the type o f overload scenario addressed in this thesis and what impact they may have on the 
operation of application-level controls such as ACG or the token-based strategy. Clearly issues 
such as these will need to be carefully considered before large-scale SIP/SCTP-based systems 
are deployed, thus analysis of these systems from the load control viewpoint is likely to become 
an important research topic.
7.3 BROADER RESEARCH TOPICS RELATING TO 
NETWORK-ORIENTED LOAD CONTROL
To conclude we will briefly discuss two longer-term directions for research relating to network- 
oriented load control. Throughout the thesis we have considered that the main goal of a 
network-oriented load control is to ensure that network resources are used in a globally optimal 
fashion in the face of relatively short-term variations in end-user demand for services. 
Furthermore, the major means of achieving this goal during high load conditions is selective 
throttling of service requests. It has been implicitly assumed that the load control strategy can 
directly influence neither the behaviour of end-users, nor the ‘structure’ o f the network (in terms 
o f which resources support which services, where resources are located in the network efc.). 
However, this need not be the case if load control is developed into a longer-term activity that is
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integrated with both network design/provisioning (thereby influencing network structure) and 
pricing policies (thereby exerting some influence over end-user behaviour).
Load control strategies attempt to achieve optimal resource utilisation within the constraints set 
by the physical and logical structure o f the network. Networks are initially designed to optimise 
resource usage for an expected traffic mix, however as new services are introduced and end-user 
demands change the network invariably becomes more susceptible to overload. Data gathered 
by a network-oriented load control could be used to automatically detect long term traffic trends 
and form recommendations regarding redistribution of resources in the network. For example, 
with the token-based strategy increases in the mean closing price for tokens relating to a specific 
service could indicate that the service should be supported by more SCPs. I f  successful the 
approach could be taken a step further in future object-based systems, by having the load control 
strategy itself initiate the automatic redistribution of resources in response to changing traffic 
conditions.
In future networks supporting multimedia-based services end-users are likely to be charged, at 
least in part, on the basis of bandwidth allocated to, or used during, a service session. Moreover, 
it is likely that prices per unit bandwidth can be varied dynamically by the service provider, 
depending on prevailing conditions in the network. Network-oriented load control strategies 
may provide a valuable input into the bandwidth price-setting process. For example, the strategy 
could detect changes in end-user demands and recommend that bandwidth prices are increased 
so as to discourage end-users and thereby the onset of overload conditions.
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APPENDIX A
S p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  SS.7/IN Q u a s i - A n a ly t i c  
M o d e l
This appendix provides a detailed specification of the SS.7/IN quasi-analytic model used in 
chapter 4 for the analysis of the performance of standard SS.7/IN load controls. An overview of 
the model structure and the techniques used is provided in §4.2. Here we present the model in 
terms o f the specifications for the three sub-model types: §A.l specifies the ISUP user part 
sub-model, §A.2 specifies the IN user part sub-model and §A.3 specifies the resource 
sub-model. In these specifications, the points at which information is passed between the 
various sub-models is indicated.
A.l ISUP USER PART SUB-MODEL SPECIFICATION
This section specifies the iterative procedure to calculate the traffic load offered to the SS.7/IN 
network resources by the ISUP user part entities. The procedure takes into account the relevant 
characteristics of the service supported (ISUP telephony) and the operation o f the ISUP load 
throttle described in §4.1.3.2.
Step 1: Calculate offered traffic load.
Set n = n + 1,
where n denotes the number of the current iteration interval (n = 0 initially).
For all UPs u e{U ,SLT}, where u denotes an arbitrary UP and denotes the set of all
ISUP UPs, do:
For all UPs u'e {U,sup} , where »V  u , do:
//Ascertain number o f  ISUP service requests fo r  this iteration.
Generate a random number, ^uUMu(tn), using an Poisson distribution with the 
pre-specified mean for UP u for the current iteration interval (denoted by tn). 
<f,u,iAM,u‘(tn) 's the number o f first-offered ISUP service requests (equivalent to the
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number o f generated IAM messages) arriving at UP u for destination UP u' during 
iteration interval tn .
where y uJAMy(tn) and Au [AKi u,(tn) are respectively the reattempted and total number o f 
ISUP service requests arriving at UP u with destination UP u' for iteration interval tn .103
/ /  Generate other ISUP service session message types.
J 'u . A C M . u 'O n )  =  8 u J A M , ’
where Su IAM u.(tn_[) denotes the number of IAM messages that arrived at UP u from UP 
u' during the iteration interval ,104
If n -  TISUP AmWER > 0 , where n denotes the number of the current iteration and Tlsup MSWER 
denotes the number o f iteration intervals used to model the answer delay for the ISUP 
service, then:
K . A N K t . M n )  =  ^  )  •
Else:
Set = ° -
If ri~T,sup,talk > 0 > where Tisuptalk is the number of iteration intervals used to model the 
conversation delay for the ISUP service, then:
h , R E L y  ( ? n  ) = ^ u .A N M .u ' TALi  ^‘
Else:
Set =
103 For brevity we omit the specification of the procedure for calculation of the volume of reattempt 
traffic. This procedure estimates reattempt volumes as follows. Whenever service requests are throttled or 
service session messages discarded (with the exception of ISUP REL/RSC messages) the number of 
relevant messages is calculated. Then, in accordance with each service’s reattempt probability, the 
volume of resulting reattempts is calculated and these are scheduled to occur evenly across a range of 
future iteration intervals. Scheduled reattempt volumes, along with estimates of proportions of these that 
are first, second, third etc. reattempts, are stored until the relevant iteradon interval. At each iteration 
interval, reattempts that have already attempted the maximum number of times are discounted and the 
remainder added to the first-offered attempt volume.
104 We define numbers of arrived and generated messages for the other ISUP (and later IN) messages 
types in a similar manner.
105 Note that we assume that the initiator of the service request (the caller) always initiates the end of the 
session by going on-hook first, thereby triggering the sending of a REL message to the callee’s ISUP UP. 
For simplicity we assume a constant conversation delay here, however in the results presented in 
chapter 4 the model has been modified to support variable length conversation delays for ISUP sessions.
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Step 2: Perform ISUP load throttling procedure.
F orallU P s UE{Um p} do:
For all UPs u'e {Ulsup} , where « '*  u , do:
//A pp ly  ISUP load throttling procedure. I f  load level equals 1 throttle lAM s only, i f  load  
/ /  level equals 2 throttle all ISUP message types.
If k,SUPuM. = 1, where kISUPuy is the ISUP load level at UP u for destination UP u ', then: 
Set K ja u A K )  = 0 •
If k,sur,»s = 2 then:
For all message types j e { J lsup}, where j  denotes an arbitrary message type and 
{J!SUP} denotes the set o f all ISUP message types, do:
Set ¿„.,.„,(0 = 0 .
/ /  Schedule reattempts fo r  the rejected service requests.
/ /  The values o f  message arrival rates from  the ISUP UPs (along with those fo r  the IN  UPs) are 
/ /  now inputted into the MTP model (cf. §A.3) The h fIP  model then provides the number o f  
/ /  messages arriving at the ISUP UPs during the current iteration interval.
Step 3: Calculate incoming traffic.
For all UPs u e {U!sup} , do:
For all UPs u 'e  {U,sup} , where u u , do:
For all message types j  e  {JISUP} do:
Set ¿ „ , , , ( 0  = 0 .
For all UPs u e  {U1SUP} do:
For all UPs u'e {Ulsup} , where u , do:
For all links I e  {L,splTll} , where I denotes an arbitrary link and {LISPIITu} is the set of 
links that directly input load into UP u ,106 do:
For all message types j e { J ISUP} do:
106 For our network topology these will be the pair of links connecting the STP pair to the SSP in 
question.
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Set 8u jy (tn) = 8y ]y {tn) + Pu-jjM - C
Bj
where p u jlu (t„) is the load on link / during iteration interval tn due to messages 
o f type j  originated by UP u' and destined for UP u ; C is the capacity o f link I 
(we assume all links have the same capacity) in bits per iteration interval; and Bj 
is the length in bits of messages of type j .
Step 4: Calculate probability of arrival of CIs whilst T29 timers are inactive.
F ora llU P s u e { U ISUP} do:
For all UPs u'e  {Ulsup}, where uV  u , do:
/ /  Calculate probability o f  TFC arrival under assumption o f  Poisson arrival process. 
/ /  This is also the probability o f  an increase in the UP's load level fo r  the destination UPs 
/ /  indicated by the TFCs.
Set P U O  = P a ,u ,M  =
where Pa  „y (/„) is the probability of arrival of a Cl for destination UP u' at UP u during
the portion o f iteration t„ in which timer the relevant T29 tim er is inactive; /*„'„•(/„) is 
the probability that the ISUP throttle load level of UP u for destination UP u' (denoted 
kisup.u.u') *s increased (if possible) during iteration interval tn ; Su JFC „.(/„) is the number 
o f TFCs relating to destination UP u' arriving at UP u during interval tn ; tT29 is the 
length o f timer T29 ; and r r29 u u {tn) is the length of time the T29  timer for UP u' at UP 
u is active during the iteration interval tn .
Step 5: Calculate new load levels for the next iteration.
F orallU P s u e { U !SUP} do:
For all UPs u’e  {U/sup} , where u'± u , do:
/ /  Use random number generation to decide i f  CIs are actually received.
Generate a random number X  uniformly distributed in the range (0,1).
I f  X  <Pjy (t„) then:
/ /  Increment load level i f  possible, set/reset T30 and decide C l arrival time.
If kISUPuu. < K ISUP , where KISUP is the maximum load level for ISUP UPs, then:
Set k lsUP uy  -  kJSUP uy  +1.
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Generate a random number Y  uniformly distributed in the range
( h l 9  ~  TT29 ,u ,u '(^n )^T 29)  ■
Set tT29uu, ( t ^  ) = tT19 — Y .
Set t T30u ii, — tT29,
where rn0ll ll. is the length o f time for which the 730 timer for UP u' at UP u has 
been active.
Else:
/ /  I f  T30 expiry decrement load level, otherwise update T30 active duration.
I f  r no „y  > 0 and rno uy = A t T29, where A is a pre-specified integer, then:
I f  k ,sup,s > 0 *en:
Ir — ]c  1
ISUP,u,u% JSUP,u,u' 1 ’
^  kisup,u,u' > 0 then.
Set rnouy = tT29. //Restart T30 .
Else:
Set Tn0u u, = 0 . / /  7’30 inactive.
Else:
r mu.u' = r7-30.1/.u' + h a  ■ //Increment T 3 0 .
A.2 IN USER PART SUB-MODEL SPECIFICATION
This section specifies the iterative procedure to calculate the traffic load offered to the SS.7/IN 
network resources by IN user parts. The model takes into account the relevant characteristics of 
the Freephone and Televoting services, as well as the operation o f the ACG load throttling 
procedure and the SCCP load throttle.
Step 1: Calculate offered traffic load.
/ /  Offered traffic load is calculated in the same manner as used fo r  ISUP (c f §A .l), so we 
/ /  omit a specification o f  this procedure here.
Step 2: Perform ACG load throttling procedure.
For all UPs u e  {UIN} , where {UM} is the set of IN UPs, do:
For all UPs u’e  {Uw } , where u u , do:
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/ /  Apply ACG load throttling procedure. Freephone first, then Televoting.
Set X \  „  u' ( O  = ----------------A" - - 'y(/,,)---------------.U , r  l , U  v  n /  « /  \  ,  v
1 +  Su.FREEPHONE.u'Vn) ' *  u,F\,u' V n )
Set = -----------—■a-,'(l;) -------—,
1 +  Su.TELEVO m -G .u'Vn) ' ^  u.TI.u' U n )
where .FI and 71 are used to denote the first messages in Freephone and Televoting 
sessions respectively; X"u FUU u (t„) is the number o f service requests for 
Freephone/Televoting arriving at UP u for destination UP u' during iteration interval tn \ 
Su ,F .../T ...,u '(t n )  *s gap interval in place for Freephone/Televoting at UP u for UP u' 
during iteration interval tn ; and A’u FUTlu, (tn) is the number o f Freephone/Televoting 
requests accepted by the ACG throttle at UP u for UP u' during iteration interval tn. 
//Schedule reattempts fo r  the rejected service requests.
Step 3: Perform SCCP load throttling procedure.
For all UPs u e  {UM} do:
For all UPs u'e {UIN}, where u ' * u ,  do:
For all message types j  e  {.//v}, where {J^}  is the set o f all IN message types (including 
the ACG message type), do:
Set À - ,(r„) = j ^SCCP.u.u'^n)
Ksccp
"  u .j .u  ( ( n )  >
where kXCPllJ1.(tn) is the SCCP load level of UP u for UP u' during iteration interval 
t„\ K sccp *s the maximum SCCP load level; and \  j  „,(/„) is the number of type j  
messages accepted by the SCCP throttle at UP u for UP u' during iteration 
interval tn .
/ /  Schedule reattempts fo r  the rejected service requests.
/ /  The values o f  message arrival rates from  the IN  UPs (along with those fo r  the ISUP UPs) are 
/ /  now inputted into the M TP model (cf. §A.3) The MTP model then provides the number o f  
/ /  messages (both service-related messages and ACGs) arriving at the IN  UPs.
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Step 4: Calculate incoming traffic.
/ /  In co m in g  tra ffic  ra tes  are  ca lcu la ted  in the sam e m anner as u sed  f o r  ISU P  ( c f  § A .l) , so  we  
/ /  o m it a  specifica tion  o f  th is p ro ced u re  here.
Step 5: Update ACG Gap interval.
F or all U Ps u e { U IN} do:
For all U Ps u ' e  {U1N} , w here  u ' * u , do:
I f  $ u,freephone_a c g , > ® > w h ere ^ u ,freephone_a c g ,u ‘On) *s num ber o f  F reephone- 
re la ted  A C G  m essages fo r U P u' arriv ing a t UP u during  iteration  in terval tn , then:
$ et S  u .freephone ,u (^ii+i) =  the h ighest o f  the values indicated in A C G s received  th is
iteration interval.
^  ^ u.televoting_ACGy O „ )> ^  w here SuTEL£VOTD{q ACG u-{tn) is the num ber o f  T elevo ting- 
re la ted  A C G  m essages fo r U P  «' arriving at UP u during iteration  in terval tn , then:
Set §  u,tele voting ,ui 0n+\) = the h ighest o f  the values indicated  in A C G s received  th is
iteration interval.
Step 6: Calculate probability of arrival of CIs whilst T29 timers are inactive.
/ /  The p ro b a b ility  o f  C l  a rriva l is ca lcu la ted  in the sam e m anner as u sed  fo r  ISU P  ( c f  § A .l) , so  
/ /  w e o m it a  sp ec ifica tion  o f  this p ro ced u re  here.
Step 7: Update SCCP load control’s load levels.
/ /  The SC C P  lo a d  co n tro l updates its load  levels in response to  C l  a rriva ls in a  m anner  
/ /  ana logous to ISU P, (cf. § A .l) , so  we om it a specification o f  this p ro ced u re  here.
A.3 RESOURCE SUB-MODEL SPECIFICATION
W e now  specify  the procedure for calculation  o f  the u tilisation  and queue lengths fo r 
links/SC Ps, TTC genera tion  rates and SCP overload levels. A t each iteration  in terval the load 
offered to  all resources in the  netw ork  fo r the iteration interval is com puted . T h is load  includes 
load held in the  resources queue at the start o f  the iteration in terval, load a rriv ing  d irec tly  from  
U Ps and load arriv ing  from  o ther resources in the netw ork.
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Step 1: Initialisation.107
Set n = 0.
For all UPs u do:
For all message types j  do:
For all links 1 do:
Set P'jAo) = °.
where p u jj( t0) is the load, in Erlangs, o f messages o f type j  from UP u carried by 
link / for iteration interval t0.
For all links I do:
Set m ,=Q ,
where ml is the number of distinct grouping of messages held in the link / queue. These 
groupings consist of messages offered to the link queue in previous iterations that have not 
yet been processed by the link.
Set Oj = FALSE,
where o, is the overload status o f link I .
Set q,(t0) =0,
where q,(t0) is the link / input queue size, in bits, at the end of iteration interval t0 .
Step 2: Calculate message rates offered to network resources by UPs.
For all UPs u do:
For all message types j  do:
For all links I e  {Lo u r p m , where {L0UTPUTji} is the set of links to which UP u directly 
outputs load, do:
/ /  Calculate the mean volumes o f messages offered, denoted <puJJ(t„), individually fo r  
//each  UP u, message type j  and link I 08
107 This step is executed only once: at the first iteration o f the model. The other steps are executed at each 
iteration.
108 These values are calculated by taking into account the messages generated by the UP models described 
in §A.l and §A.2, as well as the routes in the network over which traffic must pass to reach its 
destination. We omit a detailed specification o f these calculations here (they are specific to the network 
topology under study).
Brendan Jennings Page A8 31/05/01
Appendix A: Specification of SS.7/IN Quasi-Analytic Model
Step 3: Calculate resource utilisation and queue lengths.1”
For all links I do:110
/ /  Calculate the number o f  messages o f  the various types arriving at the link queue.
For every link l 's  { L ^ , ^ }  do:
For all UPs u do:
For all message types j  do:
Bi
where yjjrJ {t„) is the number o f UP u originated type j  messages from link V 
arriving to link I during iteration interval tn .
/ /  Add the new message grouping to the queue.
Set m, = mt +1.
For all UPs u do:
For all message types j  do:
L
Set xu j l  mi ( O  = <puJJ(tn)+  >
/'=1
I 'e {LlSPLTj}
where xuj lmi(tn) is the number o f messages o f type j  from UP u contained in 
grouping number at link I .
U J  nt,
Z Z I X v . / v - 8;
S e t p / ( 0  = - °1>lm=1c ------------- ,
where U  is the number o f UPs, J  is the number o f  message types, and p , ' ( tn) is the 
total load in Erlangs offered to link / during iteration tn.
/ /  I f  calculated queue size is larger than queue capacity truncate (he new message 
//grouping.
If  p,'(tn) -C > Qmm , where is the maximum size o f the link queue in bits, then:
For all UPs u do:
109 For convenience we do not, in the remaining specifications in this section, index message counts and 
utilisation values by their destination UP.
110 Taking into account the restrictions on the ordering o f  these calculations imposed by the topology and 
routing scheme o f the network under study.
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For all message types j  do:
Set p t (/„) — Qm x IC  ■
/ /  Schedule reattempts fo r  the messages discarded as a result o f  truncating the 
/ /  message grouping.
If  p ,'( tn)<  1.0 then:
/ /  A ll message groupings in the queue are processed by the link  
For all UPs u :
For all message types j  do:
//L oop  through message groupings in the queue until the calculated link utilisation 
//exceeds 1 (full link utilisation).
While Pi(tn)<  1.0 and m < m t do:
Set m = m +1 .
For all UPs u do:
For all message types j  do:
Set m, = 0.
Set a ( U  = I Z A j ; ( 0 .
where p,( tn) is the utilisation o f link / .
Else:
/ /N o t all message groupings are processed by the link. 
Set m = 0 . / /  First initialise variables.
Set Pl(tn) = 0 .
For all UPs u do:
For all message types j  do:
Set p UJJ(tn) = 0.
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Set ( U + ~
{ /  J
Set a W - I Z A j A ) -
V=1 /= l
/ /  Calculated link utilisation will exceed 1, so adjust utilisation values and 
/ /  numbers o f  messages, relating to the partially-processed message grouping, that 
//rem ain in the queue.
If  > 1.0 then:
For all UPs u do:
For all message types j  do:
Set
Set x ■
/ /  Remove processed message groupings from  the queue (by changing indices 
/ /  o f  the remaining message groupings)
For all UPs u do:
For all message types j  do:
Set m "= m .
W hile m”< m .+ 1 do:
Set xu J  J ~ xuJ,l1m"(fn') •
Set m"= m”+1.
Set ml = mt -  m + 1 .
U J  m.
Set ■
m= I  j *si  m= t
Set p , (/„) = 1.0. //L in k fu lly  utilised this iteration interval.
II Calculate the input queue length and utilisation fo r  SCPs in the same manner as used fo r  the 
//links. For brevity we omit a detailed specification o f  these calculations here'.“
111 Calculation o f SCP utilisation and queue size will generally take place at some mid point during the 
calculation o f  link utilisation and queue lengths. In our case it takes place after the calculations for 
L8/L10 and before those for L9/L11.
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Step 4: Calculate overload level fo r SCPs.
For all SCPs i , where i denotes an arbitrary SCP, do:
/ /  Calculate overload level using the processor utilisation measurement.
If  Pscpj > Pupper > where p SCP i is the utilisation o f SCP i and p,IPI,F^  is the upper threshold 
for SCP utilisation during overload, then:
^  °scpj < ° m a x  »where o ^ p , is the overload level o f SCP i for iteration interval and 
oxux is the maximum SCP overload level, then:
Set o ^ p j  = oSCPj  + 1 .
If PXp¿0n)K Plower’ where p mwER is the lower threshold for SCP utilisation during 
overload, then:
If  oSCP i > 0 then:
Set o ^ p ' = oscp j — 1.
Step 5: Calculate overload status of links.
For all links /:
/ /  Calculate link overload status according to the International Option MTP procedures.
If  9 / ( 0  > ^ onset and o i  = FALSE, where D0SSEJ is the link overload onset threshold in bits, 
then:
Set oi = TRUE.
If qi(t„)<DABATE and o, = TRUE, where DA,UTE is the link overload abatement threshold in 
bits, then:
Set o, = FALSE.
Step 6: Calculate TFC generation rates.
For all UPs u do:
For all UPs u ' , where w'* u , do:
Set V » ,  ( O  = 0-0-
For all UPs u do:
For all UPs u' , where u '*  u , do:
For all links / do:
Brendan Jennings Page A 12 31/05/01
Appendix A: Specification o f  SS.7/IN Quasi-Analytic Model
/ /  Generate TFCs in proportion to processed messages fo r  overloaded links.
If  O; = TRUE then:
Set
N  J=I Bj
where one TFC message is generated for every N  messages destined for a UP at 
the overloaded link.
/ /  The UP models calculate the number o f  service-related messages o f  various types they have 
/ /  received d iving  the current iteration interval and generate the appropriate response 
/ /  messages. They also calculate the number o f  Cls and ACG messages they receive and use 
/ /  these to update their load levels and gapping parameters as appropriate. These procedures 
/ /  are detailed in § A .l and  §A.2.
Go to Step 2.
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